Australia confronts China's nuclear submarine missile

Australia’s Foreign Minister Penny Wong is set to deliver a speech warning China that Australia will not be “bullied” by what Canberra describes as “provocative” actions, as it builds out its military and nuclear arsenal. The immediate trigger is Beijing’s recent test of a nuclear-capable submarine-launched ballistic missile — a capability demonstration that directly alters the underwater deterrence balance in the Indo-Pacific. Wong’s speech represents a notable escalation in Australian diplomatic language: Canberra has historically been more cautious than Washington or London in its public characterisations of Chinese military behaviour, reflecting the economic dependence on trade with China that has long constrained Australian foreign policy. The timing — occurring while the United States is engaged in a shooting war with Iran — is itself significant, suggesting Canberra is managing the risk that American attention and resources are simultaneously drawn in multiple directions.

The received wisdom

The progressive and realist-left critique of Australian defence posture would frame Wong’s speech as needlessly provocative — a form of megaphone diplomacy that risks angering China without altering its behaviour, conducted by a government that is simultaneously spending billions on AUKUS submarines while publicly lecturing Beijing on militarisation. The argument continues: Australia has little independent capacity to deter Chinese power projection in any meaningful timeframe; the AUKUS submarines will not arrive for over a decade; and antagonising the country that buys roughly a third of Australian exports for a security guarantee that remains theoretical is poor statecraft. Some within Australia’s own foreign policy community have argued for a more “hedging” posture — maintaining the US alliance while keeping economic and diplomatic lines to Beijing open.

There is a realist version of the same critique: frank public condemnation feels good but changes nothing, and China’s strategic calculus in the Pacific is driven by its assessment of American resolve, not Australian rhetoric.

A different read

The realist-hedging argument, however understandable as a description of past Australian policy, misreads both the strategic moment and the logic of deterrence.

Australia’s decision to join AUKUS — announced in September 2021 under Scott Morrison, and maintained and expanded by the Albanese Labor government since — already marked a fundamental strategic choice: that Australia’s security in a contest with China required deep integration with Anglo-American nuclear-powered submarine capability, not accommodation with Beijing. The AUKUS commitment was itself the major decision; the diplomatic language that followed is merely consistent with it. A country that signs up for nuclear-powered submarines but publicly downplays the Chinese behaviour that made them necessary would be engaged in a form of strategic incoherence.

More substantively: the submarine-launched ballistic missile test that prompted Wong’s speech matters. China’s expansion of its sea-based nuclear deterrent capability represents a qualitative shift in its strategic posture. For decades, Chinese nuclear doctrine emphasised minimum deterrence — a relatively small arsenal, maintained at low readiness, not deployed on submarines in combat-ready configurations. That posture is changing. The People’s Liberation Army Navy is expanding its Type 094 Jin-class SSBN fleet and is reportedly developing a new-generation Type 096. A nuclear-capable SLBM test is not a routine military exercise; it is a signal about the hardening of Chinese second-strike capability. Australia — and Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines — have every right and strategic interest to note this publicly.

The hedging critique also underestimates what happened to the economic dependence argument. From 2020 onwards, China imposed informal trade sanctions on Australian barley, coal, wine, beef, and lobster in response to Canberra calling for an inquiry into the origins of COVID-19. The Australian economy absorbed these sanctions more resilently than most expected — partly because coal prices rose, partly because alternative markets were found for wine and barley. The lesson Canberra drew — correctly — was that the economic lever had been overstated. China’s trade dependence on Australia (iron ore, LNG) is at least as asymmetric as Australia’s dependence on Chinese import markets. The constraints on frank Australian strategic language have loosened as that experience has been absorbed.

The bigger question is what “won’t be bullied” actually commits Australia to doing. Speeches are cheap. The real test of Australian strategic seriousness comes in three areas: the pace and funding of AUKUS delivery, the willingness to host American nuclear-capable assets under enhanced force posture arrangements, and the degree to which Australia participates in — rather than merely endorses — freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. Wong’s speech marks a rhetorical threshold. Whether it is followed by matching operational commitments will determine whether Beijing treats it as a credible signal or a domestic political performance.

The United States, currently fighting a war in the Middle East and pressing Congress for another $67 billion in supplemental war funding, is not in a position to devote sustained attention to the Pacific. Australia, Japan, and South Korea are consequently being asked to do more with less American bandwidth. That is the real strategic context for Wong’s speech: it is as much a message to Washington (“we are stepping up”) as it is to Beijing.

What to watch

  • AUKUS delivery timeline: any acceleration or delay in the schedule for Virginia-class submarine transfer and Australian SSN construction will indicate whether the strategic commitment has material substance.
  • Force posture negotiations: whether Australia agrees to enhanced basing arrangements for American B-52s or nuclear-capable surface vessels will be a concrete indicator of how far Canberra is willing to go.
  • Chinese economic response: Beijing has used trade pressure before; watch for any informal restriction on Australian iron ore or LNG exports as a signal of displeasure.
  • Japan and South Korea reactions: whether Tokyo and Seoul publicly associate themselves with Wong’s language will determine whether the speech represents a multilateral Indo-Pacific position or an Australian outlier.

— J