Israel controls 70% of Gaza nine months on

Nine months after the United States brokered a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, Israeli forces now control nearly 70 percent of Gaza, up from roughly half at the time the agreement was signed, according to NPR’s reporting. Israeli forces have pushed deeper into the territory through the ceasefire period, establishing military zones that now encompass the majority of the coastal enclave. Al Jazeera reported separately that hospital workers were wounded in an Israeli drone strike on Gaza’s Kamal Adwan facility, part of a continuing pattern of strikes within ostensibly civilian infrastructure. Meanwhile, The Guardian published testimony from aid workers accusing the IDF of a “field execution” of a Palestinian driver attempting to bring humanitarian supplies into the territory. The cumulative picture is of a ceasefire that has halted major combat operations while enabling a steady expansion of Israeli military and territorial presence.

The received wisdom

The standard liberal-internationalist reading of this situation is one of undisguised horror: a ceasefire is being used as cover for what amounts to incremental annexation, the civilian population is being strangled, and the United States—as the deal’s broker—bears moral and political responsibility for outcomes it either anticipated and accepted or naively failed to anticipate. Human rights organisations have raised alarm. European governments have grown increasingly vocal. The UN framework is strained. The argument from this camp is that international law means nothing if the world’s most powerful democracy acts as diplomatic cover for a belligerent that is systematically expanding its foothold in a territory it was supposed to be withdrawing from, or at least holding at bay.

This is a serious argument. It deserves to be engaged rather than dismissed.

A different read

And yet the received wisdom elides several important complications that a clear-eyed analysis requires confronting.

Begin with the ceasefire itself. The agreement was structured, from Israel’s perspective, not as a path to Palestinian statehood or even to Israeli withdrawal, but as a mechanism to neutralise Hamas’s military capacity while creating conditions for hostage recovery. Israel has never publicly committed to a post-conflict political settlement that does not involve its military maintaining security control over at least portions of Gaza. To accuse Israel of violating the spirit of a ceasefire whose terms never specified a withdrawal timetable is to accuse it of not making promises it never made.

The harder question, which neither progressive nor conservative commentary adequately addresses, is: what actually replaces Hamas as a governing force? The Palestinian Authority is dysfunctional, deeply unpopular in Gaza, and would almost certainly be unable to maintain order in territory it entered on the back of an Israeli military operation. The Arab states that have been most vocal about Palestinian suffering—Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia—have consistently refused to absorb significant Palestinian refugee populations or to take responsibility for post-conflict governance. The international community has been willing to demand an Israeli withdrawal but conspicuously unwilling to propose a credible security and governance architecture for the day after.

This does not justify every Israeli military action. The Guardian’s reporting on the alleged field execution of an aid driver is precisely the kind of incident that demands accountability regardless of the strategic context. Individual violations of the laws of war cannot be laundered through geopolitical argument.

But the 70 percent territorial control figure, cited with alarm by commentators, demands a more textured response than simple condemnation. Control of territory in an active counterinsurgency is not equivalent to annexation in the legal or political sense; Israel has not extended Israeli law to these areas, has not begun settlement construction, and continues to state publicly that it seeks a post-conflict governance solution. The gap between those stated intentions and the reality on the ground is disturbing and widening. NPR noted that the progression from 50 percent to nearly 70 percent has accelerated even as nominal ceasefire conditions persist. At some point, the distinction between temporary military control and de facto annexation dissolves.

The historical analogy that haunts this situation is not Nazi occupation, as maximalist critics reach for, but something more mundane and more instructive: the West Bank, where a “temporary” military administration established in 1967 has now lasted nearly sixty years, with the temporary settlement infrastructure gradually acquiring permanence simply through the passage of time and the absence of political will to reverse it. The Gaza ceasefire, absent a political settlement, is on a similar trajectory.

The uncomfortable conclusion is that the ceasefire without a political framework has served primarily Israeli strategic interests while leaving the Palestinian population in a condition of indefinite military administration, not liberation, and not even the clarity of formal annexation. That outcome was not inevitable—it required decisions by multiple parties, including Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, the United States, and Israel’s government—but it is the outcome that has arrived.

What to watch

Four signals matter most now. First, whether the United States deploys meaningful diplomatic pressure on Israel to define a post-conflict governance timeline—the absence of such pressure is itself a policy choice. Second, whether Arab states—particularly Egypt and Jordan—shift from rhetoric about Palestinian rights to concrete governance proposals. Third, whether the International Court of Justice proceedings, already underway, produce binding orders that alter the diplomatic calculus. Fourth, whether Israel’s domestic politics—Knesset dynamics, settler faction influence, coalition stability—permit any government to make the concessions a durable settlement would require. Without movement on at least two of these fronts, the 70 percent will quietly become 80, then 90.

— J