President Donald Trump has removed the remaining independent members of the Federal Election Commission, the body responsible for enforcing campaign finance law in the United States, according to Al Jazeera. The dismissals leave the FEC effectively without commissioners as Trump simultaneously presses for sweeping changes to federal voting rules. The agency, which was designed by Congress after the Watergate scandal to operate independently of presidential interference, is now vacant. Without a quorum, the FEC cannot conduct enforcement actions, issue advisory opinions, or certify election expenditure data. The Trump administration has not announced nominee replacements, leaving the commission in regulatory limbo at a moment when campaign finance enforcement would ordinarily be ramping up ahead of the 2026 midterms.
The received wisdom
The mainstream response to this development will be straightforwardly alarmed, and not without reason. The FEC was deliberately structured with bipartisan commissioners and supermajority voting requirements precisely to prevent any single administration from capturing it. Removing the final independent members—regardless of their party affiliation—strips away a guardrail that has existed, however imperfectly, since 1974. The concern is direct: without an FEC capable of adjudicating complaints, campaign finance law becomes effectively unenforceable during the vacancy. Dark money, foreign political donations, coordination violations—all become harder to police. For those who see Trump as a would-be authoritarian, this move fits a pattern of dismantling independent oversight institutions, from the civil service to the judiciary’s administrative apparatus. This is a serious concern and deserves to be engaged with honestly.
A different read
But here is what the alarm misses, or what it chooses not to say aloud: the FEC was already largely dysfunctional before Trump touched it.
For years—across both Republican and Democratic administrations—the commission deadlocked with near-clockwork regularity along partisan lines. The six-member, three-and-three structure that was supposed to produce bipartisan consensus instead produced paralysis. By the late 2010s, former FEC chairpersons were openly describing the agency as broken. Major violations went unpunished not because of White House interference but because Republican and Democratic commissioners simply voted in lockstep with their party’s political interests. The FEC’s dysfunction was not Trump’s invention; he has merely administered the coup de grâce to an institution that had been hollowing out for a generation.
That observation does not excuse what Trump has done. Removing the final commissioners without appointing replacements—rather than reforming the commission’s structure—is a nakedly cynical act of institutional vandalism. But the progressive response, which tends to treat the pre-Trump FEC as a functioning watchdog that only needs to be restored, is also analytically dishonest. Restoration to the status quo ante is not a solution; it is a return to deadlock.
There is a deeper point here about American democratic institutions more broadly. The United States built its regulatory architecture on the assumption of good faith from both parties—that partisans in quasi-independent bodies would subordinate factional interests to institutional mission. That assumption has been falsified repeatedly over the past three decades. The FEC is only the most egregious example. The lesson is not simply that Trump is bad; it is that institutions without genuine enforcement mechanisms and structural incentives for nonpartisanship are vulnerable to capture or paralysis whenever the political climate is sufficiently polarised.
Conservative commentators who shrug at this development—reasoning that the left has its own record of institutional manipulation—are making a mirror-image error to the progressives they mock. Democratic self-government requires refereed elections. The FEC’s specific design was flawed, but the function it was meant to serve—ensuring that money in politics operates under known and enforced rules—is not a progressive luxury. It is a precondition for the kind of ordered political competition that any constitutional conservative should want to preserve.
What is striking is the timing. This move comes as Al Jazeera reported that Trump is simultaneously pressing for broad changes to US voting rules. An administration that is rewriting election law while dismantling the body that enforces existing campaign finance law is concentrating political power in ways that ought to concern anyone who values rule of law over partisan advantage.
History offers a sobering parallel. In Hungary, Viktor Orbán did not dissolve democratic institutions all at once; he staffed them with loyalists, drained them of enforcement power, and allowed procedural legitimacy to serve as cover for partisan capture. The American system has stronger constitutional buffers. But buffers are not infinite, and institutional trust, once eroded, is extraordinarily difficult to rebuild.
What to watch
Three signals to monitor. First, whether Trump nominates FEC replacements before the 2026 midterm cycle moves into its active phase—the character of those nominations will reveal whether this is institutional reform or permanent capture. Second, whether Congress moves to restructure the FEC given that both parties have suffered from its paralysis; bipartisan reform legislation has been proposed before and has always failed. Third, whether federal courts will entertain legal challenges to actions taken by political campaigns during the period of FEC vacancy—the absence of enforcement may create retrospective litigation risk for both parties. The FEC’s vacancy is a legal and democratic lacuna; how long it persists will tell us much about the health of American institutions.
— J