Iran buries Khamenei, but not its ambitions

Iran buried its Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on July 10 in his hometown of Mashhad, following a week of state funeral ceremonies that began in Tehran on July 4. Khamenei, who had led the Islamic Republic since 1989, was killed earlier this year in an airstrike in circumstances the regime still blames on American and Israeli co-ordination. The burial concluded a remarkable spectacle of regime-orchestrated grief, with millions bused in for official mourning events. Yet even as the casket was lowered into the ground, the machinery of succession — which Iran’s constitution vests in an 88-member Assembly of Experts — was already grinding. The new Supreme Leader will inherit a state simultaneously at war, under sanction, and facing its most serious internal legitimacy crisis since 2009.

The received wisdom

The mainstream reading of Khamenei’s death and its aftermath is broadly optimistic about change. The argument runs as follows: Khamenei was the last of the revolutionary generation, a man personally shaped by 1979 who had steered Iran toward adventurism and repression for thirty-five years. His removal by force — however it occurred — combined with the economic ruination wrought by years of sanctions, creates a genuine opening. A pragmatist successor, the argument goes, would have every incentive to negotiate a durable nuclear deal, dial back the IRGC’s regional proxy network, and accept the kind of détente with the Gulf states that the Abraham Accords generation glimpsed. Western policymakers and liberal commentators have pointed to figures within the clerical establishment who favour engagement over confrontation, and argued that ordinary Iranians — exhausted by inflation, power cuts, and perpetual crisis — would welcome a government willing to trade ideology for prosperity.

This is not an absurd position. Successionist moments do sometimes produce liberalisation: Spain after Franco, the Soviet Union after Stalin’s death, even Saudi Arabia after King Salman’s consolidation. The structural incentives for reform are real.

A different read

The problem is that Iran’s succession mechanics are specifically designed to prevent exactly the kind of break that optimists anticipate. The Assembly of Experts, which formally selects the next Supreme Leader, is itself vetted by the Guardian Council, which is itself composed of figures appointed under Khamenei’s direction. The system is a set of concentric circles of regime loyalty, engineered over decades to reproduce itself. Any figure heterodox enough to satisfy Western hopes for détente would, almost by definition, have been filtered out of the candidate pool long before reaching this moment.

More importantly, the IRGC’s declaration of the Strait of Hormuz as closed — issued in the days following Khamenei’s burial — tells us something important about where real power now sits. The Revolutionary Guard is not waiting for a clerical consensus. It is establishing facts on the ground, signalling to both domestic rivals and foreign adversaries that it retains the coercive capacity to set Iran’s terms. Whoever becomes the next Supreme Leader will owe the IRGC their position; the IRGC’s appetite for regional influence, lucrative sanctions-busting enterprises, and institutional self-preservation will not be negotiable.

The Guardian’s reporting on the July 9 exchanges — described as the largest retaliatory strikes since the June ceasefire memorandum — illustrates the rhythm of escalation that has characterised this conflict. Each action begets a counter-action; each ceasefire is an armistice waiting to be broken. The succession vacuum may actually accelerate this cycle, since ambitious factions within the regime have every incentive to demonstrate toughness before a new leader is confirmed.

There is a deeper historical pattern worth noting here. When revolutionary states lose their founding or second-generation leaders, the result is rarely liberalisation in the near term. It is more typically a period of factional warfare and overreach, as competing hardliners prove their credentials. The Soviet Union after Lenin produced Stalin. The PRC after Mao produced Hua Guofeng’s brief interlude before Deng’s restructuring — but Deng’s opening took a decade to produce genuine liberalisation, and it was driven by economic catastrophe, not ideology. Iran’s clerical-military complex has insulated itself against exactly the kind of elite defection that economic failure normally produces in authoritarian states: the IRGC has too many financial interests, too many families with skin in the game, to permit a managed transition away from the system.

The West, and the United States in particular, faces a genuine strategic dilemma here. Offering early engagement with a successor regime might encourage pragmatists; it might equally be exploited by hardliners as a sign of weakness at the moment they most need to project strength. Maintaining maximum pressure sustains the economic incentives for change but forecloses the diplomatic channels through which change might actually arrive. Neither path is obviously correct, which is precisely why the Biden-era oscillation between maximum pressure and nuclear diplomacy produced so little.

What to watch

— The Assembly of Experts’ timeline: Iran’s constitution requires a new Supreme Leader to be selected without undue delay. Watch for signals from Qom’s senior clerics about which candidates are gathering support — Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s Iraqi network, despite being external, will have an indirect influence on Iranian clerical opinion.

— IRGC operational tempo: If the Guard stages additional provocations in Hormuz or activates Lebanese Hezbollah to a higher tempo before a new leader is confirmed, it will confirm that the succession vacuum is emboldening rather than restraining the military wing.

— Sanctions architecture: The US and European response to the July 9 strikes will determine whether the economic pressure on Iran’s new leadership begins at maximum intensity or whether there is deliberate space left for a deal.

— Russian and Chinese positioning: Both Moscow and Beijing have material interests in an Iran that is isolated enough to need their patronage but functional enough to sell oil. Their engagement with prospective successors will be a leading indicator of the new regime’s likely alignment.

— J