The ceasefire that the United States and Iran reached last month is, by every credible account, at the point of collapse. On Saturday night, US forces struck roughly 140 targets inside Iran, hitting missile and drone sites, naval facilities, ammunition depots, communication networks, and surveillance infrastructure — a strike package that, in scale and ambition, far exceeded anything undertaken in the earlier round of exchanges. Iran responded by claiming to have intercepted some projectiles over Qeshm Island and by insisting that the Strait of Hormuz remained functionally closed to US-backed shipping. President Trump rejected that characterisation; the BBC reported that the US insists the strait remains open even as shipping traffic plunged. Tehran’s foreign ministry declared diplomacy “futile.” The ceasefire, never formally ratified, may not survive the week.
The received wisdom
The dominant reading among Western foreign policy analysts is broadly sympathetic to American resolve while remaining anxious about escalation. The logic runs as follows: Iran is a revisionist power that has spent decades constructing an asymmetric threat architecture — proxy militias, ballistic missiles, naval harassment — specifically designed to impose costs on US and allied interests below the threshold of open war. The ceasefire, under this reading, was a tactical pause exploited by Tehran to buy time, resupply, and reassert its claims over the strait. Washington’s renewed strikes represent a necessary and proportionate response to Iranian bad faith. The Hormuz passage carries approximately a fifth of global oil and gas trade, and allowing any power to charge tolls for its use would set a catastrophic precedent for freedom of navigation. The humanitarian costs are real and regrettable, but the alternative — appeasement of Iranian coercion — would invite worse behaviour later.
This is not an unreasonable position. Deterrence theory genuinely does require that threats be credible, and there is a plausible argument that the partial ceasefire emboldened Tehran rather than restraining it. The case for pushing back is real.
A different read
And yet something about the current trajectory ought to trouble even hawks who believe American power should be used decisively. The United States is conducting what amounts to a sustained air campaign against a country of 90 million people with a functional — if battered — state, a coherent ideology, and a strategic position it regards as existential. This is not Libya in 2011 or Syria in 2018. It is a different order of problem.
Begin with the historical analogy that the administration seems to be reaching for: the 1986 strike on Libya, Operation El Dorado Canyon, which was presented as a decisive blow against Gaddafi’s state-sponsored terrorism. Libya did reduce its terrorist activity in the years that followed, but the causal story is contested — Gaddafi’s behaviour shifted partly because of economic pressure, partly because his domestic position required it, and partly because of sustained intelligence operations that ran alongside the military campaign. The air strikes alone, most analysts now concede, did not “solve” Libya; they were one instrument among several over many years. The administration appears to be treating a far more complex target with a similar confidence in kinetic solutions.
Second, consider the Hormuz fees proposal. Iran’s demand for a permanent navigation fee — floated in Muscat talks with Oman as an intermediary — is strategically coherent, however legally grotesque. The Guardian reports that Europe is studying whether optional fees, backed by the UN maritime agency, might be workable, with UK Deputy PM David Lammy warning that mandatory tolls would be “disastrous.” That European capitals are even entertaining this conversation suggests the de facto leverage Tehran has acquired. You do not study the terms of an adversary’s extortion unless you believe you may eventually have to pay. Every week of strikes that fails to force an unconditional Iranian stand-down makes the eventual diplomatic settlement more expensive for the West, not less.
Third, there is the question of regime incentives. The Islamic Republic is not a rational unitary actor in the game-theoretic sense, but its leadership class does respond to perceived threats to its survival. A regime that believes it is fighting for existence is not more likely to concede; it is more likely to harden, to accelerate whatever latent nuclear ambitions remain, and to activate the network of proxies it has cultivated for precisely this contingency. Al Jazeera’s analysis notes that the ceasefire is “falling apart” — that is a diplomatic assessment, not merely a military one, and it carries the implication that the party walking away from negotiation is not behaving as a defeated power behaves.
Finally, the domestic political economy in Tehran. The strikes are, counterintuitively, useful to the Iranian hardline establishment. They crowd out reformist voices, they justify emergency measures, they allow the government to frame popular grievance as externally imposed rather than self-inflicted. Nixon’s bombing of Cambodia did not break the Viet Cong’s will; it reinforced Cambodian neutrality arguments and ultimately cost the US the moral high ground it needed to sustain the war. There is a lesson in that trajectory for anyone willing to read it.
None of this is to argue for accepting Iranian dominion over the Hormuz Strait. Freedom of navigation matters. Iranian nuclear ambitions matter. The network of proxies attacking US allies matters. But there is a difference between a coherent strategy that uses force as one instrument among many — with clear red lines, defined off-ramps, and a diplomatic end-state — and a military campaign whose logic seems to be that more strikes will eventually produce an Iranian collapse. History does not offer many examples of that second approach succeeding.
What to watch
Watch whether the Gulf states — particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, whose oil infrastructure sits squarely within Iranian missile range — begin making private overtures to Tehran regardless of Washington’s posture. If Riyadh and Abu Dhabi start hedging, the American coalition starts fracturing. Second, watch the oil price and shipping insurance market: if tanker rates spike to 2019 Gulf crisis highs, the economic pain will force the issue diplomatically faster than any strike package. Third, watch whether the Muscat channel reopens. Oman has played this role before; if Omani diplomacy revives, it will signal that both sides still see an off-ramp. Fourth, watch congressional voices — there is a bipartisan group of senators who believe a formal authorisation for the use of military force is required. Their argument is constitutionally sound, and their political weight will determine whether this remains a presidential war or becomes a national one.
— J