Hungary’s parliament voted on 13 July to remove President Tamás Sulyok from office through a constitutional amendment — the most dramatic institutional power move since Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s Tisza Party swept Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz–KDNP government in a landslide in April 2026. Sulyok, an Orbán appointee and ally, had resisted Magyar’s earlier pressure to resign. The new government then pursued the constitutional route: Magyar, holding a supermajority in the National Assembly, amended the constitution to terminate Sulyok’s mandate. The move was contested by the Hungarian opposition remnants and drew criticism from legal scholars who argued that while technically legal within Hungary’s amended constitutional framework, it set a troubling precedent for using parliamentary supermajorities as instruments of institutional renovation rather than deliberative governance.
The received wisdom
The liberal-internationalist framing of Magyar’s election was one of democratic restoration. After a decade of Orbán’s illiberal consolidation — the packing of courts, the emasculation of independent media, the rewriting of electoral rules to entrench Fidesz — the incoming Tisza government was cast as a corrective. Removing a president installed by the previous illiberal regime is, in this reading, a housecleaning exercise rather than a power grab: reversing the damage done by Orbán’s own constitutional revisions. Major European outlets and Brussels officials largely applauded the election result; the EU has already signalled a warming of relations after years of Article 7 disputes and frozen cohesion funds. The constitutional amendment ousting Sulyok is seen as an unfortunate but necessary step to break the institutional deadlock Orbán had engineered to outlast any single electoral defeat.
A different read
The “democratic restoration” framing deserves more scepticism than it is currently receiving. Magyar’s Hungary has now demonstrated that a supermajority can be used to remove a sitting president through constitutional revision rather than impeachment, trial, or election. The mechanism may differ from Orbán’s methods, but the underlying principle — that institutions inconvenient to the governing party can be restructured away — is identical. Democracy is not merely a set of outcomes that the right people win; it is a set of procedural constraints that bind even majorities who believe themselves to be in the right.
Reuters reported that Sulyok was removed in what was described as a “power shake-up.” The language is revealing: this is a shake-up, not a restoration. The Weimar-to-Hitler analogy is overused, but the interwar Central European pattern of democratic governments using constitutional mechanics to entrench power — and then finding that the precedents they set could be turned against them — is relevant. Hungary’s constitutional architecture was already badly deformed by Orbán; Magyar is not healing it so much as reorienting it toward different beneficiaries.
There is also the question of what Magyar’s “Manchesterism”-equivalent is: he ran on an anti-corruption, pro-EU platform, but the Le Monde analysis noted that the constitutional amendment process was “contested” even within Magyar’s own coalition. Removing a president is visible. Building the institutional independence, judicial culture, and civil society infrastructure that would make Hungary’s democracy robust across multiple electoral cycles is much harder, slower, and less photogenic.
The EU’s rapid warming toward Magyar’s government is understandable — Orbán was a genuine thorn — but Brussels should be careful not to validate constitutional hardball simply because this time the team wielding it is more congenial. The precedent travels. A future Hungarian government — one less committed to liberalism — can now point to Magyar’s amendment as proof that presidential removal by parliamentary supermajority is part of Hungary’s constitutional repertoire. What is established as legitimate cannot easily be declared illegitimate the next time it is used.
What to watch
Who replaces Sulyok — and whether the new president is given genuine independence or installed as a Magyar loyalist — will be the first real test of whether this is reform or reorientation. EU cohesion funds, frozen during the Orbán era, are expected to be unfrozen; watch whether conditionality requirements are actually met or quietly waived in the Brussels–Budapest rapprochement. The Hungarian Constitutional Court was heavily packed by Orbán; Magyar has not announced whether he intends to reform it, which will determine whether rule of law is restored or merely redirected. And watch whether other Central European governments with emerging supermajorities — look at Poland’s ongoing institutional battles — cite Hungary as a model.
— J