The United States launched its seventh consecutive night of airstrikes against Iran on July 17, targeting what the Pentagon described as military infrastructure and command nodes. Iran disputed the characterisation, with officials claiming civilian sites had been struck. Meanwhile, the Strait of Hormuz conflict continues to raise risks for global shipping lanes, with tanker traffic through the world’s most critical oil chokepoint severely disrupted. A second tanker was hijacked near Yemen by suspected Somali pirates this week — the second incident in three months — compounding the maritime security crisis radiating from the Gulf. Iran, despite suffering repeated strikes, has demonstrated it can still inflict damage, using asymmetric naval capabilities and proxy networks to keep its adversaries off balance.
The received wisdom
The dominant Western reading of these strikes is straightforward: Iran began this confrontation by threatening closure of Hormuz, the US responded proportionately with precision airpower, and the campaign is gradually degrading Iranian military capacity to the point where Tehran must either negotiate or face strategic collapse. Liberal internationalists add a normative gloss — the rules-based order demands that no state hold global energy markets hostage, and American power is the indispensable enforcer. Progressive hawks argue that, provided civilian casualties are minimised, this is exactly the kind of muscular multilateralism that keeps sea lanes free for all.
There is also a domestic political reading: Trump, critics will note, entered office promising to end wars, yet finds himself conducting the most sustained US air campaign since the early years of the Iraq War. The left frames this as proof that hawkish advisors and Israeli pressure inevitably drag any administration back into the Middle Eastern vortex, regardless of campaign rhetoric.
Both framings share an unstated assumption: that sufficient bombing eventually produces a coercive result.
A different read
History counsels scepticism. The literature on strategic bombing and coercion is large and largely sobering. Robert Pape’s Bombing to Win — still the most systematic treatment — found that air campaigns rarely coerce determined adversaries into policy capitulation unless they threaten the regime’s physical survival or are paired with credible ground force. Iran’s clerical leadership has survived four decades of sanctions, proxy wars, and now open bombardment. There is little in the current trajectory to suggest that night eight, or night twenty-eight, will produce a different calculus in Tehran.
The Hormuz problem is structurally vexed. The strait is roughly 33 kilometres wide at its narrowest point and flanked by Iranian territory on the northern shore. Mines, anti-ship missiles, and fast-boat swarms do not require sophisticated command infrastructure — they can be pre-positioned, decentralised, and operated by units whose destruction changes nothing at the operational level. The US Air Force can eliminate radar installations and missile batteries. It cannot, from altitude, clear the sea of a threat that has already been distributed.
The civilian infrastructure question matters too. Washington denied hitting civilian sites even as reporting described strikes on an Iranian airport and bridges. If dual-use infrastructure — ports, transport nodes, power grids — is genuinely being targeted, the campaign is edging toward the kind of economic coercion that historically prolongs rather than resolves conflicts, radicalising civilian populations while doing little to change elite decision-making. The lesson of Yugoslavia in 1999 is not a clean template: NATO’s bombing campaign there was accompanied by the imminent credible threat of ground invasion, a factor absent here.
Then there is the Israeli dimension. JD Vance made waves last week by accusing Israel of “manipulating” US public opinion to prolong the Iran conflict. Whether or not that characterisation is fair, it points to a real alliance-management problem: the US and Israel have overlapping but distinct strategic interests. Israel wants Iranian nuclear and missile capacity permanently degraded; the US wants Hormuz reopened and oil prices stabilised. Those objectives may require different campaign designs and different endpoints, and conflating them produces a strategy that satisfies neither.
The maritime piracy dimension is easy to overlook but significant. The reappearance of Somali piracy near Yemen — dormant for years after robust international naval patrols — suggests that when major powers concentrate their naval assets on a single confrontation, the broader commons suffer. This is the classic problem of hegemonic overextension in miniature: suppressing one maritime threat provides cover for others.
What to watch
- Hormuz transit data: Tanker traffic throughput numbers from Lloyd’s and the EIA will be the cleanest real-time indicator of whether the campaign is achieving its primary stated goal.
- Iranian negotiating signals: Tehran has consistently paired military resistance with back-channel diplomacy. Watch for Omani or Qatari intermediary activity as an early indicator that Tehran is probing for an off-ramp.
- Congressional pressure: Sustained air campaigns without an AUMF are legally fragile. Democrats and some Republicans may invoke the War Powers Resolution — particularly if civilian casualty reporting accumulates.
- Saudi and UAE positioning: Gulf states have strong incentives to prevent Hormuz from remaining closed. Their private communications with both Washington and Tehran are the most important variable most analysts cannot see.
— J