The United States military carried out its tenth consecutive night of strikes against Iran on Monday, according to BBC News, after President Trump vowed that Iran would pay “many times over” for the deaths of three American service members. The Pentagon identified two of the fallen as 1st Lt. Tyler James Feehan, 25, of Ewa Beach, Hawaii, and Pvt. Isabella Gonzales, 19, of Carrollton, Texas, killed in an Iranian strike on Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan. A third died in a controlled detonation of an Iranian drone in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region. Iran, for its part, targeted electricity installations and water desalination plants in Kuwait, struck near the port of Aqaba in Jordan, and claimed to have disabled two oil tankers attempting to transit the Strait of Hormuz without its permission. Oil prices climbed above $90 a barrel for benchmark crude. Iran’s President Pezeshkian declared his country was now fighting a “full-scale war” with the United States — even as Tehran said diplomatic back-channels remained open through intermediaries.
The received wisdom
The mainstream reading of this conflict is essentially sympathetic to a negotiated solution and suspicious of the military escalation ladder. The ceasefire that collapsed — apparently over the precise wording of a memorandum of understanding on the Strait of Hormuz — represented a genuine diplomatic achievement, so the argument goes, and Trump’s instinct to punish Iran for every provocation only makes a return to the table less likely. The deaths of young American soldiers are being used, critics suggest, as domestic political fuel: a way to keep the hawkish Republican base energised and to forestall any questioning of why the US is fighting a war that Congress never formally authorised. The human cost on the Iranian side — NPR reports that Iran claims at least 3,000 Iranians killed, including 168 children in a school strike whose circumstances remain under US review — adds moral weight to the case for restraint. The humanitarian argument is serious. A great power that strikes water desalination plants and then has its own strikes on a girls’ school investigated for civilian casualties is not operating in a morally clean space.
A different read
Grant all of that — and then notice what it leaves out.
The deaths of Feehan and Gonzales are not merely political inputs to be weighed against diplomatic optics. They are a concrete demonstration of Iranian willingness to kill American service members on sovereign-allied territory. The strike on Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan — a country that is not a belligerent, whose population is overwhelmingly hostile to both the US and Israel, and whose government has struggled to manage the domestic political fallout — represents a significant expansion of the geographic scope of the conflict. Jordan is not Iraq, where a degree of ambiguity about militia-versus-state action has always existed. This was an Iranian missile strike on a Jordanian military installation hosting US forces. Jordan’s military confirmed shooting down three Iranian missiles the same night.
The Iran-Hormuz confrontation has historical echoes worth keeping in mind. The Tanker War of 1987–88 — which is the most relevant precedent — was ultimately resolved not by diplomatic patience but by the US Navy’s Operation Earnest Will and, decisively, Operation Praying Mantis in April 1988, in which American forces destroyed roughly half of Iran’s operational naval capacity in a single day. That military demonstration, not the preceding years of half-measures, was what brought Ayatollah Khomeini to accept a ceasefire with Iraq and eventually pull back from the Gulf confrontation. The lesson is uncomfortable for those who prefer a neat diplomatic arc: sometimes a credible show of force is what creates the conditions for negotiation rather than foreclosing them.
The war-powers objection is legitimate as a constitutional matter — Congress has never voted to authorise this conflict — but it sits awkwardly alongside the historical record of presidencies of both parties using military force under claimed executive authority in the Middle East without prior congressional approval. The more pressing question is not whether Trump has the legal authority to fight but whether he has a coherent theory of victory. The answer to that is genuinely unclear. Destroying Iran’s Hormuz interdiction capability is an achievable military objective. Preventing Iran from reconstituting that capability over time, absent a political settlement that addresses the underlying dispute over Iranian nuclear ambitions and regional influence, is not. The risk of the current approach is that it succeeds tactically while failing strategically — degrading Iran’s near-term capacity to close the strait while hardening the regime’s internal position and discrediting whatever Iranian moderates might otherwise be inclined toward accommodation.
Oil above $90 a barrel matters more than any battlefield development in terms of the conflict’s political durability in the United States. American consumers are already carrying the inflationary hangover of the Iran war in their energy bills and grocery receipts. The administration’s political coalition, which includes people who drive trucks and heat homes with oil, has a tolerance for foreign wars that is elastic but not unlimited. The question of whether Trump is managing this conflict with a view to a negotiated endgame — or simply improvising from one nightly bombing run to the next — is not one the White House has answered clearly.
The back-channel diplomacy that Tehran says is still ongoing is, if genuine, the most important fact in this story. The US-Iran MoU that collapsed was apparently close to agreement on Hormuz transit rules before it fell apart over technical language. That is a frustrating kind of failure — the kind that suggests the gap between the two sides is not fundamentally unbridgeable. But gaps that are not unbridgeable can still remain unbridged for a long time, and during that time, young people like Tyler Feehan and Isabella Gonzales pay the price.
What to watch
- Oil prices: A sustained move above $95 would begin to bite US consumer sentiment in ways that create real domestic political pressure on the administration.
- Jordan’s stability: The monarchy in Amman is under simultaneous pressure from Iranian missiles and from a population bitterly opposed to any association with US-Israeli operations. A domestic crisis in Jordan would complicate the regional picture enormously.
- The school strike review: Whether the US military completes and publishes a full after-action review of the strike on the girls’ school — and what it says — will be a significant indicator of whether the conflict is being conducted with the minimum necessary transparency.
- Back-channel signals: Any leak or indication that Oman or Qatar is actively shuttling messages on the Hormuz MoU should be treated as the most important diplomatic signal in the region.
— J