The United States and Saudi Arabia signed a landmark nuclear cooperation agreement on Wednesday, formalising a framework under which American companies will help the Kingdom develop civilian nuclear power infrastructure, according to BBC News. The deal, confirmed by both the Trump administration and Riyadh, covers the transfer of nuclear technology and expertise under what is formally described as a “123 Agreement” — the section of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act that governs civilian nuclear cooperation with foreign states. The agreement was also confirmed by NPR, which noted that the deal was signed as part of the Trump administration’s broader Gulf outreach, according to NPR. Al Jazeera reported that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had made civilian nuclear capability a strategic priority for his Vision 2030 agenda, framing it as both an energy diversification measure and a marker of national technological ambition, according to Al Jazeera.
The received wisdom
The case for the deal is straightforward and has genuine strategic weight. Saudi Arabia is going to build nuclear power capacity regardless of American involvement — the only question is whether the technology comes from Westinghouse or from Russia’s Rosatom or China’s CNNC. American engagement means American oversight, American safety standards, and American influence over the Kingdom’s nuclear trajectory. It also deepens the bilateral relationship at a moment when the Gulf’s trust in Washington has been tested by a decade of perceived disengagement. A nuclear deal that draws Riyadh closer to Washington’s orbit simultaneously advances non-proliferation goals (American companies insist on full-scope IAEA safeguards) and commercial interests (the US nuclear industry desperately needs export contracts to remain viable). This is, in this framing, exactly the kind of practical statecraft that ideological critics consistently undersell.
There is a reasonable version of this argument. The alternative — Saudi Arabia contracting with Moscow or Beijing for its nuclear infrastructure — would be considerably worse on proliferation grounds, and the argument that “we had no choice” has a basis in the real world of great-power competition.
A different read
The problem with the deal as reported is what it does not appear to contain: a binding commitment from Saudi Arabia to forgo domestic uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing.
These are not technical footnotes. Enrichment and reprocessing are the two pathways to weapons-grade fissile material. The standard “gold standard” 123 Agreement, exemplified by the 2009 US-UAE deal, requires the foreign partner to explicitly renounce enrichment and reprocessing in exchange for American technology. The UAE accepted that constraint. Saudi officials, including Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman himself, have publicly and repeatedly refused to do so. In a 2018 CBS interview, MBS said plainly: if Iran develops a nuclear weapon, “we will follow suit as soon as possible.” That statement was not walked back. It has not been renounced.
The Trump administration’s willingness to proceed with a deal that — based on available reporting — does not contain enrichment renunciation represents a significant departure from decades of American non-proliferation policy. The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty architecture has already been under stress from Iran, North Korea and the perceived double standard over Israel. A Saudi programme that retains the domestic enrichment option would validate the reasoning of every aspiring nuclear state that the NPT rules are negotiable for the right partner.
The historical parallel worth examining is the 1956 Eisenhower administration’s “Atoms for Peace” programme. The instinct then — share civilian nuclear technology broadly to create dependencies on American fuel supply and establish goodwill — produced, among other things, the Iranian research reactor that became one node of Tehran’s subsequent weapons programme. American civilian nuclear exports do not inevitably lead to proliferation; but the conditions attached to those exports are precisely the mechanism that prevents it. Weakening those conditions in exchange for diplomatic warmth is a trade that looks better at the signing ceremony than it does in retrospect.
There is also a regional dynamic to consider. Israel and the Gulf states have spent the past several years edging toward normalisation under the Abraham Accords framework. A Saudi nuclear programme that retains enrichment capability will register in Tel Aviv as an existential threat regardless of American assurances — and Israel has demonstrated in both Syria and Iraq that it is prepared to take unilateral military action against nuclear infrastructure it considers threatening. The deal may therefore not merely risk proliferation; it risks a bilateral crisis with the one Middle Eastern ally whose intelligence and operational cooperation the United States cannot afford to lose in the middle of a war with Iran.
What to watch
Watch the published text of the 123 Agreement when it is submitted to Congress — the enrichment and reprocessing provisions, or their absence, will be the decisive variable. Watch whether the Israel lobby in Congress, which has been largely quiet on this, raises objections during the required legislative review period. Watch whether Iran’s ongoing conflict with the United States prompts Saudi officials to accelerate the enrichment question; the moment the war ends and Iranian enrichment resumes, Riyadh’s internal pressure to match it will intensify. And watch whether Russia and China use this deal to argue that their own nuclear export conditions need not include enrichment renunciation.
— J