Keiko Fujimori was sworn in as Peru’s president on Tuesday after a narrow election victory, becoming the first woman to hold the office and the daughter of the late former President Alberto Fujimori, who ruled Peru from 1990 to 2000. The 51-year-old conservative leader has pledged to fight crime with an “iron fist,” according to NPR, which noted she described herself as a law-and-order candidate throughout the campaign. Keiko Fujimori had previously run for the presidency three times and lost, and had faced her own corruption charges — which she denied — before her political rehabilitation and eventual electoral success. Her father, Alberto Fujimori, died in 2023 after being released from prison on health grounds; he had been convicted of human rights abuses and corruption during his authoritarian presidency.
The received wisdom
The progressive consensus on Keiko Fujimori is deeply sceptical, and not without reason. Her father’s presidency — however effective its early economic stabilisation — ended in a corruption and human rights catastrophe. His intelligence chief, Vladimiro Montesinos, ran a systematic bribery operation that reached into every institution in Peru, and the Fujimori government’s counterinsurgency campaign included extrajudicial killings carried out by the Grupo Colina death squad. Keiko Fujimori’s previous criminal proceedings (later acquitted) and her long advocacy for her father’s release from prison have made her, for many Peruvians and most international human rights organisations, a figure who represents the darkest chapter of the country’s recent history. The mainstream view holds that her electoral success is a warning sign about the fragility of Latin American democracy and the degree to which economic insecurity and crime can make voters overlook or actively prefer authoritarian legacies.
A different read
The mainstream view contains real moral weight. It is also, on its own, an insufficient explanation for what is actually happening in Peru and across Latin America — and it risks becoming a kind of analytical comfort that prevents serious engagement with why voters keep making choices that horrify the liberal international establishment.
Peru has been through six presidents in six years. The country’s constitutional court, Congress, and executive branch have been locked in a state of permanent institutional warfare. Pedro Castillo, the leftist teacher who preceded the caretaker governments leading to this election, was impeached and arrested while attempting to dissolve Congress in what prosecutors described as an attempted autogolpe. His vice president Dina Boluarte completed his term amid ongoing protests and violence. Against this backdrop, the appeal of a Fujimori — a name that, whatever its baggage, is associated in popular memory with defeating the Shining Path insurgency and stabilising a hyperinflationary economy — is not difficult to understand, even if it is uncomfortable to acknowledge.
The “iron fist” language is not mere campaign rhetoric in Peru’s context. Al Jazeera’s coverage of Sudan’s parallel crisis serves as a useful contrast: where institutional collapse leads to near-total violence, the demand for any governing authority capable of maintaining basic order becomes overwhelming. Peru is nowhere near Sudan, but it is experiencing genuinely alarming levels of criminal violence — particularly from Venezuelan and local organised crime networks that have expanded aggressively since the pandemic. The electorate that voted for Keiko Fujimori is not voting for a return to Montesinos; it is voting, with considerable desperation, for someone who promises to make the streets safer.
The historical parallel is Fujimori père in 1990. Alberto Fujimori, a political outsider and agricultural university rector, ran against the novelist Mario Vargas Llosa — the more obviously qualified candidate by every liberal metric — and won decisively. The voters who chose him were not voting for future corruption; they were voting against Shining Path and hyperinflation. That choice had catastrophic consequences for democratic institutions. The question now is whether the daughter has learned the lessons of the father’s second term, or whether the gravitational pull of authoritarian convenience will prove irresistible once again.
There is a broader Latin American pattern worth naming. Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, Javier Milei in Argentina, and now Keiko Fujimori in Peru represent a wave of leaders who won on explicit rejections of the progressive-technocratic governance model — not because their electorates are incapable of judging democratic values, but because in their lived experience, progressive-technocratic governance has repeatedly failed to deliver the basics of security and economic stability. Dismissing these electorates as authoritarian-adjacent misses the practical logic of their choices.
What to watch
- Whether Fujimori’s new government moves quickly to consolidate institutional control — appointments to the judiciary, intelligence services, and electoral bodies will be early indicators of whether this is a law-and-order mandate or a broader power-consolidation project.
- The status of her prior corruption proceedings and whether her government attempts any retrospective shielding of Fujimorismo from legal accountability.
- Peru’s security metrics over the first six months: her mandate is explicitly anti-crime; if crime does not fall, her political legitimacy will erode rapidly.
- Regional reaction: how neighbouring governments, particularly the leftist administrations in Colombia, Bolivia, and Mexico, position themselves toward Lima will shape the geopolitical geometry of the Andes.
— J