A divided Federal Reserve held interest rates steady despite persistent above-target inflation, NPR reported on 29 July. Fed Chair Jerome Powell acknowledged there was no magic wand to tackle high prices during a press conference, according to BBC reporting, as the central bank held borrowing costs unchanged. The BBC noted separately that the Bank of England is also expected to hold its rate again, in a parallel moment of central bank paralysis on both sides of the Atlantic. The Fed vote was not unanimous, according to NPR, with internal disagreement reflecting genuine uncertainty about whether inflation is genuinely cooling or simply plateauing at a stubbornly elevated level.
The received wisdom
The Keynesian-progressive interpretation of the Fed’s decision is sympathetic: the central bank is navigating a genuine dilemma between defeating inflation and protecting employment, and in an environment of geopolitical uncertainty — including the ongoing US-Iran conflict that has pushed energy prices higher — the cautious, data-dependent approach is the responsible one. Cutting rates prematurely, this argument runs, risks reigniting the inflationary spiral that took years to build and would be extremely painful to break again. The Fed’s dual mandate explicitly includes maximum employment, and the labour market has remained resilient; Powell’s “no magic wand” formulation is not an evasion but an honest acknowledgement that monetary policy has limits. On this reading, critics demanding faster rate cuts are asking the Fed to prioritise short-term political comfort over long-term price stability — which is precisely the political interference in monetary policy that destroys central bank credibility over time.
A different read
All of that is true as far as it goes. But the “no magic wand” formulation also reveals something the Fed has been reluctant to say plainly: that the inflation problem the United States faces in 2026 is not principally a monetary phenomenon in the classic sense, and is therefore not primarily solvable by the Federal Reserve alone. NPR’s reporting on the Fed’s internal division underscores that even the institution’s own experts disagree about what the rate path should be — a sign that the models underlying the decision are themselves uncertain.
The structural sources of current inflation are worth naming. Energy prices have been elevated by regional conflict in the Middle East; domestic energy production has not expanded at the pace the administration’s industrial policy assumed; and the federal deficit, running at levels that would have been considered alarming in any pre-2020 environment, continues to inject demand into the economy even as the Fed tries to dampen it. The classical monetarist argument — Milton Friedman’s “inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon” — captures part of the picture, but fiscal policy is doing heavy lifting in the opposite direction. You cannot credibly fight inflation with one hand while running structurally large deficits with the other. This is a point that both parties’ establishments have largely chosen to avoid.
The Bank of England’s parallel decision to hold rates, noted by the BBC, reflects the same structural bind in a different jurisdiction. The UK faces its own combination of supply-side constraints, energy exposure, and fiscal pressures. The convergence of both central banks on a “hold and wait” posture suggests not careful coordination but shared helplessness — a recognition that the tools available to monetary authorities are insufficient to the problem at hand without complementary fiscal consolidation that neither government has the political will to pursue.
There is also a distributional dimension that the right ought to press with more vigour than it typically does. High inflation is a regressive tax. It falls hardest on those with fixed incomes, modest savings, and no asset portfolio to appreciate in nominal terms. The households most harmed by persistent above-target inflation are not wealthy investors who can hedge; they are wage earners whose real purchasing power has eroded. The political promise of expansionary fiscal policy — that it can deliver both growth and fairness — has once again run into the reality that the costs of that expansion are borne disproportionately by those it claimed to help. The BBC’s reporting that today’s 20-somethings really do have it worse than previous generations is partly a story about housing and wages — but it is also a story about what happens to an economy that has spent fifteen years treating fiscal discipline as an optional value rather than a structural requirement.
The conservative case is not that interest rate hikes are painless — they manifestly are not, as the small-business bankruptcies and mortgage stress of recent years demonstrate. It is rather that the pain of monetary tightening is finite and recoverable, while the pain of entrenched inflation, once it becomes embedded in wage-setting and expectations, is far longer-lasting and more damaging to social cohesion.
What to watch
- The September Fed meeting: whether incoming inflation data allows Powell to begin a cutting cycle without abandoning credibility.
- Congressional budget negotiations: any sign of genuine fiscal consolidation (or lack thereof) will significantly constrain what the Fed can do on rates.
- UK Burnham government borrowing plans: if London expands borrowing significantly while the Bank of England holds rates, the sterling carry trade will be instructive.
- Energy prices: any de-escalation of the US-Iran conflict that lowers oil costs would give both central banks room to move; any escalation removes that option.
— J