Bessent's leaked notepad and the yen question

At a Camp David cabinet meeting on Friday, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent inadvertently disclosed what appeared to be a plan to purchase $5 billion to $10 billion in Japanese yen, after a Reuters photographer captured a handwritten note reading “Buy Japanese Yen (JPY) $5-10 bil” on Bessent’s notepad. The photograph was taken at 11:33 a.m. local time; the notepad was still visible when Bessent spoke to praise the president thirty minutes later. The Financial Times subsequently reported that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York had sold euros to buy yen on behalf of the Treasury. The yen had recently dipped to its weakest level since 1986, driven partly by rising oil prices, according to Bloomberg. The dollar fell from around 158.9 yen to 157.6 yen during late Friday afternoon — a drop of roughly 0.8 percent. Japan’s own authorities had also stepped in earlier on Friday to prop up the yen. The last time the United States intervened to support the yen was in 2011, following the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami, as part of a coordinated G7 action.

The received wisdom

The mainstream economic reading of yen weakness is broadly sympathetic to intervention. Japan’s ultra-loose monetary policy, maintained over many years to fight deflation and stimulate growth, combined with higher interest rates in the United States, has produced a persistent interest-rate differential that punishes the yen. A very weak yen is, in theory, good for Japanese exporters — Toyota and Sony sell more abroad when their products are cheap in dollar terms — but it also pushes up import prices, particularly for energy, which Japan almost entirely imports. For ordinary Japanese consumers, a weak yen is inflationary in a way that erodes living standards. The case for occasional intervention to smooth extreme moves in the yen is therefore defensible: it protects consumer purchasing power without abandoning the underlying monetary policy framework. A coordinated US-Japan intervention is, in that reading, a sensible act of alliance management that also happens to serve American interests by stabilising a key trading partner.

A different read

The argument for intervention has its merits, but the circumstances here are more unsettling than a clinical exchange-rate technocracy would suggest.

Begin with the obvious: the United States Treasury Secretary went to a nationally televised cabinet meeting with a sensitive market-moving note written in plain view of journalists. The notepad was photographed, published, and moved the market before the Treasury had made any public statement. Whether this was genuine carelessness or a deliberate “accidental” signal — a technique occasionally used by central banks to test market reactions before formal announcements — is unclear. What it reveals, either way, is an administration that governs by improvisation rather than process. Accidental disclosure of a potential $10 billion FX intervention is not a trivial lapse; it is the kind of thing that in previous administrations would have been a firing offence.

The deeper issue is what the intervention reveals about the Trump administration’s approach to the dollar and to currency management more broadly. Trump has sent contradictory signals throughout his second term: calling for a weaker dollar to boost US exports while also demanding that other countries not “manipulate” their currencies against the dollar. The purchase of yen to prop up a foreign currency sits oddly alongside an administration that has previously and repeatedly accused trading partners of currency manipulation. The US has not, as of this writing, been formally labelled a currency manipulator by its own Treasury — the irony writes itself.

There is a broader historical point about the limits of unilateral exchange-rate management. The last time the G7 coordinated to support the yen, in 2011, it was a one-off response to an extraordinary natural disaster. Sustained yen weakness is a structural product of divergent monetary policies, and the only durable remedy is either for the Bank of Japan to raise rates further — which carries its own growth risks — or for the US Federal Reserve to cut, which inflation dynamics currently preclude. Buying $5–$10 billion in yen in a $7 trillion daily FX market is a rounding error. It can smooth the rate for a day or a week; it cannot reverse the fundamental pressures. Currency intervention without accompanying policy change has a mixed-to-poor track record. The Plaza Accord of 1985 worked partly because it was genuinely coordinated and accompanied by complementary fiscal and monetary adjustments across the G5; bilateral ad-hoc operations on a much smaller scale are less likely to stick.

The episode also raises a question about the state of the US-Japan alliance more broadly. Japan is running a significant trade surplus with the United States — a fact that Trump has periodically raised as a grievance. The yen intervention could be read as a goodwill gesture from Washington toward Tokyo, smoothing over the trade friction that might otherwise produce tariff threats. If that is what it is, it is a somewhat opaque form of diplomacy. But it is not incoherent: Japan hosts major US military installations, is essential to any Pacific deterrence posture against China, and is one of the largest holders of US Treasury debt. Keeping Japan economically stable and politically aligned is in American interests by almost any calculus. The question is whether ad-hoc notepad diplomacy is the best way to manage that relationship.

What to watch

Track the dollar-yen rate over the next two weeks to see whether the intervention holds or whether the rate slides back toward the pre-intervention level. If it fades, the Treasury faces a choice: announce a sustained programme of intervention, which would require explanation and defend-ability in Congress, or accept that the move was a one-shot signal. Watch also whether the Bank of Japan uses the cover of US intervention to raise its own policy rate — the fundamental adjustment that actually addresses yen weakness. Finally, watch for any political fallout in Washington: the accidental disclosure may invite questions from Congress about who authorised the intervention and whether currency operations are subject to appropriate oversight.

— J