Hamas disarmament deal and the strikes that followed

Hamas agreed to a disarmament deal on Sunday, in what would represent a historic concession by the Palestinian militant organisation that has governed Gaza since 2007. Almost simultaneously, at least 13 people were killed in Israeli strikes on Gaza following the announcement, according to BBC News. The juxtaposition — a disarmament agreement and lethal strikes arriving in the same news cycle — is not merely dramatic irony. It encapsulates, in compressed form, the fundamental structural problem that has frustrated every ceasefire and framework agreement in the Gaza conflict since October 2023. The deal’s specific terms, verification mechanisms, and timeline have not been publicly confirmed. What is clear is that major violence continued even as the ink, metaphorically, was drying.

The received wisdom

The dominant reading among international observers, Western governments, and peace-process veterans will be cautious but hopeful. A Hamas decision to agree to disarmament, if genuine and verifiable, would represent a seismic shift — the organisation has defined itself for decades by its armed resistance identity, and any step away from that is significant regardless of implementation. The mainstream argument is that this deal, however imperfect, creates the political architecture necessary for a post-war Gaza settlement. The EU, United Nations, and Qatar — the key diplomatic brokers — will likely frame the strikes as a dangerous provocation by Israel that threatens to derail the most promising opening in years. Human rights organisations will emphasise the civilian cost: 13 dead in a single day, on the day of a supposed disarmament agreement, is not an abstraction. The received wisdom says that external pressure on Israel to hold its fire is now more urgent than ever.

A different read

It is worth stepping back from both the optimism and the outrage to ask a harder question: what does a Hamas disarmament deal actually mean in the absence of a functioning governance structure to replace it?

Hamas is not merely a military organisation. It has been the de facto government of Gaza for nearly two decades — running schools, courts, utilities (such as they are), and civil administration. Disarmament without a credible successor arrangement does not produce peace; it produces a power vacuum. The historical precedent most relevant here is not the PLO’s 1993 Olso Accords, which at least had the Palestinian Authority as a formal governmental counterpart, but rather the 2006 Lebanon ceasefire, which left Hezbollah nominally constrained but structurally intact. Hezbollah never disarmed. The Lebanese state never had the capacity to make it.

Gaza’s situation is more acute. The BBC reported that strikes continued even after the disarmament agreement was announced — which raises an immediate verification crisis. If Israel strikes during the agreement window, and Hamas hardliners point to those strikes as evidence of bad faith, the factions within Hamas who opposed the deal gain ammunition. Every militant organisation that has ever negotiated a surrender knows that its internal hardliners will use any perceived breach to delegitimise the deal-makers.

Then there is the question of what disarmament means operationally. Hamas’s military capacity is not concentrated in warehouses that can be inspected and cleared. It is distributed across tunnel networks, urban caches, and the institutional knowledge of its military wing. Verifiable disarmament of a non-state actor embedded in a dense civilian population has essentially no modern precedent outside of post-civil-war settlement processes backed by long-term international occupation — which neither Israel nor any international body appears willing to undertake.

The Israeli strikes, whatever their military rationale, suggest that the Israeli government does not yet treat the disarmament agreement as creating a new legal or operational reality. This may reflect legitimate security concerns about ongoing Hamas military activity, or it may reflect a political calculation by a government that has its own internal coalition pressures. Both can be simultaneously true. The point is not to assign blame but to note that a disarmament agreement that cannot stop strikes on the day of its announcement is not yet functioning as a disarmament agreement.

What the episode does illustrate vividly is that formal deals in Gaza consistently run ahead of the underlying political conditions necessary to sustain them. Every ceasefire since 2008 has collapsed under the weight of unresolved sovereignty, unaddressed governance questions, and mutual distrust between parties that have vastly different conceptions of what the end state should look like. A deal is not a settlement. It is, at best, an agreed pause during which the harder work must be done — work that requires sustained attention from powers whose focus is currently split between Ukraine, Iran, and their own domestic politics.

What to watch

  • Verification mechanism: Which body — UN, Qatar, Egypt — will monitor Hamas disarmament, and does Israel accept its authority?
  • Israeli cabinet response: Whether Israel formally endorses the disarmament framework or continues to treat it as operationally irrelevant is the clearest indicator of whether the deal has diplomatic traction.
  • Internal Hamas politics: Statements from the military wing versus the political bureau in Doha will reveal whether the deal has genuine buy-in across the organisation.
  • Civilian casualty trajectory: If strikes continue at current pace through the coming week, the deal’s credibility — and with it, any post-war governance discussion — will erode rapidly.

— J