The new Muslim arc and its ambiguities

Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan have signed a joint defence agreement, formalising security cooperation between three of the Muslim world’s most powerful states. The deal, struck against the backdrop of the ongoing US-Iran confrontation and a shifting Middle Eastern order, includes provisions for intelligence sharing, joint military exercises, and mutual consultation in the event of threats to any signatory. Al Jazeera reported the pact was framed partly in response to concerns about Iran’s regional posture, with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan both wary of Tehran’s influence in their respective near-abroads. Turkey, a NATO member, brings a distinctive — and complicating — dimension to an alignment that does not fit neatly into any existing alliance structure. The BBC confirmed the signing on August 7, noting the three countries represent a combined population of more than 500 million people and significant conventional military capacity.

The received wisdom

The standard liberal-internationalist reading of this pact is broadly welcoming. After decades in which the Muslim world was fractured between Saudi-led Gulf conservatism, Erdoğan’s assertive neo-Ottoman populism, and Pakistan’s perpetual pivot between Washington, Beijing, and Islamabad’s own domestic imperatives, here at last is cooperation. The mainstream view holds that a structured security relationship between Riyadh, Ankara, and Islamabad could stabilise a region wracked by proxy wars, provide a counterweight to Iranian expansionism without requiring direct US involvement, and give these nations the collective voice they have long lacked in global forums. For those fatigued by American unilateralism, there is appeal in the notion of sovereign states managing their own regional security. The progressive press will note, cautiously, that all three governments have authoritarian tendencies — but will treat that as a caveat rather than a disqualifier, given the pragmatic necessity of regional order.

A different read

The historical record counsels scepticism. Multilateral pacts among states with overlapping but divergent interests have a poor track record in this region. The Al Jazeera analysis asks the right question: does this create a new regional order, or does it paper over irreconcilable tensions?

Consider the fault lines. Turkey’s NATO membership means Ankara is formally committed to an alliance whose largest member, the United States, currently finds itself at odds with Iran — the implicit target of this new pact. Turkey cannot simultaneously deepen a security partnership with Saudi Arabia against Iranian interests while also hedging its bets with Moscow and Tehran on Syrian and Ukrainian questions. Erdoğan has made a career of this kind of strategic promiscuity, but promiscuity has costs: it erodes trust among all parties simultaneously.

Pakistan’s position is equally fraught. Islamabad has a long history of security entanglement with Saudi Arabia — Pakistani troops served quietly in the Kingdom for decades — but it also shares a 900-kilometre border with Iran, and the two countries have repeatedly clashed over Baloch separatists, Sunni-Shia sectarian violence, and cross-border militant activity. A formal defence pact with Riyadh that positions Pakistan as a counterweight to Tehran risks inflaming precisely the domestic sectarian tensions that Pakistani governments have spent years trying to manage. The banning of international media from much of Pakistan, reported just days ago, is a reminder that the Pakistani state is managing significant internal pressures that a new regional adventure could destabilise further.

Saudi Arabia’s motivations are perhaps the most coherent: Riyadh has been seeking to build a security architecture that does not depend entirely on American patronage since at least the Obama-era nuclear deal demonstrated that Washington’s reliability was conditional. The Abraham Accords era accelerated this trend. But Saudi Arabia’s capacity to lead a genuine multilateral defence bloc — rather than purchase security relationships — remains unproven.

There is a deeper structural problem. Alliances require a shared enemy or a shared set of values, ideally both. The anti-Iran framing gives this pact its surface coherence, but the three countries’ interests in Iran are not identical. Turkey needs Iranian gas and uses Iranian territorial corridors. Pakistan cannot afford a war with a neighbour that already sponsors cross-border instability. Saudi Arabia may genuinely want strategic deterrence against Tehran, but deterrence is not the same as aggression, and the line between the two can be crossed by miscalculation.

The historical parallel that comes to mind is the Baghdad Pact of 1955 — another US-adjacent security architecture in the Muslim world, designed to contain Soviet (and implicitly Arab nationalist) influence. It was plagued by internal contradictions from the start, collapsed within three years of Iraq’s withdrawal in 1958, and arguably destabilised the region it was meant to calm. The Saudi-Turkey-Pakistan pact has the advantage of not being formally US-sponsored, which removes one source of nationalist backlash. But the internal tensions may prove just as corrosive.

None of this is to say the pact is meaningless. Three major states formalising security consultation is inherently significant. If it holds together, it could provide a meaningful counterweight to Iranian overreach and reduce the vacuum that has drawn both the US and Russia into regional conflicts. The question is whether it will hold together — and the honest answer, given the parties involved, is that the odds are against it.

What to watch

  • Whether Turkey begins distancing itself from NATO obligations or seeks to reframe the pact as complementary to its alliance commitments — Ankara’s statements in the coming weeks will be telling.
  • Pakistan’s domestic political reaction, particularly from pro-Iran Shia political parties and from the military establishment, which has its own institutional interests in the relationship with Tehran.
  • Saudi Arabia’s willingness to commit real military resources, rather than treating the pact as a diplomatic signal with no operational weight.
  • Iran’s response — any retaliatory move against Pakistani or Turkish interests would test the pact’s mutual-defence provisions almost immediately.

— J