Todd Blanche, President Trump’s former personal defence attorney, was narrowly confirmed by the Senate as United States Attorney General this week. The confirmation cleared the chamber by a slim margin after weeks of debate over Blanche’s dual role: he served as Trump’s lead counsel in the New York criminal trial before the president’s re-election, and now leads the Justice Department that oversees any residual federal matters touching his former client. The Senate vote was described by observers as one of the closest for a cabinet-level nomination in recent memory.
The received wisdom
The dominant critique from the opposition and much of the legal commentariat is simple and not without merit: no attorney general should be the former personal lawyer of the president who appointed him. The argument runs that the Department of Justice must be seen to operate independently of the White House — a norm badly strained already across administrations of both parties — and that Blanche’s appointment destroys even the pretence of that independence. Critics point to the history of Attorneys General who stretched their institutional loyalty toward their appointing president, from John Mitchell under Nixon to Eric Holder’s self-described role as Obama’s “wingman.” Blanche, the argument goes, takes this to a categorical extreme. He didn’t just socialise with Trump; he built his professional case against federal prosecutors on Trump’s behalf. The conflict of interest is not incidental — it is the core of the man’s recent biography.
This is the mainstream legal reading, and it deserves engagement rather than dismissal. Institutional independence at the DOJ is not a liberal hobby-horse. It is a republican norm — small “r” — that conservatives once understood intuitively and that figures from William Barr to Jeff Sessions defended in theory, if not always in practice.
A different read
And yet.
The critique, taken alone, omits a great deal. The first thing it omits is that the independence of the DOJ has not, in practice, been the pristine Weberian ideal its defenders now invoke. The weaponisation of federal prosecutorial power against political opponents is not a Trump invention. The Obama-era DOJ’s handling of the IRS targeting scandal, the selective leaking of grand jury material, the Clinton email investigation’s peculiar conclusions — these are not ancient history. They are recent institutional behaviour. The conservative complaint — that the administrative state has been captured by a progressive professional class that operates its power semi-independently of elected governments — is not paranoia. It is a reading of the evidence that has accumulated across three administrations.
The second thing the critique omits is the logic of the appointment itself. Trump’s defenders argue — not without some force — that the only attorney general who would pursue the president’s stated agenda of dismantling what they call the “two-tier” justice system is precisely someone whose loyalty is beyond doubt. This argument has a Jacksonian pedigree. Andrew Jackson’s spoils system was brutal and often corrupt, but it was also a populist correction to an entrenched Federalist professional class that treated public offices as hereditary property. The question is not whether the principle is pretty. It is whether the alternative — a DOJ that operates as a de facto fourth branch, answerable to its own internal culture — is actually more democratic.
The third consideration is empirical: what will Blanche actually do? The Senate’s narrow vote suggests that Republican senators themselves were not uniformly comfortable. Several extracted commitments — reported, though not yet publicly disclosed — about recusal from specific proceedings. If those commitments hold, the Blanche DOJ may in practice be more constrained than the critics predict. If they do not, the critics will have been right.
What genuine conservatives should watch here is not the spectacle of partisan recrimination but the harder structural question: is there a sustainable model for a DOJ that is simultaneously accountable to elected government and independent enough to prosecute the powerful without favour? The British model — a Director of Public Prosecutions structurally separated from the Home Secretary — is imperfect but instructive. So is the tradition of special counsel appointments, which have themselves become partisan weapons. The honest answer is that the United States has not solved this problem, and appointing a former personal defence attorney is not a solution. It is a provocation that forces the question into the open.
There is a version of conservative thought — the Burke-inflected variant rather than the Bannon-inflected one — that believes institutions matter precisely because majorities can be wrong and temporary majorities can inflict permanent damage. That version of conservatism should be uncomfortable with the Blanche confirmation, not because it accepts the Democrats’ framing, but because it takes seriously what institutions are actually for.
What to watch
First: whether any recusal commitments made during confirmation hearings are formalised and disclosed publicly. The absence of transparency will be more revealing than the commitments themselves.
Second: the handling of any pending federal matters that tangentially involve Trump’s business interests or inner circle. Early prosecutorial decisions — or conspicuous non-decisions — will set the institutional tone for the full term.
Third: whether senior career prosecutors at Main Justice resign in numbers sufficient to constitute a structural signal rather than normal attrition. That has historically been the clearest early indicator of DOJ political capture.
Fourth: Congressional oversight appetite. If the Senate Judiciary Committee, including its Republican members, exercises genuine subpoena oversight rather than deferential rubber-stamping, the Blanche DOJ may be more constrained than the appointment suggests.
— J