Netanyahu's Gaza veto and the limits of Trump's peace

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced on Sunday that Israel formally rejects the 15-point document underpinning Donald Trump’s Gaza peace framework, which the Board of Peace — the multilateral body Trump created to oversee the deal — had declared operative last month. The plan’s core bargain requires Hamas to disarm completely in exchange for an Israeli military withdrawal from Gaza. Netanyahu stated at a cabinet meeting that Israel would “not carry out any withdrawal until Hamas is genuinely disarmed,” calling any fictitious disarmament unacceptable. Hamas, meanwhile, told the BBC it “reaffirms its commitment” to the agreement and is ready “to engage seriously and responsibly” in its implementation. The Board of Peace’s senior diplomat Nickolay Mladenov defended the process, saying discussions remain ongoing toward a “positive outcome.”

The received wisdom

The progressive reading of this episode is, in outline, reasonable: Israel is once again the obstacle. Netanyahu, the narrative goes, is a prisoner of his far-right coalition partners — people like National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir, who dismissed the draft as “not acceptable” — and uses their pressure as political cover to indefinitely delay any settlement that would cost him his government. The international community, including Trump, has done the hard work of engineering a framework; the Israeli right is sabotaging it. The solution, this reading continues, is sustained external pressure on Israel to accept phased disarmament verification, since requiring prior full disarmament before any withdrawal is a condition designed to fail. From this vantage point, the suffering of the approximately 1.9 million displaced Gazans — 90% of Gaza’s population according to the United Nations — is a direct consequence of Israeli intransigence.

A different read

The received wisdom contains real truth but omits a crucial structural problem. The core demand embedded in Trump’s plan — that Hamas disarm — is not a fantasy confected by Israeli hawks. It is the minimum condition for any durable peace. And the mechanism by which Hamas was supposed to demonstrate that disarmament is, as Netanyahu correctly notes, genuinely unverified.

Consider the sequence of events. Trump’s Board of Peace announced in early August that Hamas had for the first time agreed “in principle” to disarm its heavy weapons — a statement Hamas immediately qualified by insisting disarmament was contingent on Israel first ending “all forms of aggression” and withdrawing its forces. In other words, Hamas agreed to disarm after Israel withdrew. Israel insists on disarmament before withdrawal. Neither side has moved; the Board of Peace’s “agreement” was, in practice, a mutual non-agreement presented as a breakthrough.

This is not a novel problem. The history of Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy is littered with agreements that papered over incompatible sequencing demands. Camp David in 2000 collapsed not because of bad faith alone but because the two parties had genuinely different conceptions of what “statehood” and “security guarantees” meant. Oslo broke down in part because the verification mechanisms were weak and each side accused the other of violating commitments in real time. The specific problem here — how do you verify disarmament of a non-state armed group embedded in a dense urban population? — is not one American diplomatic creativity can simply dissolve.

Netanyahu is behaving opportunistically, no question. He is using the language of security requirements to delay political decisions that would cost him his coalition. But the uncomfortable truth is that the underlying security demand — that Hamas cannot retain its military capacity across any settlement — is not unreasonable on its face. The October 7, 2023 attack, in which approximately 1,200 people were killed, was launched from a Gaza that had been nominally under a blockade for over a decade. The lesson Israeli security planners draw from that is that no paper agreement substitutes for actual disarmament.

Mladenov’s defence of the plan is worth parsing carefully. He told Israeli television that the framework is “verifiable” and “reversible” and that Israel “would not be required to withdraw until it could be verified that Hamas was taking steps to disarm.” That is a more nuanced formulation than the headline version of the plan — it implies phased verification, not complete prior disarmament. If that formulation is the real operational content of the plan, Netanyahu’s public rejection may be partly political theatre: a message to Ben Gvir’s wing that he is tough, while leaving the door open to a modified version. Whether that opening is real or illusory will become clear in coming weeks as discussions between Israeli and US officials continue.

What is clear is that Trump’s deal-making model — announce a framework, declare success, pressure parties to accept — has run into the wall it always runs into in the Middle East: local political constraints that no Washington announcement can override. The Biden administration made the same mistake in its final months, repeatedly announcing imminent ceasefire deals that never materialised. Trump added the Board of Peace machinery, which adds diplomatic gravitas but not necessarily leverage.

What to watch

  • Whether Netanyahu’s “discussions with US officials about how to go forward” produce any modified sequencing proposal that gives him political cover with the coalition while allowing Mladenov to declare progress
  • The reaction from far-right coalition partners: if Ben Gvir’s faction calls for a new cabinet vote to formally end the Gaza framework, that would signal the rejection is structural, not tactical
  • Hamas’s internal politics: the group’s public reaffirmation of commitment to the plan, while rejecting any disarmament-first sequencing, suggests it calculates international pressure will fall on Israel — a calculation that may or may not prove correct
  • The status of Palestinian hostages still held in Gaza, whose fate remains the most acute human pressure point on all parties

— J