Zhu Rongji's death and China's unfinished reform

Zhu Rongji, the former Premier of China who drove the country’s accession to the World Trade Organisation and engineered the sweeping state-enterprise reforms of the 1990s, has died at the age of 97, according to BBC News and NPR. Zhu served as Premier from 1998 to 2003 and was widely credited — and sometimes blamed — for transforming China from a Soviet-style command economy into the export-oriented manufacturing juggernaut that came to define the early twenty-first century. NPR described him as someone “who drove China’s 1990s economic reforms” and sought “to transition China from the post-Maoist years to a more global market-oriented financial system, without ceding party control over the economy.” His death arrives in a peculiarly loaded moment: an NPR discussion this week asked whether the United States has already lost its technological and economic dominance to China — and Beijing may be benefiting from both the Iran war and American tariff policy.

The received wisdom

Zhu Rongji has always been something of a hero figure in the narrative Western economists and liberal internationalists told themselves about China. He represented, in that story, the high-water mark of the thesis that engagement works: that market liberalisation and WTO membership would gradually liberalise China’s political economy, making Beijing a “responsible stakeholder” in the US-led international order. His iron discipline — he kept inflation under control, broke up the vast loss-making state enterprises that were haemorrhaging public funds, and pushed China through the painful adjustment of WTO accession — seemed to vindicate the argument that technocratic reformers within the Chinese Communist Party could steer the country toward a more rule-bound, market-oriented future. Obituaries today will stress his legacy of growth, poverty reduction and institutional modernisation.

There is real substance in this tribute. Zhu’s reforms lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty. The productivity gains from dismantling the old state enterprise system, however brutally it was managed, were enormous. China under Zhu was, in important respects, a more liberalising polity than China under his successors.

A different read

What Zhu’s death actually invites is a reckoning with the limits of what he achieved — and what those limits tell us about the present.

The central irony of Zhu’s reform project is that it succeeded brilliantly on its own narrow technocratic terms while planting the seeds of the structural problems that now define US-China relations. The WTO accession he engineered created the conditions for the “China shock” — the massive deindustrialisation of American and European manufacturing communities that we now recognise as having produced profound political consequences. As the economist David Autor and colleagues documented, the rapid scaling of Chinese exports after WTO entry depressed wages and eliminated jobs in US manufacturing regions in ways that fed the populist backlash politics of the 2010s and beyond. Zhu’s reforms were, from a global welfare standpoint, a triumph of efficient resource allocation. From the standpoint of political economy in the receiving countries, they were a slow-motion shock that liberal governments were utterly unprepared to manage.

More relevant to the present: Zhu’s market-opening project was always conditioned on Party primacy. He was not liberalising China politically. He was deploying market mechanisms in the service of state power. The “without ceding party control over the economy” phrase in NPR’s reporting is the crucial qualifier that the engagement school systematically underweighted. What Xi Jinping has done since 2012 is not a departure from the Zhu model so much as a revelation of its true nature: the market was always a tool, not a commitment to pluralism.

This matters enormously for the current debate. The NPR segment asking whether the US has lost its dominance to China frames the question partly around Beijing benefiting from the Iran war and Trump’s tariff policy. That framing is correct as far as it goes — China has been positioning as an alternative supplier and a diplomatic alternative to American leadership during the period of US regional military engagement. But the deeper structural challenge is one Zhu helped create: the state-directed industrial policy model, which combines market efficiency with political direction, has proved extraordinarily effective at scaling technology production. Chinese dominance in solar panels, electric vehicles, battery technology, and increasingly in AI hardware components reflects not a break from Zhu’s legacy but its maturation into something more formidable than its architects perhaps intended.

The lesson Western policymakers are only now absorbing — after three decades of wilful misreading — is that economic integration does not automatically produce political convergence, and that technocratic efficiency in an authoritarian state is a tool of power projection, not a pathway to liberalism. Zhu Rongji was a great man by the standards of economic management. But eulogising him purely as a reformer elides the system he served and the strategic challenge his successes created.

What to watch

  • Xi’s handling of Zhu’s legacy in official commemoration: How Beijing chooses to frame Zhu’s reformist period — as an achievement to build on or a historical phase now superseded — will signal Xi’s relationship with economic liberalisation rhetoric.
  • US-China tech competition indicators: Semiconductor export data, AI chip shipment volumes, and any new US export control actions in the coming weeks will provide a concrete measure of where the dominance contest actually stands.
  • China’s response to Iran war developments: Whether Beijing accelerates diplomatic initiatives in the Gulf as US military attention is absorbed by the Iran conflict will test the NPR thesis about Chinese benefiting from American distraction.
  • WTO reform discussions: Whether the Biden or Trump administrations had any live proposals for WTO reform that Zhu’s death catalyses commentary on could indicate whether the rules-based trade order he helped build is being defended or abandoned.

— J