Canada-US trade deal and the tariff hostage crisis

Canada and the United States say they are finalising a trade deal, though both governments acknowledge that key details remain unresolved and unannounced. The announcement follows months of tension in which the Trump administration imposed — and at various points threatened to escalate — tariffs on Canadian goods, including a particularly contentious levy on Canadian energy exports. Separately, the Guardian reported that Trump paused a fresh tariff threat while signalling potential revival of the Keystone XL pipeline as part of a broader energy-for-market-access framework. The negotiations have taken place under the shadow of these threats, with Canadian officials publicly describing a process of extraordinary pressure and private frustration.

The received wisdom

The progressive and liberal internationalist account of the Canada-US trade negotiation runs as follows: the original USMCA (CUSMA in Canada) was a workable framework that replaced NAFTA with modest updates, and the Trump administration’s decision to use tariff threats as leverage against one of America’s closest allies and largest trading partners was an act of gratuitous economic nationalism that damaged the bilateral relationship, disrupted supply chains, and produced uncertainty for businesses on both sides of the border. If a deal is now being finalised, the mainstream framing will tend to celebrate it as a return to normalcy — a pragmatic resolution that demonstrates the system still works, even if it took longer and cost more than necessary.

The Canadian Liberal-aligned commentary, meanwhile, will note that Ottawa stood firm on core Canadian interests, particularly supply management in dairy and poultry, and that whatever deal emerges should be evaluated on whether those red lines held. The deeper worry in this framing is that Canada’s economic dependence on the US market — which absorbs roughly three-quarters of Canadian exports — makes genuine reciprocity structurally difficult. Canada negotiates from weakness, and the deal will reflect that.

A different read

The received wisdom is not wrong about the asymmetry. Canada does depend on the US market in ways that fundamentally constrain its negotiating position. But the framing tends to treat this as an accidental product of Trump’s aggression rather than as the revelation of a pre-existing structural condition that NAFTA and USMCA always papered over.

Consider the Keystone XL dimension. The pipeline, initially approved, then cancelled by Obama, then revived and cancelled again by Biden, represents something larger than an infrastructure project. It encapsulates the recurring problem in the Canada-US energy relationship: Canada has vast hydrocarbon resources, the US has the refining capacity and the market, and every time a US administration changes ideology, the pipeline’s fate flips. From a Canadian perspective, this is an object lesson in the risks of deep economic integration with a trading partner whose domestic politics are highly volatile. The energy corridor has become a political football that neither side fully controls.

The tariff-as-leverage dynamic also deserves scrutiny that goes beyond the immediate case. Economic coercion between allies is not new — the US has used trade threats against Japan, South Korea, and the EU at various points — but it typically produced two types of outcomes. In some cases (Japan’s voluntary export restraints in the 1980s), it produced formal agreements that resolved specific market access issues, though sometimes at the cost of the target economy’s long-run dynamism. In other cases, it produced agreements that were subsequently renegotiated or abandoned because they reflected power imbalances rather than mutual interest.

The question for the Canada-US deal now being finalised is which type it resembles. Deals struck under duress, with one party accepting terms it would not voluntarily have agreed to, tend to breed resentment and to be revisited at the earliest political opportunity. If Canada’s Conservative government — which is generally more sympathetic to the US Republican orbit — accepts terms on energy, dairy, or digital services that feel like concessions extracted under threat, the political sustainability of those terms in Canada is limited. Future Canadian governments, of whatever party, will face domestic pressure to revisit or renegotiate. The deal’s durability will be tested the moment Washington’s leverage dissipates.

There is also a broader systemic concern. The US-Canada relationship is the most deeply integrated bilateral economic relationship in the world, with over $2 trillion in annual trade. Supply chains in automotive, agriculture, and energy are thoroughly intertwined. Using tariff threats as routine leverage within such an integrated system is like threatening to cut your own circulation to force a concession from your right hand. The short-term leverage is real; the medium-term costs are also real. Businesses on both sides have already adjusted supply chains, absorbed cost increases, and in some cases, relocated investment decisions in response to the uncertainty. Those adjustments don’t fully reverse when a deal is announced.

One area where the right-of-centre perspective offers a genuinely different read: the dairy and supply-management issue. Canada’s supply management system — which protects domestic dairy, poultry, and egg producers through import quotas and price controls — is genuinely protectionist. It raises food prices for Canadian consumers, primarily to benefit a relatively small number of producers. American (and trade-liberalising Canadian) critics of supply management are not wrong that it is inefficient. The question is whether trade coercion between allies is the right mechanism for removing domestic agricultural protectionism — and whether the quid pro quo (Canadian concessions on dairy in exchange for reduced US tariffs) is actually in Canadian consumers’ interest or primarily serves American agricultural exporters.

What to watch

Watch whether the deal’s specific terms are published in full or described vaguely — the level of transparency will indicate whether one or both sides have agreed to provisions that are politically difficult to defend publicly.

Watch Canadian parliamentary reaction, particularly from the NDP and from dairy-province MPs, as a gauge of whether the deal’s terms have genuinely protected supply management.

Watch the Keystone XL commitment — whether it is a firm contractual commitment or a political aspiration will determine how much it actually changes Canada’s energy export calculus.

Watch for any side letters or implementation schedules that defer contentious issues — trade deals struck under political pressure frequently contain delayed-implementation provisions that push the hard choices into the future.

— J