DR Congo's peace roadmap: fragile hope in Goma

The Democratic Republic of Congo and the M23 rebel group have agreed a roadmap for peace talks, according to reports from the BBC, in what would be the most significant attempt to end the eastern Congo conflict since the collapse of previous ceasefire efforts. The agreement, brokered with African Union and regional facilitation, sets out a framework for direct negotiations between Kinshasa and M23 — a rebel movement that has held significant territory in North Kivu province, including the city of Goma, and that has long been accused of operating with logistical and political support from Rwanda, allegations Kigali has consistently denied.

The eastern Congo conflict is, by most measures, the world’s most persistently deadly humanitarian emergency. Millions of people have been displaced over multiple decades of fighting involving not just M23 but a constellation of more than a hundred armed groups operating in territory the Congolese state has never fully controlled.

The received wisdom

The mainstream response to any DRC peace initiative follows a predictable and, in many ways, reasonable pattern. Diplomats and aid organisations welcome the roadmap cautiously, stressing that previous agreements — the Nairobi Process, the Luanda Accord, various ceasefire declarations — have all failed to produce durable peace. The framing emphasises the urgency of the humanitarian crisis, the role of regional mediators, and the need for international support. The implicit conclusion is that this time might be different if sufficient international attention and resources are brought to bear. That attention, historically, has been intermittent at best.

The human scale is not in dispute. The UN estimates that some 7 million people have been displaced in the DRC — more than in Ukraine at the height of the 2022 displacement crisis. That this has generated so little sustained Western political attention is itself a reflection of how geopolitical prioritisation works.

A different read

The history of peace processes in eastern Congo is one of the most dispiriting records in modern diplomacy. Since the 2003 Global and Inclusive Agreement, the DRC has been through more than a dozen significant ceasefire or peace frameworks, each of which has collapsed or been quietly abandoned. The reasons are structural and have not changed substantially: the DRC state lacks the capacity to project authority into its eastern territories; Rwanda’s interests in North Kivu — which include access to mineral resources and concern about Hutu militia remnants — have not been resolved; and M23’s political leadership has consistently extracted negotiating leverage from military pressure on the ground before agreeing to talks.

The pattern here is not unique to Congo. It recurs across post-colonial African state formation challenges, from South Sudan to Somalia. States without functioning bureaucratic reach cannot enforce agreements; external guarantors have insufficient sustained interest to maintain compliance monitoring; and armed groups with access to resources — in Congo’s case, the extraordinary mineral wealth of the Kivus — have little economic incentive to demobilise permanently.

The Rwanda dimension is particularly important and particularly underdiscussed in Western media. The BBC’s coverage notes the peace roadmap without extensively examining the degree to which Rwandan strategic interests must be incorporated into any durable settlement. Kigali’s relationship with M23 has been extensively documented — by UN Group of Experts reports, by American officials, and by researchers — yet diplomatic politeness tends to keep the most direct observations off the record. Any peace process that does not address Rwanda’s underlying concerns about security on its western border and its interest in North Kivu’s economy is likely to produce another pause rather than a settlement.

There is also the question of what the Congolese state can realistically offer as part of a settlement. M23 and its backers have historically sought recognition, integration of their fighters into the FARDC (the national army), and political representation. These are demands that a weak central government finds simultaneously difficult to refuse and difficult to honour — particularly given the precedent such concessions set for Congo’s other armed groups.

None of this is to counsel despair. The alternative to imperfect peace processes is continued war, and the people of eastern Congo have suffered enough. But the intellectual honesty the situation demands is an acknowledgement that roadmaps require not just signing but implementing, and that implementation requires both Congolese state capacity and sustained regional accountability mechanisms that have not historically materialised.

What to watch

Whether Rwanda publicly endorses or explicitly distances itself from the roadmap will be an early signal of whether this process has a different regional architecture than its predecessors.

The composition and mandate of any international monitoring mechanism will matter enormously. Previous missions, including MONUSCO, have struggled with ambiguous mandates and limited enforcement authority.

Watch whether the African Union commits sustained high-level political attention beyond the announcement phase — historically the point at which interest tends to dissipate.

And track M23’s behaviour on the ground. If fighting continues or expands in North Kivu after the roadmap signing, as it has after previous agreements, the framework’s value is primarily diplomatic rather than operational.

— J