Trump's economic D-Day and the limits of financial warfare

The United States is preparing what President Trump has called the “most crushing economic operation ever taken against any country” against Iran, with Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent expected to unveil details of new sanctions on Monday 25 August. Iran’s top security official warned that any country joining the US campaign would be treated as an enemy, promising “seismic” retaliation. Bessent issued a blunt ultimatum to US partners: “You’re either with us or against us,” specifically calling on China, which purchases over 80% of Iran’s shipped oil, to comply. The threats come after nearly six months of US-Iran conflict, with diplomatic efforts stalled and the Strait of Hormuz remaining effectively closed — a blockade that has sent oil and commodity prices soaring. Egypt has called on both sides to return to the diplomatic path. Iran’s government has signalled domestic fuel price hikes in anticipation of the coming pressure.

The received wisdom

The mainstream view holds that sanctions are an indispensable tool of statecraft, far preferable to military escalation. Maximum economic pressure, on this reading, is not a sign of strategic failure but of responsible restraint — using financial instruments rather than bombs to change adversary behaviour. Critics who argue that sanctions don’t work are dismissed as either naive about the alternative or secretly sympathetic to Tehran. The humanitarian costs, while acknowledged, are considered secondary to the strategic objective of compelling regime change or at minimum behavioural modification. Prominent analysts such as Stephen Walt have argued that Trump has “run out of options,” but the administration’s response is to double down — escalating the financial squeeze rather than revising the strategy. The “you’re either with us or against us” framework, explicitly borrowed from the post-9/11 Bush era, attempts to turn the financial system into a compliance mechanism, compelling neutrals to choose.

A different read

The Bush-era framing is a useful tell. When Colin Powell stood before the UN Security Council in February 2003 presenting intelligence about Iraqi weapons programmes, he was using the same logic: the choice is binary, the cost of inaction exceeds the cost of action, and any country sitting on the fence is effectively enabling the threat. That framing proved more durable as political rhetoric than as strategic analysis. Twenty-three years later, the US is running a structurally similar playbook — “economic D-Day,” crushing isolation, you’re either with us — and the same questions apply.

The central problem with comprehensive financial warfare is that it is most effective against countries that are deeply integrated into the dollar system and have something to lose from exclusion. Iran, after years of sanctions, has been systematically building the infrastructure of exclusion-resistance: bilateral barter arrangements, cryptocurrency workarounds, and most critically, a deep trade relationship with China that is precisely not denominated in dollars. When China buys 80% of Iran’s oil, it is not doing so through the SWIFT system that US secondary sanctions can reach. The sanctions are therefore partly directed at China — a country with its own nuclear arsenal, veto at the UN Security Council and the second-largest economy on earth.

There is a second structural problem: the Strait of Hormuz. Iran closed the strait when the US and Israel launched strikes in February, and the economic disruption has been severe — oil prices elevated, fertiliser costs up, global supply chains disrupted. The new sanctions are designed to create additional economic pressure, but they cannot open a waterway that Iran controls physically. Treasury can freeze accounts in New York; it cannot escort tankers through Hormuz. The gap between financial instrument and physical reality is the soft underbelly of the entire strategy.

Historical parallels abound and none are encouraging for the maximalist position. The US sanctions against Japan in 1941 — cutting off oil exports and freezing assets — were intended to compel withdrawal from China. They produced Pearl Harbour. The Cuba embargo, now entering its seventh decade, has failed to change the character of the Cuban government while providing it with an inexhaustible domestic legitimacy narrative. Iran’s theocracy has survived comprehensive sanctions for over four decades; the regime has proved far more resilient than the Iranian economy. Each round of economic pressure has generated a new round of domestic nationalist consolidation, with reformist voices marginalised precisely because they advocate engagement with the West.

The “either with us or against us” demand directed at China is perhaps the most strategically dangerous element. China has been slowly constructing an alternative financial architecture — the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), yuan-denominated commodity contracts, bilateral currency swaps — precisely to reduce exposure to dollar-system coercion. Every time Washington uses secondary sanctions as a bludgeon against Beijing’s trading partners, it provides Beijing with a fresh argument for accelerating that project. The sanctions may squeeze Iran; they will certainly accelerate the de-dollarisation that erodes the very instrument of American financial power being deployed.

What to watch

  • Whether Bessent’s Monday announcement includes Chinese entity designations. If it does, Beijing’s response will determine whether the Iran conflict becomes a proxy battleground for dollar-system authority.
  • The Strait of Hormuz talks between Iran and Oman. These are the most likely off-ramp. Any movement there would signal that behind-the-scenes negotiations are further advanced than public rhetoric suggests.
  • Iranian fuel price hikes and domestic stability. A regime that is raising fuel prices on the eve of the heaviest sanctions in its history is signalling both economic stress and a willingness to absorb pain — the opposite of imminent capitulation.
  • Whether Egypt’s mediation produces a joint de-escalation framework. Cairo is the most plausible neutral broker, with relationships in both Tehran and Washington that other regional actors lack.

— J