South Sudan's peacekeepers die as civil war looms

Armed men ambushed a United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) patrol on Monday as it travelled toward Pajut in Jonglei state, killing two peacekeepers and wounding three others, along with two South Sudanese police officers and two civilian mission staff. The UNMISS deployed a Quick Reaction Force to secure the area. The identities and nationalities of the dead have not yet been disclosed. The UN mission head, Anita Kiki Gbeho, called the attack “unacceptable.” The ambush comes against a backdrop of rapidly escalating violence: UN figures show more than 450 attacks on humanitarian workers and assets between January and July of this year, more than double the total for the same period in 2025. At least 36 humanitarian workers and contractors have been killed this year, already surpassing the 31 killed in all of 2025. South Sudan is edging toward a full return to civil war, as the 2018 power-sharing agreement between President Salva Kiir and opposition leader Riek Machar has effectively collapsed since Machar was suspended from the vice presidency last year and placed under house arrest on treason charges he says are politically motivated.

The received wisdom

The humanitarian and peace-operations community frames South Sudan’s crisis as a failure of political will — primarily from Kiir’s government, but also from regional powers and international donors who have not applied sufficient pressure to enforce the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS). From this perspective, the solution is more engagement: more funding for UNMISS, more diplomatic pressure through the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), more sanctions on officials who obstruct the peace process, and more direct US pressure on both Kiir and Machar to return to dialogue. The United States itself has called for “urgent action to uphold peace and mitigate the risk of civil war through an immediate return to dialogue.” The ambush in Jonglei is, on this reading, a symptom of insufficient commitment from the international community at a critical moment — violence that could be reduced if sufficient resources and political attention were marshalled.

A different read

The received wisdom is generous about what international engagement can actually accomplish in South Sudan, and has been for the country’s entire short history as an independent state. South Sudan became the world’s newest country in 2011, following a referendum that was itself the product of years of international mediation. It descended into civil war within two years. A peace deal in 2015 collapsed within months of being signed. The 2018 agreement held for roughly three years before beginning its slow-motion unravelling. The pattern is consistent enough to warrant a hard question: is international peacekeeping and mediation stabilising South Sudan, or is it enabling its governing elites to perpetuate the conflict at a lower intensity than would otherwise be sustainable?

The structural problem in South Sudan is not primarily logistical or even military — it is political-economic. The country’s leaders, on both sides of the Kiir-Machar divide, have built systems of patronage that depend on controlling oil revenues and distributing them to armed constituencies. Peace, under these conditions, does not serve the interests of the people in power; it removes the emergency conditions that justify the extraction. External pressure — UN missions, sanctions, mediation — is useful at the margins but cannot substitute for the internal political incentive to settle. The Al Jazeera reporting notes that the violence in Jonglei began escalating in December when opposition forces seized government outposts, and the government has responded with air strikes even while insisting it remains committed to the 2018 accord. This is not the behaviour of a government that believes it will be held accountable.

The ambush of UNMISS peacekeepers is, in this context, more than a tragedy — it is an indicator of how far the situation has deteriorated. Violence against peacekeepers is, as the Al Jazeera report notes, rare even in South Sudan. When it occurs, it typically signals either a complete breakdown of local command structures, deliberate targeting to send a message about mission unwelcomeness, or both. The fact that 450 attacks on humanitarian workers have occurred in seven months — double the prior year’s rate — suggests that the operational environment has fundamentally changed, not merely degraded at the margins.

There is a difficult but necessary conversation to be had about UNMISS’s mandate and its relationship to political accountability. The mission has been in South Sudan since 2011 and has spent years protecting civilians in designated safe areas while doing relatively little to alter the political incentives that generate those civilian protection needs. In peacekeeping literature, this dynamic is known as the “protection trap”: the presence of a mission reduces the immediate human cost of a stalemate in ways that reduce pressure on parties to settle, while simultaneously providing international legitimacy to an arrangement that serves no one’s long-term interest. This is not an argument for pulling UNMISS out — the short-term humanitarian costs would be catastrophic. It is an argument for a serious review of what fifteen years of peacekeeping has accomplished and what conditions would need to change for the mission to work as intended rather than as a permanent palliative.

The US posture is relevant here too. Washington has called for dialogue and flagged civil war risk, but the administration’s attention in sub-Saharan Africa has been consumed by the Sudan crisis, the DRC conflict, and the broader reshaping of great-power competition for African resources. South Sudan’s particular geography — oil-rich, landlocked, and surrounded by states with their own instability — makes it a low-priority problem for an administration that has shown limited appetite for sustained Africa engagement. That inattention has consequences: Kiir has less reason to heed American calls for dialogue when he can read the disposition of the global superpower.

What to watch

Watch Machar’s legal situation: if he is formally charged with treason and tried, it will likely end any remaining prospect for the power-sharing arrangement and could be the trigger for full-scale war. Track whether IGAD convenes emergency talks following the peacekeeper deaths — the killing of UN personnel is one of the few events that reliably generates diplomatic urgency, however brief. Monitor the humanitarian access corridors in Jonglei and Upper Nile states: if NGOs begin evacuating staff, it will signal a deterioration severe enough that the formal civil war declaration is largely a formality at that point.

— J