Six months into Iran war, no one is winning

Six months have passed since the United States and Israel launched intensive bombing campaigns against Iran, and the results do not match the ambitions. NPR’s comprehensive review of the war’s half-year mark finds an Iranian regime that has not collapsed but has hardened, a Strait of Hormuz that remains largely closed to shipping, and diplomatic negotiations that have stalled. The US and Israel bombed Iran intensively from February 28 until a ceasefire on April 8, killing dozens of top Iranian leaders including Supreme Leader Khamenei on the first day, and eliminating virtually all of Iran’s air force, air defenses, and navy. The war has killed 3,375 Iranians and 18 US service members, with more than 33,000 Iranians and hundreds of Americans injured, according to the World Health Organization and the Pentagon respectively. The Strait of Hormuz, through which a significant portion of the world’s oil and gas transits, has been largely shut since Iran’s counter-response to the initial attacks, disrupting global energy markets and driving up costs for fertilizer and other goods.

The received wisdom

The liberal and realist critiques of this war are by now well-rehearsed and deserve to be engaged honestly. The critics argue that the bombing campaign was launched without adequate diplomatic groundwork, that the goal of regime change was always unrealistic given Iran’s depth of internal security apparatus, and that the disruption to the Strait of Hormuz has imposed costs on the global economy — and especially on developing-world importers of energy and food — that dwarf any strategic benefit the US has accrued. The “47 years of bad blood” quote from Middle East Institute senior fellow Alex Vatanka — that the “best-case scenario” is a compromise, not a clear-cut winner — reflects a sober assessment that a significant portion of the foreign policy establishment, including many who are not reflexively anti-intervention, shares. The US munitions stockpile concern is real: analysts quoted by NPR note that the intensive bombing campaign has drawn down US missile inventories to levels that raise questions about the sustainability of extended high-tempo operations. These are not frivolous arguments.

A different read

The problem with the anti-war consensus, as it currently presents itself, is that it treats the status quo ante as recoverable. It is not.

Iran’s nuclear programme, before the war, was weeks from weapons-grade enrichment by multiple independent assessments. The ceasefire and the degradation of Iran’s military infrastructure — whatever its costs — created a condition that did not exist six months ago: a regime without air defenses, without a meaningful navy, and without most of its missile production capacity. That is not nothing. The regime has “dug in its heels and taken an even harder line,” as NPR reports, but “entrenched” is not the same as “invulnerable.” A government that cannot protect its own airspace is operating under strategic constraints that its predecessor did not face.

The Hormuz question deserves more analytical attention than it receives. Iran has turned the Strait into its primary remaining strategic weapon — precisely because it is the one lever it still controls after the destruction of its conventional military forces. NPR reports that Iran and Oman are negotiating a deal to temporarily reopen the strait, but that the Trump administration has rejected the arrangement, refusing to recognise Iranian control or tolerate tolls on an international waterway. The administration’s refusal is, on the merits, legally correct: the Strait of Hormuz is international waters under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and recognising Iranian authority to impose tolls would set a precedent that would outlast any particular diplomatic settlement. The question is whether the legal principle is worth the economic cost, and that is a genuine policy debate rather than an obvious answer.

The Oman complication reveals a recurring pattern in Trump’s Middle East policy: a tendency to pursue maximalist objectives that close off intermediate exits. Threatening to bomb Oman — a US ally — for facilitating a Hormuz reopening negotiation is precisely the kind of move that looks like leverage in the short run but erodes the network of relationships through which American influence actually operates. Oman has historically played a quiet but significant back-channel role in US-Iran relations; the 2015 nuclear deal was partly enabled by Omani facilitation. Threatening Muscat in the middle of a crisis is not a way to keep that channel open.

The historical parallel that cuts most sharply is not Vietnam or Iraq but the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq War, which lasted eight years, killed up to a million people, ended without a clear winner, and left both states economically devastated while the underlying political disputes — Shia-Sunni fault lines, water rights, border demarcation — remained unresolved. No one was “winning” that war after six months either. The regime’s survival instinct proved far more durable than outside analysts predicted, and the international community eventually accepted a ceasefire that left the pre-war status quo essentially intact. The Trump administration’s Operation Economic Outcast — new sanctions announced this week by Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent — may be the right pressure tool, but sanctions have historically strengthened rather than weakened the IRGC’s domestic economic position, as sanctions enforcement creates rents that regime insiders capture.

The 18 American dead deserve to be named and counted. So do the 3,375 Iranians. Wars begun with confident timelines rarely end on them.

What to watch

Watch the Hormuz reopening negotiations: any agreement between Iran and Oman that the US eventually accepts would be a significant signal that the administration is prepared to accept something less than full capitulation. Watch the US munitions pipeline: the pace of replenishment from US defence manufacturers will constrain future military options more than any diplomatic development. Watch Iran’s internal politics: the hardening of the regime line does not mean the population is united behind it, and domestic economic pressure — compounded by the new Bessent sanctions — could eventually create political openings. And watch the UN process: there will be mounting pressure for a formal ceasefire framework that does not depend on bilateral US-Iran negotiations, which have repeatedly stalled.

— J