UK long-term borrowing costs have risen to their highest level since 1998, piling fresh pressure on Prime Minister Andy Burnham ahead of his first Budget. The yield on thirty-year gilts has climbed in recent weeks, a development that economists attribute to persistent inflation, weak growth signals, and investor unease about the UK’s medium-term fiscal trajectory. On the same day the markets delivered this implicit verdict on British public finances, Burnham delivered his first speech to the House of Commons as prime minister, promising “substantial change” and committing to more devolution and public control of essential services. Burnham blamed Brexit and what he called the “wrong turns” of the last forty years of British politics — including the Thatcher era — for the country’s structural problems. A thinktank, the Resolution Foundation, simultaneously proposed funding increased defence spending through a tax rise on middle earners, arguing that Britain’s internationally low “tax wedge” must rise to pay for its defence ambitions.
The received wisdom
The progressive case for Burnham’s programme is coherent and sincerely held. Britain has endured a decade and a half of underinvestment in public services, the Thatcherite marketisation of utilities and healthcare has produced fragmented, expensive, and poorly coordinated outcomes, and Brexit genuinely did impose real costs on trade, labour supply, and regulatory certainty. The rising gilts yield can be read as a temporary disruption — markets are always nervous before budgets — rather than a fundamental rejection of the government’s plans. The Resolution Foundation’s argument that British workers pay less tax than their continental counterparts is empirically supported, and there is a respectable case that a country that wants Scandinavian-quality public services needs to consider Scandinavian levels of taxation. From the centre-left, Burnham’s arrival represents the possibility of a serious structural reform programme, and the bond market’s jitters are simply the price of ambition.
A different read
Burnham made his Commons debut blaming Brexit and Thatcher for Britain’s difficulties. The historical catalogue of blame is not entirely unfair — Brexit did impose real costs, and some of Thatcher’s privatisations did produce the fragmented infrastructure Britain is still living with. But there is something politically and economically revealing about a new prime minister’s opening move being retrospective attribution rather than forward-looking structural reform. Burnham enters office with a Labour majority and a genuine mandate; he does not need to relitigate the 1980s to justify action. The repeated invocation of historical blame is a signal that the programme will be organised around identity and narrative as much as policy substance.
The bond market is a more impartial judge than the Commons chamber. Gilts at their highest yield since 1998 is not a trivial data point. 1998 was, of course, the Gordon Brown era of “prudence with a purpose” — ironically also a Labour government — and the market environment since then has been characterised by generally falling interest rates and accommodating monetary conditions that have now definitively reversed. The Liz Truss mini-Budget episode of 2022 demonstrated, with almost pedagogically perfect clarity, what happens when UK governments present fiscal plans that bond markets find incredible: a rapid, punishing repricing of risk that forces immediate policy reversal. Burnham is not proposing anything like Truss’s unfunded tax cuts; his political instincts run in exactly the opposite direction. But the structural dynamic remains: any UK government that promises simultaneously to increase defence spending, rebuild public services, maintain fiscal rules, and avoid burdening working people with the full cost of those commitments is making promises that require numbers to reconcile.
The Resolution Foundation’s proposal — to fund defence through a middle-earner tax rise — has the virtue of honesty. At least it names the trade-off rather than pretending it doesn’t exist. But it also illustrates the political problem: “substantial change” for Burnham means raising taxes on the people whose support his party needs most. The i-word — investment — has been used by every British government of the last generation to describe spending that would previously have been called debt. The bond market does not care what you call it.
There is a deeper conservative-minded observation here. Burnham’s programme of renationalisation and public control of essential services is presented as pragmatic rather than ideological — evidence-based intervention where markets have failed. But the evidence base for the specific interventions proposed is more mixed than the rhetoric suggests. A thinktank arguing for tax rises on middle earners to pay for defence is making a case that the previous centre-left consensus would have resisted — it concedes that the state’s competing demands cannot all be met without asking the broad middle of the income distribution to pay more. That is an uncomfortable truth for a Labour government that won power partly by promising not to raise taxes on working people.
What to watch
Watch the October Budget for concrete numbers: whether the fiscal rules are maintained, whether the defence spending increase is funded through genuine taxation or accounting creativity, and whether the growth projections that underpin everything are credible. Watch the thirty-year gilt yield — if it continues to rise through the autumn, it signals that markets have not been reassured. Watch whether Burnham’s devolution commitments create a genuine power shift to English regions or become another layer of political management. And watch the Conservatives’ response — Kemi Badenoch accused Burnham of offering “more government control, more taxes and more politicians,” which is a coherent line of attack, but one that requires the Tories to present a credible alternative rather than simply opposing everything.
— J