The ongoing Iran-US conflict has produced unexpected ripple effects within BRICS, the bloc of major non-Western economies that held its most recent summit in Delhi this month. BBC analysis published Sunday notes that the war has simultaneously reshaped BRICS ties and exposed deep divisions within the organisation — with member states taking substantially different positions on the conflict, on Iran’s nuclear programme, and on the broader question of whether the bloc should function as a geopolitical counterweight to the United States or as a platform for economic cooperation that deliberately avoids security entanglement. The divergence illustrates the central tension at the heart of the multipolar project: the states that most want an alternative to American-led order are also the states least able to agree on what that alternative should look like.
The received wisdom
The progressive-internationalist framing of BRICS is broadly sympathetic. These are countries representing a majority of the world’s population, often with legitimate historical grievances against the Western-dominated Bretton Woods system, seeking to build institutions that reflect a more balanced distribution of global economic power. The Iran war, on this reading, confirms the dangers of a unipolar world in which the United States can conduct military operations with minimal multilateral accountability. BRICS solidarity is the appropriate response: a collective refusal to endorse the American-Saudi-Israeli coalition’s framing, and a push for negotiated settlement through non-Western mediators.
There is something to this. The UN Security Council’s paralysis on the Iran conflict — vetoes from both the US and Russia ensuring no resolution can pass — means that any diplomatic movement will require track-two channels, and BRICS members including India and the Gulf states play roles in those channels. The bloc’s value is at least partly as a diplomatic address.
A different read
But the “BRICS as counterweight” narrative has a persistent problem that this week’s events again expose: the member states have fundamentally different interests, and those interests are not converging under pressure. Consider the geometry. Iran is itself a new BRICS member, which means the bloc technically includes both the country being bombed and several of the countries — Saudi Arabia, UAE — whose energy infrastructure is being targeted by Iran’s proxies. The idea that this organisation can speak with one voice on the Iran conflict is not credible on its face.
India is the critical variable. Modi has been careful to maintain working relations with both Washington and Moscow — a balancing act that has become genuinely heroic in its technical complexity — and has no interest in being enrolled into an anti-American coalition that would jeopardise the technology partnerships and defence agreements that underpin India’s strategic autonomy. Brazil under Lula has been more willing to make explicitly anti-American noises, but Brasília’s actual leverage is limited. China, which is the organisational core of the expanded BRICS, has its own reasons for caution: Chinese-Iranian relations have grown significantly since the 2021 cooperation agreement, but Beijing also has enormous economic exposure to Gulf states that Iran’s proxies are attacking, and is dependent on the Strait of Hormuz for its own energy imports.
The Strait of Hormuz problem is worth dwelling on. Houthi activity in the Red Sea and the broader Persian Gulf has already disrupted global shipping to an extent that has raised costs for Chinese manufacturers. China is simultaneously Iran’s largest trading partner and one of the countries most damaged by Iran’s proxy strategy. That is not the profile of a coherent bloc; it is the profile of a transaction cost.
The historical parallel is the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War — a grouping that attracted enormous rhetorical energy and produced some genuine diplomatic achievements, but was repeatedly paralysed by the fact that “non-aligned” meant different things to Egypt, India, Cuba, and Yugoslavia. BRICS is a more economically substantial organisation, but it faces the same structural problem: the unity of the bloc depends on agreement about what it is against, and that negative consensus dissolves the moment the members have to agree on what they are for.
There is also a democratic accountability dimension that tends to get lost in the multipolar enthusiasm. Several of the countries most vocally demanding a post-Western international order are not democracies in any meaningful sense, and the institutions they are proposing — a new reserve currency, alternative to SWIFT, multipolar security architecture — would reduce the accountability mechanisms that, however imperfectly, currently apply to Western-dominated institutions. The case for reforming the Bretton Woods system is strong; the case for replacing it with something built partly on Russian and Chinese preferences is considerably weaker.
What to watch
Watch whether India uses its BRICS position to propose any formal mediation mechanism on the Iran conflict — Modi has the credibility with both Washington and Tehran to attempt this, and the incentive to do so before the war disrupts his own energy supply chains further. Watch whether the Gulf states within BRICS — Saudi Arabia, UAE — begin to act as a distinct caucus with interests divergent from China and Russia’s, which would further hollow out the bloc’s coherence. And watch the Tehran-Muscat talks that were postponed Sunday — Oman remains the most credible quiet-channel mediator, and its decision to delay citing “regional consensus need” suggests Gulf states are not yet aligned on even the terms of a ceasefire conversation.
— J