With Brazilian elections approaching, the country’s political pendulum is swinging hard to the right. Reporting from the bellwether state of Minas Gerais shows Flávio Bolsonaro, the eldest son of the incarcerated former president Jair Bolsonaro, neck-and-neck with incumbent President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in national polling. Flávio has inherited much of his father’s base while attempting to smooth some of his father’s more combustible edges — presenting himself as a vehicle for the same cultural and economic resentments, with a degree more institutional discipline. Jair Bolsonaro himself was convicted after the January 8, 2023 riots and is barred from running. Whether his son can carry the movement to power without him is the central question of this election cycle.
The received wisdom
The dominant left-liberal framing positions a Bolsonaro victory — or even a competitive race — as a democratic emergency: the return of a family that actively undermined democratic institutions, that is linked to a violent attempt to overturn the 2022 election result, and that represents an authoritarian project with regional and global echoes. On this reading, the closeness of the polls reflects not a genuine shift in Brazilian public opinion but the effectiveness of disinformation, economic nostalgia, and the manipulation of evangelical and agribusiness constituencies. Lula’s social programs — including Bolsa Família and increased minimum wage — have materially improved the lives of millions of Brazilians. That voters might nonetheless prefer the Bolsonaristas is, in this framing, a failure of political communication or a testament to the right’s superior machine politics, not a legitimate popular verdict.
A different read
The problem with that framing is that it treats the electorate as either deceived or irrational, which is exactly the kind of managerial condescension that has consistently failed the Latin American left.
Lula’s record is real. Brazil’s poverty rate fell under his third term, and social spending has been genuine. But the Workers’ Party’s political economy has an enduring structural problem: it produces growth and redistribution in commodity boom cycles and tends to produce fiscal crisis and institutional rot when commodity prices fall. The Workers’ Party’s first two terms ended with Lula’s imprisonment and Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment — outcomes that were partly the result of genuine corruption and partly judicial overreach, but that left the party’s institutional credibility deeply damaged. Lula’s return to power in 2022 was narrower than the polls predicted, and his popularity has eroded since.
The more important question is what Bolsonarismo as a political phenomenon actually represents. There is a version of the analysis — common in Davos-adjacent commentary — that treats it purely as authoritarian populism with no legitimate grievances beneath it. That version misses too much. The Bolsonaro coalition includes small farmers who feel squeezed between international capital and domestic taxation, evangelical Christians who genuinely believe their values are under sustained cultural attack, and a security-conscious lower-middle class that experienced a decade of Workers’ Party rule as, among other things, an era of rising violent crime and political clientelism. Those grievances are real, even when the vehicle for expressing them is a family with a troubling relationship to democratic norms.
The historical parallel is instructive. The Argentine right returned to power under Milei after a Peronist economic catastrophe; the Peruvian left came to power under Castillo after a decade of right-wing management failures. In both cases, the electorate was not expressing a coherent ideological preference but a verdict on incumbency: you had your chance, you failed us, we are trying something else. If Lula loses — or nearly loses — the proper analysis is less “Brazilians chose fascism” and more “the Workers’ Party did not do enough, fast enough, to make its social gains irreversible and its governance credible.”
That is a harder lesson to absorb, but it is the one that produces better politics. The left in Latin America has consistently responded to electoral defeats with explanations that preserve its self-image — fraud, disinformation, the machinations of agribusiness — rather than with honest accounting of governance failures. Until that changes, the cycle of left administrations that overreach, invite backlash, and are replaced by right-wing movements that then overreach in turn will continue.
Whether Flávio Bolsonaro as president would be more or less dangerous than his father is genuinely uncertain. He is more tactically cautious. He is also leading a movement whose institutional loyalties run not to Brazilian democracy but to the Bolsonaro family. That is a distinction worth holding in mind while also holding in mind that the incumbent has not given Brazilians sufficient reason to want four more years.
What to watch
- The final polling in Minas Gerais and São Paulo — the two states that have historically determined Brazilian election outcomes
- Whether Jair Bolsonaro’s legal team succeeds in any appeal that could allow him to play a direct role in the campaign
- Lula’s response to the polling deficit — whether he attempts to move toward the centre or doubles down on the Workers’ Party base
- The position of Brazilian markets, which have been volatile around the election cycle and whose signal on Bolsonaro’s economic credibility will matter to foreign investors
— J