The Sahel's jihadi surge, and what we failed to learn from 9/11

As the United States marked the 25th anniversary of the September 11 attacks, conflict monitor ACLED published data showing that Islamist extremist violence in Africa’s Sahel region is set to reach historic highs in 2026, driven by a series of sweeping offensives by groups linked to al-Qaida and Islamic State. The statistics underline, in the Guardian’s framing, “the continued expansion of the veteran organisation [al-Qaida] in parts of Africa — in stark contrast with its relative weakness elsewhere.” The Sahel — encompassing Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, and parts of Nigeria and beyond — has over the past decade become the primary operational theatre for jihadist groups that were once confined to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula. The scale of violence now documented by the data represents not an emerging problem but the culmination of a decade-long trend that Western policy has consistently failed to interrupt.

The received wisdom

The progressive-internationalist framing of Sahel insecurity emphasises structural drivers: poverty, climate change, state fragility, the legacy of French colonial extraction, and the failure of post-independence governments to deliver basic services. On this view, military counterterrorism operations — whether French, American, or those conducted by the Wagner-successor Russian forces now active in Mali and Burkina Faso — are at best palliative and at worst counterproductive, generating civilian casualties that serve as recruitment tools for the very groups they aim to destroy. The solution, on this reading, is development investment, political inclusion, governance reform, and climate adaptation — building the conditions in which jihadist recruitment narratives lose their purchase.

This framing has genuine empirical support. Research on insurgency consistently shows that military operations alone, without accompanying political and economic stabilisation, tend to suppress rather than resolve armed movements. The French Opération Barkhane, which deployed thousands of troops across the Sahel for years before France’s expulsion from Mali and Burkina Faso, did not produce the durable security outcomes it promised. There is no honest accounting of Western counterterrorism in the Sahel that ignores that failure.

A different read

But the structural-drivers framing, while important, tends to obscure an equally important empirical question: why have al-Qaida-linked groups specifically succeeded where other insurgent movements with similar grievances have not? The answer lies, in significant part, in organisational and ideological factors that the structural framing is poorly equipped to address. JNIM (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin), al-Qaida’s principal Sahel affiliate, has been effective not merely because poverty exists in the Sahel — it always has — but because it has combined local grievance articulation with a coherent organisational doctrine, external funding networks, and a capacity for governance in areas it controls that rivals or exceeds that of the states it displaces.

The Guardian’s reporting notes that the violence is “set to reach historic highs” in 2026 — meaning that a quarter-century of global counterterrorism effort, including the destruction of al-Qaida’s Afghan sanctuary, the killing of Osama bin Laden, the degradation of its central leadership, and the subsequent destruction of the Islamic State’s territorial caliphate in Syria and Iraq, has not prevented the organisation from reconstituting itself as a major military force in Africa. This is a strategic data point of the first order, and it has received remarkably little attention in the anniversary commentary.

The lesson the US and its allies drew from 9/11 was primarily tactical: find the network, disrupt the leadership, destroy the sanctuary. The Afghan war, for all its costs and ultimate failure, did deny al-Qaida the organisational infrastructure it had built in Kandahar. The drone campaign that followed dismantled successive generations of senior leadership. But the implicit theory — that destroying the organisational core would prevent reconstitution — has been falsified by events. Al-Qaida franchises have proliferated across the Middle East and Africa precisely because the model is modular: the franchise absorbs local grievances and provides ideological and logistical resources without requiring the central organisation to survive intact.

The Sahel’s particular dynamics compound this problem. France’s withdrawal from Mali and Burkina Faso — a consequence of military coups in both countries whose juntas have expelled French forces in favour of Russian contractors — has created a vacuum that jihadist groups have been adept at filling. The suspected sabotage of Netherlands rail infrastructure this week is a reminder that Russian hybrid warfare tactics are active in Europe; but Russia’s overt military presence in the Sahel, through the Wagner-successor Africa Corps, is arguably a more consequential strategic intervention, one that has weakened rather than strengthened the governance capacity of the countries it supports.

There is a hard question here for the right as well as the left. Conservatives who support a robust military posture against Islamist terrorism must reckon with the fact that twenty-five years of that posture has not prevented the emergence of the largest al-Qaida territorial network since the fall of the Afghan emirate. The counterterrorism model has been refined, technologised, and professionalised — and the underlying trend line points the wrong way. This is not an argument for doing nothing; it is an argument for intellectual honesty about what military operations can and cannot achieve, and for a more serious engagement with the governance and institutional dimensions of the problem.

What to watch

Watch the ACLED data for the remainder of 2026 to see whether the record-high trajectory continues or whether any of the regional security initiatives — the reconstituted G5 Sahel framework, African Union deployments — show measurable impact. Watch whether the Wagner-successor Russia Africa Corps contracts are renewed or renegotiated following the Iran-related strain on Russian military resources. Watch whether any of the Sahel states currently governed by military juntas hold elections, and whether jihadist activity intensifies around electoral periods. And watch whether the US Congress, which has just passed a Russia sanctions bill, engages with the Sahel at all — its near-total absence from the American political conversation is itself a policy choice.

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