Russia's hybrid war is Europe's new normal

French President Emmanuel Macron declared on September 18, 2026 that Russian hybrid attacks against Europe are intensifying, citing a range of operations including sabotage, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and attempts to destabilise Western political systems. His remarks came as Latvia’s president separately warned that Europe is not up to date with drone and aerial warfare in Ukraine, and as reports emerged that Russian drones are increasingly threatening Kyiv-bound Western officials — a tactic interpreted as coercive signalling directed at European capitals as much as at Kyiv itself. The BBC reported separately that Russia’s relentless missile tactics are systematically exhausting Kyiv residents, describing a four-minute warning window that leaves civilians effectively without viable shelter options.

The received wisdom

The liberal-internationalist consensus on Russian hybrid warfare runs roughly as follows: these attacks are serious, they deserve firm multilateral responses, and the appropriate instruments are enhanced cybersecurity cooperation, attribution frameworks, sanctions on responsible individuals, and — above all — maintaining unified Western resolve. The EU’s hybrid threat centre in Helsinki, expanded intelligence sharing, and rhetorical solidarity at summits are held up as the appropriate institutional responses. Macron’s statement fits neatly into this framework: he is rallying European awareness, signalling that France takes the threat seriously, and implicitly calling for greater collective investment in resilience.

This consensus rests on genuine insight. Russian hybrid operations are real, documented, and damaging. The attribution problem is genuinely hard. Multilateral coordination is genuinely necessary. And Macron is right that the intensity appears to be increasing. The question is whether the consensus response — more meetings, more frameworks, more declarations of concern — is remotely proportionate to the operational reality being described.

A different read

Europe’s hybrid warfare problem is not primarily an intelligence or attribution problem. It is a political-will problem, and a structural one at that. Western governments have spent the better part of three years documenting Russian hybrid operations in considerable detail — arson attacks on logistics hubs in Germany and the UK, sabotage of Baltic pipelines and undersea cables, interference in French and German elections, Leipzig railway sabotage linked to Russian military intelligence — while the operational consequences for Russia have been marginal. GRU officers are occasionally indicted; they are not deterred.

The Latvia president’s warning about drone warfare is more pointed than it sounds. Edgars Rinkēvičs told European partners that the continent has not absorbed the lessons of the Ukrainian battlefield — that drone warfare has changed the economics of air defence, that high-value missile interceptors are being expended against cheap munitions at an unsustainable ratio, and that European industrial production has not caught up. This is a material, not rhetorical, problem. You cannot out-diplomacy a manufacturing asymmetry.

The historical parallel that comes to mind is Europe’s response to Soviet subversion during the Cold War — the “active measures” campaigns documented extensively in the Mitrokhin Archive and elsewhere. Western democracies were slow to recognise the scale and seriousness of these operations, partly because the operations were deniable and partly because acknowledging them fully would have required uncomfortable countermeasures. What eventually worked was a combination of counterintelligence hardening, exposure and attribution (bringing operations into daylight where domestic legal consequences could apply), and — crucially — rebuilding the credibility of the deterrent through actual capability investment. Words mattered less than deployments.

The right-leaning critique of the current European response is not that hybrid warfare should be met with military escalation — it should not, at least not reflexively. It is that the continent has become habituated to a posture of rhetorical seriousness combined with operational timidity. Macron’s statement is the latest in a long line of statements. What would actually change Russian calculus is a demonstrated willingness to impose costs — economic, legal, cyber — at a pace and scale that exceeds what Moscow currently factors into its operational planning. Sanctioning three GRU officers does not do this. Disrupting GRU infrastructure might.

Latvia and Estonia have understood this at a visceral level for thirty years. They have invested in civil defence, territorial depth, and counter-hybrid capacity in ways that dwarf their larger European partners as a share of GDP. Their warnings should not be treated as the anxious noise of small states with historical grievances — they are the informed assessment of countries that have watched Russia’s methods evolve up close and have no illusions about what “intensifying” means in practice.

What to watch

  • European industrial defence ramp-up: NATO’s credibility now depends less on summit communiqués than on whether EU member states actually hit their defence spending targets and whether the promised ammunition production increase materialises. Concrete output numbers, not pledges, are the signal to watch.
  • Attribution and legal consequences: The next major documented Russian hybrid operation in Western Europe will be a test. Will governments expel intelligence officers, freeze assets, and bring criminal charges publicly? Or will they issue statements?
  • Baltic early warning: Estonia and Latvia’s own threat assessments — released through their foreign intelligence services — are consistently more accurate than the European consensus. Watch what Tallinn and Riga are saying, not Brussels.
  • Ukrainian air defence attrition: The drone-to-interceptor cost ratio is a leading indicator. If Ukraine begins running critically short of Patriot missiles, the implications for European deterrence are immediate and serious.

— J