Russia's sham elections in Ukraine's occupied east

Russia held parliamentary elections this weekend that, for the first time, included Ukrainian territories Moscow illegally annexed after the start of its full-scale invasion more than four and a half years ago. Voting was conducted in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson — four Ukrainian oblasts that Russia claimed to annex in September 2022 following staged referendums that were rejected as illegitimate by the overwhelming majority of the United Nations General Assembly. Russia simultaneously reported “powerful” cyberattacks on the second day of the parliamentary vote, which Russian officials attributed without evidence to Western-backed sources. The elections are for the State Duma, Russia’s lower house of parliament, and in the context of Russian political life represent the formal codification of an occupation that has displaced hundreds of thousands of civilians and continues to be actively contested by Ukrainian armed forces.

The received wisdom

The standard liberal-internationalist response to this development is appropriate and correct in its fundamentals. International law does not recognise Russia’s annexation. The referendums of 2022 were conducted at gunpoint, without independent oversight, in the midst of active hostilities, and with a predetermined outcome. Incorporating occupied territories into domestic electoral processes is a standard tool of authoritarian consolidation — a technique used by the Soviet Union in the Baltic states after 1940, by Nazi Germany in the Sudetenland, and by various occupation regimes throughout the twentieth century. Holding elections in these territories is an attempt to normalise the abnormal, to launder conquest through the vocabulary of democratic procedure.

The progressive gloss would add that Western governments have been insufficiently responsive to Ukrainian needs throughout this conflict, that Ukraine’s partners have allowed diplomatic fatigue and economic self-interest to attenuate their commitments, and that the holding of these elections is partly a measure of Western failure to impose sufficient costs on Russian aggression. This argument also has merit, and those who have been consistent advocates for robust support for Ukraine are entitled to make it.

A different read

What is less often analysed, however, is what these elections tell us about Russia’s strategic theory of the case — and whether Western policy has adequately grappled with it.

Putin’s approach to annexation has never been purely military. The military phase creates facts on the ground; the administrative, electoral, and legal phases are what Russia hopes will convert temporary military advantage into durable political reality. The sequencing is deliberate. First, military occupation. Then, population management — the documented removal of Ukrainian civilians, particularly children, and their replacement with Russian settlers from other regions. Then, administrative integration — the imposition of Russian law, currency, education system, and bureaucratic structures. And finally, electoral incorporation — the moment when the territory’s “representatives” sit in the Duma and vote on Russian federal budgets.

Each step is designed to create a new baseline. The international community condemns the annexation, but the practical question that confronts it a decade after any such event is: what does reversing it actually look like? The NPR report on the elections notes that these territories are still being actively contested by Ukrainian forces — which means the elections are being conducted in a war zone where Russian administrative control is at best partial. But Russia’s bet is that enough time and enough administrative facts will make the question of reversal practically unanswerable, regardless of what international law says.

This is a pattern with historical precedent. Israel’s gradual annexation of East Jerusalem after 1967 — through settlement expansion, administrative incorporation, and eventually formal annexation in 1980 — followed broadly similar logic. So did Morocco’s absorption of Western Sahara after Spain’s withdrawal in 1975, formalised incrementally through settlement and administrative integration over decades. The international community in both cases declared the annexations illegal and has largely continued to do so. But the practical effect of those declarations, absent enforcement mechanisms, has been modest. Russia is applying the same logic to a much larger and more strategically significant set of territories.

The cyberattacks reported during the vote deserve attention too. Russia’s framing of foreign interference in its domestic elections — including elections held in territories that are not Russia’s under international law — is a rhetorical move worth noting. It allows Moscow to present itself as a democracy under siege, defending its sovereign electoral process against Western subversion, rather than as an occupying power conducting a legitimation exercise in conquered territory. This framing works domestically and, to a surprising degree, in the Global South, where the history of Western interference in other countries’ elections provides Russia with a ready-made tu quoque.

The Trump administration’s signing of sweeping Russia sanctions legislation this week is a relevant data point. However belatedly, the US has codified economic pressure. But sanctions without a diplomatic strategy for their relief are an endgame tool, not a negotiating one. If Western policy is implicitly aimed at freezing the conflict rather than resolving it, Russia’s administrative consolidation of occupied territories will proceed during any ceasefire, making eventual Ukrainian recovery of those territories harder with each year that passes.

What to watch

Watch whether the Duma elections produce any formal legislative acts that further integrate the occupied territories into Russian federal law — such as budget allocations, defence conscription obligations, or infrastructure investment mandates. Each such act deepens the administrative integration that makes reversal harder. Watch the Ukrainian government’s diplomatic response: Kyiv has been consistent in rejecting any negotiation that concedes territory, but its Western partners are not unanimously aligned on that position. Watch whether the elections are cited by any government, including Global South states, as evidence of a democratically expressed preference — that would represent a meaningful diplomatic shift. And watch whether Trump’s Russia sanctions, just signed, are actually enforced or remain primarily symbolic.

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