The United States and China have opened high-level diplomatic talks in preparation for a Trump-Xi summit, with officials from both sides acknowledging the meeting but declining to specify a venue or timeline. The talks are understood to cover a range of issues including trade tariffs, technology restrictions, Taiwan, and the management of the US-led military posture against Iran — in which Beijing has privately expressed displeasure at the disruption to its Gulf energy supplies. The Trump administration has simultaneously signalled unease about China’s rapid AI development and has been pushing for guardrails on military AI applications, which Beijing has rebuffed as an attempt to lock in American technological advantage while limiting Chinese catch-up. The summit, if it happens, would be the first direct Trump-Xi meeting in this presidential term and the highest-level US-China engagement since relations deteriorated sharply after the Taiwan tensions of 2025.
The received wisdom
The case for a Trump-Xi summit is framed by its advocates in the language of pragmatic necessity. The two largest economies on earth — collectively responsible for roughly 40 percent of global GDP — cannot afford to operate in a state of permanent strategic hostility, however much their interests diverge. A summit, even one that produces only modest procedural agreements, is valuable simply as a channel: it restores direct communication at the highest level, reduces the risk of catastrophic misreading of signals, and creates domestic political space on both sides to walk back from more maximalist positions. The Biden administration spent much of its tenure slowly rebuilding the communications infrastructure between Washington and Beijing that had been smashed by the first Trump term; a second summit would consolidate that restoration rather than squander it. For the mainstream foreign policy establishment, dialogue is not naivety — it is the basic machinery of great-power management.
A different read
The summit-is-good framing is largely correct as far as it goes — which is not very far. The real question is not whether Trump and Xi should talk, but what talking is likely to accomplish and whether the current trajectory of the relationship is as manageable as the diplomatic optimists suggest.
Let us start with the structural problem. The US-China relationship is in a fundamentally different place than it was during the engagement era of the 1990s and 2000s. The assumptions that sustained that era — that Chinese economic integration would produce political liberalisation, that Chinese commercial interests would align with a stable US-led international order, that Taiwan’s status could be indefinitely deferred — have all collapsed. What has replaced them is a relationship in which both sides have concluded the other is a long-term strategic adversary, and are organising their defence postures, supply chains, and technology ecosystems accordingly. Summits between adversaries can be useful — Nixon and Brezhnev negotiated arms control agreements that genuinely reduced the risk of nuclear war — but they work when there is a defined, bounded issue to manage. The US-China rivalry is not bounded; it is systemic.
The AI dispute is telling. China is pushing back hard on American warnings about AI development pace, arguing — not entirely unfairly — that US calls for slowdown and guardrails are selectively timed to arrive precisely when China is closing the technological gap. Beijing is not wrong that the same American officials who dismissed AI risk concerns for years have suddenly found enthusiasm for international AI governance now that it might serve to lock in current American advantages. This is a reasonable geopolitical reading. But it does not make the underlying concern about unsupervised military AI development less legitimate; it just makes the diplomatic approach to addressing it harder.
The Trump factor adds a layer of uncertainty that the establishment’s transactional framing tends to underestimate. Unlike Biden, who approached China with consistent strategic competition doctrine, Trump operates transactionally — he is primarily interested in trade concessions, intellectual property commitments, and commercial agreements he can present as victories to his base. Xi, dealing with an economy still digesting a severe property market correction and elevated youth unemployment, needs a deal that delivers enough economic relief to stabilise domestic politics without appearing to capitulate to American pressure. The narrow zone of overlap between Trump’s political requirements and Xi’s is not obviously large. But the zone of mutual catastrophe — a Taiwan miscalculation, an accidental naval engagement, a cyber exchange that escalates — is very large indeed.
The right-of-centre view on this is not hawkish escalation; it is clear-eyed realism. The summit is worth having, but only if both sides understand its limits. It cannot resolve the structural competition. It cannot restore the old engagement consensus. What it can do, at best, is establish minimal red lines around the scenarios — Taiwan, military AI, naval confrontation in the South China Sea — where accident could produce war. That is genuinely valuable. But it requires honesty about what this relationship is, rather than nostalgic invocations of a partnership that no longer exists.
What to watch
Taiwan language in any joint communiqué. Whether Washington reaffirms or softens its “one China” formulation will be the most closely read signal in Taipei and Tokyo. Any ambiguity will be treated as a concession.
AI and semiconductor language. If the summit produces even a framework for military AI communication channels, that would be substantive. Anything less is atmospherics.
Trade deal announcement. Trump will want a headline trade concession. Watch whether any announced deal includes meaningful enforcement mechanisms or is cosmetic enough to be dismissed by Chinese officials within six months.
South Korea and Japan’s response. Both US allies are watching this summit with deep unease. Any signal that Washington is trading allied interests for a bilateral deal with Beijing will accelerate their independent defence build-ups.
— J