Germany's student strikes and the conscription question

Students have struck across Germany in protest against the reintroduction of mandatory military service. The demonstrations, organised under the banner of “Wir dienen nicht” (We do not serve), drew participants in Berlin, Munich, Hamburg, and several university cities, with organisers claiming tens of thousands of attendees. The protests come as the German government pushes ahead with a graduated national service scheme — lighter than the old Bundeswehr conscription that ended in 2011 but designed to rebuild a military that NATO partners have been criticising for inadequate readiness since at least 2022. Germany currently spends approximately 2.1 percent of GDP on defence, meeting the NATO target after years of falling short, but the Bundeswehr remains understaffed and its equipment maintenance record has been publicly criticised. The question of who should serve, and whether the state can compel it, has become one of the defining tensions in European security politics.

The received wisdom

The students’ case deserves a fair hearing. Conscription is a significant imposition on individual liberty. The young people in Berlin and Munich who plan to study medicine, engineering, or the arts have legitimate objections to the state interrupting those plans for six months or a year of military service — particularly when the purpose of that service is not the defence of German territory against an immediate threat but the fulfilment of an alliance commitment that their generation played no role in incurring. There is also the question of equity: the history of conscription in most democracies includes a litany of exemptions, deferrals, and purchased substitutions that mean the burden falls disproportionately on those with fewer resources to navigate the system. Germany’s new scheme, however well-designed, will face the same pressures. And the protesters are right that the decision to abandon conscription in 2011 reflected genuine public consensus — reversing it without adequate democratic deliberation is itself a governance failure.

A different read

The legitimate grievances do not change the underlying strategic reality, which is that Europe’s security has been underwritten for 75 years by an American guarantee that is now explicitly contingent rather than unconditional. President Trump’s statements about NATO — that he would not defend members who do not pay their “fair share” — have been the subject of enormous diplomatic effort to recontextualise, but they have not been retracted. The logical implication, which European governments are only now beginning to absorb in their defence budgets and force structure decisions, is that the continent must develop a meaningful capacity for collective self-defence.

Germany is the central case. It is the largest economy in Europe, geographically the most exposed major power in NATO’s eastern axis, and historically the country whose commitment to collective defence has mattered most. A German military that cannot maintain its own equipment, cannot fill its recruiting targets through voluntarism, and cannot project credible conventional deterrence to the Baltic states and Poland is not merely a German problem — it is a structural weakness in the European security order.

The analogy to the 1930s is overused and I will not deploy it here. A more instructive parallel is Switzerland, a country that has maintained universal male military service continuously since 1874, including through periods of significant pacifist and left-wing political pressure. The Swiss model is not presented as an expression of militarism but as a social contract: the state guarantees security, and citizens contribute proportionally to maintaining it. That contract has survived because it was never fully broken — unlike Germany’s, which was interrupted and then formally abolished, making any restoration feel like imposition rather than tradition.

The demographic reality compounds the problem. Germany has an aging population and a shrinking youth cohort. The mathematics of filling Bundeswehr readiness requirements through an all-volunteer force are challenging even if recruiting incentives are generous. A graduated service scheme — perhaps six months of military or civilian national service — that distributes the obligation broadly rather than relying on a relatively small number of career soldiers is not inherently illiberal; it is a practical response to a genuine capability gap.

The students’ instinct that their generation is being asked to pay for decisions made by their parents and grandparents — the Cold War commitments, the post-Cold War defence dividend, and now the decision to reverse course — is not wrong. But the answer to that complaint is better democratic deliberation about defence policy, not the abdication of the obligation that follows. The question “why should we serve?” deserves a frank institutional answer, not platitudes. What it cannot honestly produce is the conclusion that the obligation does not exist.

What to watch

  • The Bundestag vote on the graduated service legislation: whether the government maintains coalition discipline or faces significant backbench defections on the left.
  • NATO reaction: whether Germany’s domestic difficulties become a factor in alliance planning discussions at the next ministerial meeting.
  • Whether the protests generate cross-border solidarity actions in other EU states with contested conscription policies — France, the Netherlands, and the Nordic countries all have their own versions of this debate.
  • The polling: if the protests shift public opinion among 18-30 year olds toward Reform-adjacent parties or the Greens, that will be the political legacy of this moment regardless of how the legislative fight resolves.

— J