Russian forces have widened their attacks to target Ukraine’s civilian digital infrastructure, including data centres, internet service providers, and business centres housing critical communications equipment. President Volodymyr Zelensky said on Friday that Russia was “constantly expanding its escalation operation,” specifically naming American and other foreign-operated businesses as targets. A drone strike on Kyiv’s Inkom business centre killed four people and damaged a major data centre run by Datagroup. A separate attack killed a fourteen-year-old Israeli citizen in the city’s Pecherskyi district. About 100,000 households in Kyiv suffered internet outages earlier in the week. The Russian defence ministry confirmed the Datagroup strike, claiming the facility was used by Ukrainian military intelligence. Meanwhile, ArcelorMittal announced it could no longer safely operate its steelworks in Kryvyi Rih, Ukraine’s largest steel plant, after a wave of Russian strikes across multiple regions.
The received wisdom
The progressive-liberal consensus frames Russia’s data centre attacks as part of a coherent pattern of hybrid warfare aimed at civilian morale — a war crime that should trigger additional Western sanctions, accelerated weapons deliveries, and renewed diplomatic pressure on neutral states to isolate Moscow. Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha’s framing captures this neatly: targeting data centres disrupts “life-saving information” such as air raid alerts, and is therefore not merely a strategic military act but an act of deliberate civilian terror. The EU’s release of €6.6 billion for Ukraine — including €900 million for its military assistance mission — announced by Kaja Kallas on Friday, is held up as the correct response: escalate support, make Russia feel the cost, and demonstrate that hybrid attacks strengthen rather than weaken Western resolve. The argument is morally coherent and, in important respects, correct.
A different read
What the received wisdom undersells is the strategic novelty of what Russia is now doing, and why that novelty matters beyond the immediate humanitarian horror. Russia is not simply adding data centres to a target list that already includes power stations and railways. It is testing, at scale, a doctrine of infrastructure disaggregation: the deliberate destruction of the civilian information layer that modern economies require to function at all — not just light and heat, but routing tables, DNS servers, alert systems, and the business continuity platforms that allow institutions to keep operating under bombardment.
This doctrine has a lineage. The United States developed its own version during Operation Desert Storm, when the targeting of Iraqi command-and-control networks was celebrated as “network-centric warfare.” The difference is that in 1991, precision munitions were used against explicitly military command nodes. What Russia is doing in 2026 is using cheap drone swarms to attack civilian data infrastructure while claiming military intelligence usage as legal cover — a claim that, as Sybiha correctly notes, would logically justify destroying every data centre in any country that uses civilian cloud providers for any government function.
The strategic logic from Moscow’s perspective is rational even if the methods are illegal. Winter is approaching. Russia has been intensifying strikes on Ukraine’s energy grid for weeks. Polish prosecutors have opened an investigation into what they believe was Russian sabotage of a Starlink relay station in Wola Krobowska — the network that transmits internet traffic through Poland to Ukraine. If Russia can simultaneously degrade Ukraine’s power, its logistics, its industrial base (the ArcelorMittal shutdown is significant: steel is essential for military hardware production), and now its internet layer, the cumulative effect is not merely civilian hardship but a degradation of Ukraine’s capacity to coordinate its own defence.
The NATO response has been to warn publicly of Russian hybrid operations — Germany blamed Russia for an attempted drone attack on Leipzig-Halle Airport, France ordered plans to protect its critical infrastructure — but warnings are not the same as deterrence. Lavrov’s statement that Russia’s war in Ukraine will continue “through to the end” signals that Moscow has made a strategic decision that neither Western economic pressure nor battlefield reverses have altered. The data centre campaign is the expression of that decision in a new domain.
The harder question for Western policymakers is one of proportionality and response. Ukraine’s suggestion of “additional decisions” to protect data infrastructure is sensible but limited — you cannot fully harden dispersed civilian internet nodes against drone swarms. The EU’s €6.6 billion package helps, but none of it addresses the specific military capability gap: Ukraine needs better drone interdiction over its capital, which requires either better air defence or the willingness to strike Russian drone launch sites more aggressively, a decision that remains politically constrained in Brussels and Washington.
Putin’s Friday comments that Moscow would “give careful thought” to resuming direct peace negotiations — after noting that Ukraine “must feel our retaliatory strikes” — are not a peace signal. They are a performative gesture, made credible by accompanying violence, designed for a Western audience that increasingly needs to justify its support to a war-fatigued public. The price of credulity here is strategic: it legitimises the idea that Russian attacks “create the conditions” for talks, rather than constitute the reason talks are impossible.
What to watch
Watch whether NATO allies accelerate delivery of additional SHORAD (short-range air defence) systems capable of intercepting drone swarms at the urban scale Russia is now deploying. Track ArcelorMittal’s Kryvyi Rih shutdown: if it becomes permanent, Ukraine loses a critical industrial asset. Monitor Polish and German investigations into Russian hybrid attacks on their own infrastructure — if Moscow extends the data centre doctrine to NATO members, that triggers Article 5 discussions that European governments are currently trying to avoid. Finally, watch the Starlink Poland relay: SpaceX’s continued provision of connectivity is a strategic dependency that Russia is actively working to sever.
— J