US forces have destroyed at least eight Ecuadorian fishing vessels in international waters in a little over two weeks, part of a broader pattern of nearly 70 US airstrikes in the Pacific and Caribbean that have killed 234 people since last year. The operations follow a bilateral agreement between President Trump and Ecuador’s far-right president Daniel Noboa, signed in March, authorising joint counter-narcotics operations and granting US military personnel immunity from criminal prosecution. US Southern Command claims intelligence confirmed the vessels were being used by criminal gangs as “floating refuelling stations” for drug-running speedboats. The fishermen deny this. The captain of one destroyed vessel, the Don Rufo, told the Guardian that when he tried to show US personnel his catch, they would not listen, before placing bombs aboard, handcuffing and blindfolding him and his crew, and destroying the boat. Ten other crew members were left adrift in the Pacific for two days before being rescued by the Ecuadorian navy. The Washington Post has reported that some of these attacks are part of a covert CIA programme.
The received wisdom
The progressive framing is one of unambiguous imperialism: the United States is projecting lethal force into the territorial waters of sovereign Latin American states without judicial oversight, killing civilians on the basis of “intelligence” that cannot be reviewed by any court, under an agreement negotiated with a Noboa government that has its own human rights record of torture and forced disappearances. The comparison to counterterrorism drone strikes — Trump’s own invocation of “like ISIS” as justification — lands heavily, because the post-9/11 drone programme’s legal architecture was rightly criticised for its opacity, its civilian casualty counts, and its tendency to expand indefinitely once normalised. Secretary of State Marco Rubio accepting Ecuador’s highest national honour while Ecuadorian fishermen were adrift in the Pacific captures the hypocrisy with uncomfortable precision. Human rights organisations and journalists have documented multiple cases where the evidence for drug trafficking involvement appears thin or absent.
A different read
The conservative instinct to celebrate this programme — disrupting narco networks, projecting decisive force, leveraging partnerships with Latin America’s newly right-aligned governments — is understandable but legally and strategically shortsighted in ways that ought to concern anyone who takes the rule of law seriously as a conservative principle rather than just a rhetorical convenience.
Start with the due process problem, which is not a progressive invention. The fifth Amendment to the US Constitution requires that no person be deprived of property or life without due process of law. The counter-narcotics drone programme operates on the basis of executive-determined intelligence assessments that are not reviewed by any court before force is used. This is not a new concern — it was raised persistently, including by conservative legal scholars, about the Obama-era targeted killing programme. The argument then, as now, is that the executive branch cannot function as judge, jury, and executioner simultaneously, regardless of the target’s suspected criminality. The rule of law requires process not because criminals deserve sympathy but because processes exist to protect against error — and in this case, the captain of the Don Rufo was trying to show officers his fish when his livelihood was blown up.
The scale of error matters. Seventy US airstrikes killing 234 people is not a pinpoint campaign against cartel leadership. It is an area operation that treats commercial fishing grounds as a free-fire zone. Ecuador is not a drug-producing country — it is a transit hub, meaning that the vessels operating in these waters are overwhelmingly engaged in legitimate commerce. The base rate of actual drug-running vessels among all fishing boats in the eastern Pacific is low enough that “intelligence confirmation” becomes critically important — and the immunity agreement with Ecuador means there is no mechanism for independent verification.
The geopolitical problem compounds the legal one. Trump’s “Shield of the Americas” coalition has built its counter-narcotics architecture around leaders willing to authorise joint operations and grant US troop immunity: Noboa in Ecuador, recently-joined Peru and Colombia. The coalition now includes all but left-governed Latin American states — Mexico and Brazil remain outside it. This means the programme creates a visible dividing line between US-affiliated right-wing governments and left-aligned states, transforming a law enforcement question into an ideological patronage arrangement. When Ecuador’s iron-fist approach “has done little to reduce violence” while eroding human rights — Will Freeman’s assessment at the Council on Foreign Relations — the “laboratory” for new US methods may be producing a failed experiment that will discredit both the policy and the governments that implemented it.
The conservative case for the rule of law is not squeamishness about using force. It is the understanding, hard-won over centuries, that unaccountable state violence — however justified in individual cases — creates precedents and institutional habits that eventually devour the liberties they were supposed to protect. The post-9/11 AUMF precedent should be instructive: a law passed for one purpose, against one enemy, has been used to justify military action in multiple countries against groups that did not exist in 2001. “Like ISIS, they should be killed, exiled or detained” — Trump’s formulation — is precisely the logic that made the AUMF so expansive. Applied to civilian fishermen in international waters, it should give constitutional conservatives pause.
What to watch
Watch the CIA programme disclosure: the Washington Post report has not been officially confirmed or denied, and congressional oversight committees have not yet held hearings. If they do, watch how Republicans who criticised Obama’s drone programme respond when the same legal questions are asked of Trump’s. Track the human rights documentation in Ecuador: if the “Guayaquil Four” pattern — military interactions ending in civilian deaths and disappearances — extends to the maritime operations, the political sustainability of the Noboa government’s partnership with Washington degrades. Monitor Brazil’s October election: if the Bolsonaro-aligned candidate wins, Brazil may join the Shield of the Americas, significantly expanding the programme’s geographic reach. Finally, watch whether Ecuador’s own courts attempt to assert jurisdiction over the US immunity agreement — several Latin American constitutional courts have previously invalidated bilateral military arrangements on sovereignty grounds.
— J