Ethiopia recaptures Sekota but the war is widening

Ethiopia’s military has reportedly recaptured the strategic town of Sekota from Tigrayan rebel forces, according to Al Jazeera, as fighting has spread significantly beyond the areas covered by the November 2022 Pretoria peace agreement. The Guardian reported that Tigrayan rebels have formed a new coalition explicitly “aimed at overthrowing Abiy Ahmed’s government,” a significant escalation in stated war aims. Fighting that was expected to remain localised appears to be spreading, raising fears — explicitly voiced by regional observers — of a return to the full-scale civil war that killed an estimated 300,000 to 500,000 people between 2020 and 2022. The conflict’s resumption comes as the Pretoria agreement has been widely described as stalled on implementation of its key provisions, particularly the disarmament of Tigrayan forces and the return of occupied territories.

The received wisdom

The mainstream international framing of the Ethiopian conflict has, since November 2022, been one of fragile but real progress. The Pretoria peace agreement was hailed as a diplomatic success — brokered by the African Union in a demonstration of African-led conflict resolution that Western capitals were eager to validate. The narrative held that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, however tarnished by the conduct of the war, remained the best available option for Ethiopian stability; that Tigrayan leaders, chastened by military losses and international isolation, would gradually demobilise; and that the humanitarian situation, catastrophic in 2021-22, was slowly improving. Development institutions continued disbursing aid. The UN maintained that the political process, however slow, was the only viable path. This is a defensible position that reflects a genuine desire not to see the region return to mass atrocity. It also reflects the institutional preference of large multilateral bodies for the peace agreement they helped create.

A different read

The recapture of Sekota by federal forces is military news of a particular kind: it indicates that Tigrayan forces had recently taken Sekota, which means the Pretoria agreement has already broken down in ways not being adequately signalled in international coverage. The formation of a new rebel coalition aimed at removing Abiy Ahmed entirely is not an incremental deterioration — it is a fundamental change in the nature of the conflict. If accurate, it suggests that the Tigrayan political leadership has concluded the agreement is dead and has chosen renewed war as the alternative to either submission or continued limbo.

The history of the Pretoria agreement’s implementation is relevant here. Al Jazeera’s reporting places current events in the context of a conflict that never truly ended but merely paused. The disarmament provisions were never fully implemented. Eritrean forces — which played a significant and brutal role in the 2020-22 phase — were never included in the peace process. Abiy Ahmed’s government, facing its own internal political pressures from Amhara nationalist movements and ongoing conflict in Oromia, has limited bandwidth and limited incentive to make concessions that would alienate domestic constituencies. The Tigrayan leadership, meanwhile, watched the post-Pretoria period produce little of the reconstruction aid, reintegration of regional administration, and political normalisation that were promised.

The broader context is that Ethiopia is simultaneously managing conflicts in Tigray, Amhara region, and Oromia. This is not a government that has stabilised and is managing a single insurgency; it is a state facing multiple simultaneous challenges to its territorial integrity. The Guardian’s framing — “fears of a return to civil war” — understates what may already be happening. The scale of fighting that constitutes “civil war” rather than “armed insurgency” is partly a definitional question, but the formation of a regime-change coalition crosses a threshold that should concentrate minds.

The international community’s record on Ethiopia has been poor. The 2020-22 war killed more people than almost any other conflict of that era and received a fraction of the media attention of smaller conflicts elsewhere. The African Union’s diplomatic investment in the Pretoria agreement created an institutional incentive to describe the peace process as alive even as it hollowed out. Western governments, distracted by Ukraine and the Middle East, largely allowed this fiction to persist. The humanitarian consequences of a renewed full-scale conflict would be immense — the region’s food security is already severely stressed by the legacy of the last war and by ongoing drought.

What to watch

Watch whether Tigrayan rebel communications confirm the formation of a formal anti-government coalition and whether other Ethiopian ethnic armed groups — particularly in Amhara — join it, which would dramatically change the strategic situation. Watch the African Union’s response: does the AU acknowledge that Pretoria has effectively collapsed, or does it maintain the fiction that the agreement is salvageable? Watch international humanitarian organisations’ access to conflict areas, which tends to be an early indicator of how severe conditions on the ground are becoming. And watch Eritrea: President Isaias Afwerki’s posture toward the Tigrayan leadership has been consistently hostile, and renewed Eritrean involvement would substantially escalate the conflict’s brutality.

--- J