America leaves Baghdad and Turkey moves in

American forces completed their withdrawal from the last remaining US military base in Baghdad on Tuesday, ending a presence in the Iraqi capital that began with the 2003 invasion — a presence that, at its peak, comprised over 150,000 troops and cost hundreds of billions of dollars. Al Jazeera reported the final handover, noting that Iraqi officials welcomed the departure as a restoration of full sovereignty, while questions immediately arose about Baghdad’s ability to handle future security challenges alone. Simultaneously, NPR published a detailed analysis noting that as the US signals a smaller Middle East footprint, Turkey is positioning itself to step in, with Ankara cultivating ties across the region in the wake of the Hamas attack on Israel in 2023 and the ongoing Iran war. The convergence of these two stories — American departure and Turkish ascendancy — marks a potentially decisive inflection point for the region’s strategic architecture.

The received wisdom

The liberal internationalist case for the US withdrawal runs something like this: America has been mired in Iraq for over two decades, spending blood and treasure on an intervention whose democratic ambitions were never realised, whose stabilisation goals were only partially achieved, and whose presence became, over time, more of a recruitment tool for Iranian-backed militias than a bulwark against them. A US footprint in Baghdad had, by the mid-2020s, become a symbol of imperial overextension rather than a guarantor of security. The Iraqi government — an elected one, however imperfect — had repeatedly requested American troops leave. Honouring that request is not retreat; it is respect for sovereignty and the culmination of a transition that began under Obama and has continued across multiple administrations. As for Turkey filling the vacuum: Ankara is a NATO member, a regional power, and a more legitimate interlocutor with Arab governments than Washington has been since 2003. That reading has real merit and represents the honest version of the administration’s position.

A different read

The problem with the received wisdom is its assumption that vacuums stay empty — that when American power recedes, something better (or at least no worse) will replace it. History offers limited support for this view. The 2011 Libya intervention, which ended with Gaddafi’s removal and no stabilising follow-through, produced a failed state and a migration crisis that continues to destabilise Europe. The Obama-era drawdown from Iraq in 2011 — which also followed an Iraqi parliamentary request — created the conditions for the rapid rise of the Islamic State, requiring a costly re-intervention. Al Jazeera’s inside story segment frames the question of whether Iraq can handle security challenges alone as genuinely open — and the honest answer, based on available evidence, is: probably not without significant external support.

Turkey is the more interesting part of this story. NPR’s analysis describes Ankara positioning itself to fill the void left by a retreating America in a Middle East reshaped by the Gaza war and the conflict with Iran. There are reasons to be glad of this and reasons to be deeply concerned. On the positive side, Turkey has relationships across ideological and sectarian lines that Washington lacks — it talks to Hamas, to Iran, to the Gulf states, and to Israel simultaneously, and its geographic position gives it real leverage. On the negative side, President Erdoğan’s Turkey has, over the past decade, demonstrated a consistent willingness to use regional presence for nationalist political ends rather than stability. Turkish military operations in Syria have killed Kurdish fighters who were America’s primary partner in defeating the Islamic State. Turkish diplomatic overtures to Russia continued even as NATO stood behind Ukraine. Turkey under Erdoğan is not a rogue state — but it is an unreliable one, and a regional architecture built around its preferences is unlikely to be congenial to either liberal democratic values or stable minority rights.

There is also an Iran dimension that deserves more attention than it typically receives. The US withdrawal from Baghdad removes a physical tripwire against Iranian-backed militia operations in central Iraq. For all the costs of the American presence, it served as a constraint on the most aggressive impulses of groups like Kata’ib Hezbollah, whose power and reach have grown substantially in the years since the 2020 killing of Qasem Soleimani scrambled the landscape. A Baghdad without any US military presence is a Baghdad where those groups face considerably less friction. Whether Iraq’s own security forces can supply that friction is a question the next six to twelve months will answer empirically.

The broader argument for conservatives is straightforward: American strategic retrenchment is not inherently wrong — the forward deployment posture of the post-9/11 era was expensive, strategically incoherent, and politically unsustainable. But retrenchment that is not accompanied by a coherent theory of what replaces the withdrawn presence is not strategy — it is withdrawal. The difference between an orderly strategic repositioning and an ungainly retreat is whether you have thought through the second-order effects. The evidence on that front, from Iraq to Afghanistan before it, is not encouraging.

What to watch

Watch whether Iranian-backed militias test the new Baghdad security environment in the weeks following the US departure — the tempo of provocations will be an early indicator of whether the withdrawal has changed the operational calculus. Watch Turkey’s specific diplomatic moves: who does Erdoğan call, what deals does he offer, and to whom does he align himself on the Palestinian question, which remains the region’s most potent mobilising issue. Watch whether the remaining US presence in Iraqi Kurdistan becomes a new focal point for Iranian pressure or, conversely, a durable foothold that gives Washington continued leverage. Finally, watch Iraqi political dynamics: the question of which external power Shia political parties turn to in the absence of an American military anchor will define Iraqi foreign policy for the next decade.

— J