Plans to reunify Libya’s fractured governance have collapsed after allegations emerged that Saddam Haftar, deputy commander of the Libyan National Army and son of warlord Khalifa Haftar, oversaw a “terror cell” that launched drone attacks on fuel storage facilities and power stations in western Libya. The Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU) — the UN-recognised administration that controls western Libya — declared further cooperation with the Haftar faction “impossible” following the revelations. The US State Department, which had been quietly positioning Saddam Haftar as a key figure in its vision of a unified Libyan security architecture, has declined to comment directly. The UN Support Mission in Libya, which has shepherded multiple failed unity frameworks since 2020, is reported to be reassessing its mediation strategy. Libya’s oil revenues — which flow through competing institutions controlled by rival factions — remain frozen in contested accounts.
The received wisdom
The standard Western analysis of Libya frames the problem as a governance deficit: too many armed groups, too little institutional capacity, an economy dependent on oil revenues that fuel factional competition rather than public goods. The solution, in this telling, is patient multilateral engagement — UN-facilitated dialogue, power-sharing frameworks, integration of rival militias into a unified security sector, technical assistance for elections. The Obama administration’s 2011 intervention removed Gaddafi but left the country without a functioning state, a failure the international community has been trying to retrospectively correct ever since. The current impasse, this reading holds, reflects insufficient commitment to the process rather than a flaw in the process itself.
A different read
This is not a governance deficit. It is a power reality that governance frameworks persistently refuse to acknowledge.
Libya has no state because the parties that matter — the Haftar family’s eastern LNA, the Tripoli-based GNU, the Misrata militias, the myriad armed groups in the south — have no incentive to accept a unified framework that would constrain their access to oil revenues and territorial control. Each engagement that appears to make progress falls apart not because of technical deficiencies in the negotiation design but because one or more parties concludes that delay is more profitable than settlement. Saddam Haftar’s alleged drone strikes on western Libya’s fuel infrastructure are not a deviation from this pattern; they are the pattern, expressed with unusual operational bluntness.
The deeper problem is a characteristic failure of American and European Libya policy: the willingness to treat armed actors as interlocutors without addressing the material incentives that make conflict more rational than peace. The US investment in Saddam Haftar as a “key figure” — made while evidence of his faction’s destabilisation activities was apparently available to intelligence services — reflects a pattern observable from Kabul to Baghdad to Tripoli: the selection of tractable strongmen as partners, followed by surprise when those strongmen use American backing to consolidate local power rather than build Western-style institutions.
The 2011 intervention is now old enough for honest assessment. The humanitarian case for removing Gaddafi was genuine — his threat to massacre the population of Benghazi was credible and imminent. But the strategic case for what followed was never made. No post-intervention planning of comparable seriousness to the combat operation was prepared. France and Britain, which led the air campaign, had no coherent vision of what a post-Gaddafi Libya would look like, and the Obama administration’s “leading from behind” posture meant American leverage was deployed at maximum distance from accountability. The result was a power vacuum filled by exactly the armed competition that now defines Libyan politics.
There is a respectable realist counter-argument: that some countries are simply not amenable to Western-style institutional development on any achievable timeline, and that the appropriate policy response is selective engagement — keeping oil flowing where possible, preventing the worst humanitarian outcomes, avoiding entanglement in domestic power contests. This view, which sounds cynical, has the advantage of being approximately accurate about Libya’s situation. The Haftar family controls roughly 60 percent of Libya’s oil infrastructure. Any stable arrangement that involves oil revenues flowing to international markets will involve accommodating some version of eastern Libya’s strongman governance. The question is whether that accommodation can be made while maintaining minimal constraints on the worst abuses — or whether the West’s insistence on democratic legitimacy simply ensures that no arrangement is ever made at all.
What to watch
- Whether the State Department publicly distances itself from Saddam Haftar following the drone attack allegations, or continues the quiet partnership in hopes of salvaging the unity framework — a test of whether Washington can update its position when its chosen partners act contrary to stated objectives.
- The trajectory of Libyan oil revenues: if the contested accounts remain frozen, both the GNU and the LNA face fiscal pressure that could either push them toward compromise or toward more aggressive resource capture.
- Algeria’s regional role: Algeria’s government this week sent fighter jets to Niger to block what it described as a coup attempt — a signal that Algiers is increasingly willing to project military power in the Sahel. Algeria borders Libya and has its own interests in preventing LNA consolidation on its eastern frontier.
- UN mandate renewal: the Security Council votes on the UN Support Mission’s mandate in the coming weeks; Russia and China have previously used such votes to constrain the mission’s scope.
— J