Pakistan's Imran Khan march and the limits of lawfare

Supporters of jailed former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan launched a mass march toward Islamabad on Sunday after talks between the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party and the government broke down, according to Al Jazeera. The march, organized under the banner of demanding Khan’s release, follows a series of similar mobilizations over the past eighteen months that have consistently demonstrated PTI’s ability to turn out hundreds of thousands of supporters in major cities while consistently falling short of the threshold required to force either the military establishment or the civilian coalition government to change course. Khan himself remains imprisoned on a series of charges — including corruption, unlawful marriage, and, most seriously, inciting the May 9, 2023 attacks on military installations — which his supporters describe as politically motivated persecution and which his opponents characterize as the legitimate application of law to a man who never respected it when he held power. The march reached the outskirts of Islamabad by Sunday evening before being met by security forces deploying tear gas and container barriers, the same pattern that has played out at each previous mobilization.

The received wisdom

The liberal-internationalist position on Pakistan is structurally sympathetic to Imran Khan, and not without reason. The circumstances of his ouster in April 2022 — a parliamentary no-confidence vote of questionable procedural regularity, orchestrated with apparent military blessing — were not a model of democratic transition. The charges against him have multiplied with suspicious speed and convenience. The trials have been held in unusual venues, including a converted classroom in Adiala Jail, in ways that have drawn criticism from bar associations and human rights organizations. The suppression of PTI’s social media presence and the detention of its activists constitute a recognizable playbook of authoritarian pressure on political opposition. On this reading, Khan is a flawed but democratically legitimate figure being crushed by a security state unwilling to accept electoral accountability.

A different read

The problem with this framing is that it selects the starting point of the narrative with great care. Begin the story in April 2022, and Khan is a victim of a coup-in-suits. Begin it in August 2018 — when Khan took office with conspicuous military backing, using state apparatus to harass opposition politicians, muzzle independent media, and install loyalists in key institutions — and the picture is considerably murkier. Imran Khan was, for most of his time in power, enthusiastically complicit in the same civil-military fusion he now denounces. He benefited from judicial time-serving when it served him and decried it when it turned against him. His economic record was poor: growth slowed, the rupee collapsed, and the IMF relationship deteriorated before the COVID shock could shoulder all the blame.

None of this justifies arbitrary detention or politically timed prosecutions. The rule of law is indivisible: you cannot selectively apply it to opponents while exempting allies, and Pakistan’s establishment has a long and inglorious history of doing precisely that. But the argument that Khan must be released because he is popular confuses democratic sentiment with democratic legitimacy. Popularity is not innocence. Majorities can be mobilized behind people who have committed genuine wrongs, and the courts — however imperfect — are not obliged to suspend proceedings because the defendant’s supporters have taken to the streets.

The deeper structural issue is Pakistan’s recurring failure to build institutions capable of holding any politician accountable without those institutions being perceived as tools of factional warfare. The army engineered Khan’s rise, then engineered his fall. The civilian establishment, which suffered under Khan’s tenure, is now using the same legal mechanisms against him that he used against them. The cycle produces a political culture in which every actor believes that legality is a weapon, not a constraint — and that belief, held widely enough, becomes self-fulfilling. PTI’s marches will not resolve this. Releasing Khan without institutional reform will not resolve it either. What Pakistan needs — a judiciary genuinely independent of both military pressure and political patronage, an electoral commission whose neutrality is not contested by every losing party — is precisely what none of its current power centres have an incentive to create.

The geopolitical stakes should not be understated. Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state of 240 million people bordering Afghanistan, Iran, India, and China. Political instability that degrades civilian oversight of the military is not merely a domestic matter. Washington, Beijing, and Riyadh all have interests in Pakistani stability, and all have historically preferred a predictable security state to the unpredictability of genuine democratic accountability. That preference is part of why the cycle has proved so durable.

What to watch

  • Government response in Islamabad: Will security forces allow the march to reach D-Chowk, the symbolic protest space near parliament, or will containment escalate to serious violence?
  • Khan’s legal proceedings: Key hearings in the cipher case and the terrorism charges related to May 9 are pending. Watch for any bail applications and judicial responses.
  • Military posture: The army’s silence on PTI’s recent mobilizations is notable. Any public statement — or conspicuous absence of one — will be read as a signal about the establishment’s appetite for continued suppression.
  • Economic pressure: Pakistan’s IMF programme is in quarterly review. Political instability that threatens fiscal reform implementation could trigger a funding pause, which historically creates pressure for political resolution.

— J