Zaporizhzhia and the glide bomb normalisation

A Russian glide bomb attack on the city of Zaporizhzhia killed at least twenty people and wounded dozens more on Saturday, Ukrainian authorities reported. The strike hit a residential district in the late morning, when civilians were outside. Glide bombs — conventional aerial munitions fitted with GPS guidance kits and fold-out wings that allow them to be released from outside Ukrainian air-defence range — have become Russia’s weapon of choice for strikes that high-altitude drones and ballistic missiles cannot deliver with the same payload. The Zaporizhzhia attack is the deadliest single glide bomb strike on a Ukrainian city in several weeks and follows a pattern of intensifying attacks on civilian urban areas that international observers have been documenting through the autumn.

The received wisdom

The liberal-internationalist reading is consistent and, on the bare facts, accurate: Russia is committing war crimes on a systematic basis, the International Criminal Court has issued warrants, and the West’s failure to provide Ukraine with the weapons needed to shoot down glide bombs — particularly Western-supplied fighter aircraft with adequate stand-off jamming capability — bears some moral responsibility for these deaths. The argument proceeds that the restraint exercised by Western governments on arms transfers has been calibrated to avoid escalation with Moscow but has in practice simply given Russia a permissive environment in which to inflict maximum civilian suffering with minimal military risk. The advocates of this position are not wrong about the weapons gap: glide bombs are largely immune to the Soviet-era air defence systems Ukraine still primarily relies upon, and the gap between what Ukraine needs and what it has received remains significant.

A different read

The received framing is correct as far as it goes — but it treats the weapons supply problem as the primary variable, when the deeper issue is the normalisation of a specific form of warfare that the Western deterrence framework was supposed to prevent.

Glide bombs represent something strategically distinct from conventional artillery or even cruise missiles. Their economics are compelling for Russia: they are cheap to produce relative to precision-guided ballistic weapons, they can be released by aircraft that never enter contested airspace, and they carry a sufficient payload to destroy multi-storey apartment buildings. What makes them particularly significant is that they represent a deliberate Russian decision to systematically target civilian urban areas rather than military infrastructure — a decision that, whatever the military logic, constitutes a textbook violation of the laws of armed conflict under Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. The pattern of strikes — cities, markets, residential areas on weekend mornings — does not lend itself to the “dual-use” or “military necessity” defences that are routinely offered.

What is striking, viewed from a longer historical lens, is how thoroughly the post-1945 humanitarian law framework has failed to deter this conduct. The framework was not merely a set of aspirational norms: it was backed by the expectation that great powers would enforce compliance, whether through military deterrence, economic punishment, or international prosecution. Russia’s conduct in Ukraine since 2022 tests every pillar of that expectation simultaneously, and the West’s response — incremental arms transfers, rolling sanctions, ICC referrals that Russia ignores — has not altered Russia’s military conduct in any discernible way.

The harder argument here is not primarily about weapons, though weapons matter. It is about whether the West has a coherent theory of coercion — a credible account of what costs Russia will face if it continues and intensifies these strikes. The current posture implies that the costs are tolerable. Until that calculus changes, the attacks on Zaporizhzhia and cities like it will continue. The diplomatic class in Washington and Brussels has been reluctant to state this plainly because the honest conclusion is uncomfortable: either the West is prepared to impose costs sufficient to change Russian conduct, or it is not, and if it is not, then the repeated invocations of international humanitarian law are more liturgy than strategy.

What to watch

  • Whether Ukraine’s air-defence situation changes materially: any announcement of Western-supplied systems specifically capable of intercepting glide bombs would be strategically significant.
  • ICC proceedings: watch whether the court’s existing warrant framework extends to glide bomb strikes and whether any Western government moves to deepen enforcement mechanisms.
  • Russian targeting patterns: if attacks intensify ahead of winter, the political pressure on European governments to accelerate weapons transfers will mount sharply.
  • The Ukrainian counter-offer: Kyiv has periodically proposed to trade territorial acknowledgements for air-defence guarantees — whether that framework resurfaces in any back-channel is worth watching.

— J