Violent protests erupted across France on October 17, with more than a thousand people arrested as demonstrators clashed with police in Paris and other cities over the rising cost of living. Buildings and cars were set ablaze, shops were looted, and reporters for international outlets were assaulted during the unrest. The protests, which began as student-led demonstrations and quickly drew in broader working-class participation, targeted the government’s failure to contain food and energy prices that have remained stubbornly elevated for three years. French police deployed in force but struggled to contain the disorder, which spread across multiple arrondissements in Paris and replicated in Lyon, Marseille, and Bordeaux. The scenes drew comparisons to the Gilets Jaunes movement of 2018, though analysts noted that the current unrest carries a deeper economic despair.
The received wisdom
The instinctive progressive reading of these events is sympathetic and not wrong on its face: ordinary working people have been squeezed for years by inflation their governments failed to prevent, and street protest is a legitimate democratic expression of that pain. Cost of living pressures have hit Belgium, Italy, and Portugal simultaneously, suggesting a systemic European failure rather than French mismanagement alone. The left argues that austerity has hollowed out the social safety net that should have cushioned the blow, and that corporate price-gouging in food and energy sectors has been enabled by governments too deferential to business interests. On this reading, the riots are a rational, if destructive, response to a decade of economic governance that prioritised financial stability over wage earners.
There is also a familiar media tendency to romanticise French street politics as a virtuous national tradition — the inheritors of 1789, 1848, 1968. The blockaded intersection as republican virtue.
A different read
Let us grant the underlying grievance. Food prices in France are up nearly thirty percent since 2021. Energy costs, partially cushioned by state subsidies that are now being wound down under fiscal pressure, are hitting household budgets directly. The working population that cannot work from home — drivers, hospitality staff, care workers, tradespeople — has absorbed these costs without the cushion of asset appreciation that protected the professional class. These are real and serious hardships, and dismissing them as mere economic illiteracy would be both callous and wrong.
But the right analysis of a real grievance is not automatically the one that validates the response to it. The French government did not create global commodity inflation. It did not, on its own, produce the energy price spiral that followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the disruption to European gas flows. What it did do — and what successive French governments of both left and right have done for thirty years — is maintain a fiscal and regulatory structure that makes the country extraordinarily resistant to the kind of supply-side reforms that might have built more resilience into the economy. France has one of the highest tax burdens in the OECD. Its labour market remains heavily regulated in ways that deter entry-level hiring. Its energy mix, historically a model for the rest of Europe thanks to nuclear power, was partially undone by the ideological hostility of the Hollande-era Greens to nuclear — a decision whose consequences are still being paid in higher household bills.
The Gilets Jaunes movement of 2018 began with a fuel tax that was, objectively, a reasonable climate policy instrument. It triggered national paralysis because it landed on a population that had no financial margin to absorb it and no political confidence that the revenues would be spent on their behalf rather than on Macron’s priorities. What we are seeing in 2026 is a successor movement born of the same structural mismatch: governments that have expanded the state’s promises without expanding its capacity to deliver them efficiently, and populations that are losing faith in the state’s competence to serve ordinary interests.
The looting is not revolutionary consciousness — it is a sign of civic breakdown, and treating it as such matters. Societies in which property destruction is routinely excused as authentic protest end up having less property and less protest, because the institutions that make civil society possible get ground down. The moderate French right and the sensible centre need to hold the dual position that the grievance is legitimate and the method is not — and that the path through requires structural economic reform, not larger subsidies funded by further borrowing from a bond market that is already eyeing France’s debt trajectory with alarm.
The broader European context is telling. This is not a French problem alone. Belgium, Italy, and Portugal are seeing simultaneous unrest. The common factor is not any particular government’s policy — it is the combination of persistent post-pandemic inflation, energy market disruption, and the accumulated erosion of trust in technocratic institutions that promised stability and delivered uncertainty. The European Central Bank’s rate-rise cycle killed inflation at the cost of growth; governments that borrowed heavily during COVID now face both constrained fiscal space and angry electorates. The pressure valve is the street, because the institutional channels — parliaments, parties, unions — have lost their credibility as genuine representatives of working-class interests.
What to watch
Watch the French government’s response: whether Macron’s successor administration moves toward punitive crackdown, emergency subsidies, or structural negotiation will reveal which model of European centre governance can still hold. Watch bond markets — if French spreads over German Bunds widen materially, it will signal that markets are pricing in the fiscal cost of political instability. Watch whether the European Commission attempts any coordinated response, or whether Brussels reverts to institutional silence. And watch the hard right across Europe: Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National, the AfD, and their equivalents have been building precisely on this kind of systemic frustration, and uncontrolled street violence tends to move voters toward order rather than revolution.
— J