Europe's riot season and the disorder beneath

A week after violent protests gripped Paris and the surrounding banlieues, Italy announced it would deploy 500 troops to Milan after looters ransacked luxury boutiques in one of Europe’s wealthiest cities. In Marseille, authorities braced for renewed disorder after earlier protests gave way to what local officials described as “apocalyptic” scenes. French police, according to the interior minister, effectively “lost control” of several city centres at the height of the unrest. Vinted, the secondhand clothing platform, was forced to block French looters from listing stolen goods for resale online. A historic town hall was set alight; a suspect has been arrested. What began as a localised French political crisis has become a Europe-wide test of social cohesion.

The received wisdom

The sympathetic left-liberal account situates these events within a long arc of structural injustice. Decades of deindustrialisation, housing unaffordability, concentrated unemployment in peripheral estates, and the daily indignities of racial profiling have produced a combustible situation that political elites have refused to address honestly. In this reading, the rioters — predominantly young, predominantly from immigrant communities — are not criminals to be suppressed but symptoms of a society that has failed to integrate on the terms it promised. Al Jazeera noted the divided reactions among PSG fans amid Paris riots, reflecting the genuine social fracture beneath the surface. The deployment of soldiers in Milan is treated by this school of thought as an authoritarian overreaction that will deepen grievances without resolving them. The correct response, in this framework, is investment, recognition, and reform — not suppression.

This analysis contains enough truth to be taken seriously. The banlieues were never adequately resourced after the 2005 riots. French secularism as practiced has often functioned as an instrument of cultural condescension rather than genuine inclusion. Italian cities have absorbed significant migration without building the social infrastructure to match. These are real failures.

A different read

Yet the received wisdom, however much it captures structural causes, struggles to explain the specific character of this disorder. Looting luxury boutiques in Milan is not a political statement; it is organised theft. Burning a historic town hall is not protest; it is the destruction of a community’s own civic heritage. The speed with which stolen goods appeared on Vinted — a platform used across Europe — suggests networks of coordination that go beyond spontaneous rage. A genuine movement for social justice does not require e-commerce platforms to suspend their services.

The more uncomfortable reading is that two distinct things are happening simultaneously, and conflating them is intellectually dishonest. There are legitimate grievances about economic exclusion. There is also a subset of actors exploiting that grievance cover to engage in straightforward criminality, often organised along ethnic or gang lines that both governments and progressive commentators are reluctant to name. France’s problem is not simply that it has failed to integrate immigrants — it is that several decades of progressively less selective immigration policy, combined with welfare systems that subsidised residential segregation rather than dispersal, created communities where state authority has attenuated and parallel loyalties have strengthened.

The Italian dimension is newly significant. Italy’s deployment of 500 troops to Milan means that the Italian government, led by the post-fascist right, will now be able to frame its immigration and policing positions as vindicated by events in a way that the centre-left cannot easily rebut. The political beneficiaries of European disorder are consistently not the parties of the poor but the parties of the anxious majority. Every burned car and looted boutique is a vote for whoever promises order first.

There is also a question about democratic accountability that rarely gets asked. France’s and Italy’s governing elites have presided over these conditions for decades, across governments of both left and right. If the institutions that are supposed to aggregate and respond to popular grievance have failed — and they manifestly have — then the disorder is partly a consequence of elite unresponsiveness. But the solution to democratic deficit is not burning things; it is building durable political representation for the people the system has failed. That requires leadership within affected communities willing to take on both structural racism and the nihilism of criminal gangs — a combination that is scarce.

What to watch

The critical variables are the Italian parliamentary response and the French government’s autumn budget. If Italy’s Meloni government uses this moment to push through harder detention and deportation legislation, it will set a template that other European governments will face pressure to follow. Watch whether Macron attempts to outflank the right by making law-and-order concessions, as he has tried before, or whether he finally grasps that order without economic reform simply defers the next explosion. The spread from Paris to Marseille to Milan in a single week suggests something more than local contagion: it suggests common underlying conditions across Northern European urban zones. If Stockholm or Brussels experiences similar events before winter, the framing of these as French peculiarities will become untenable.

— J