Russia signalled this week that it was willing to resume peace talks with Ukraine and the United States, following a visit from Trump envoy Steve Witkoff to Moscow. Within hours of that announcement, missiles struck Kyiv, killing and wounding civilians in residential districts. The juxtaposition was not subtle. The Kremlin had, in the space of a single news cycle, offered an outstretched hand to Washington and a clenched fist to the Ukrainian capital. BBC correspondent Steve Rosenberg, reporting from Moscow, concluded that the US diplomatic push “offers little hope for imminent Ukraine peace”, noting persistent gaps between what Trump’s team wants and what Vladimir Putin is actually prepared to concede. Zelensky, for his part, remains at loggerheads with Trump despite what Washington describes as “new optimism.”
The received wisdom
The dominant framing in liberal foreign-policy circles holds that diplomatic engagement with Russia, however painful, is the only realistic path to ending a war that has now entered its fifth year. On this reading, the Witkoff visit and Russia’s conditional agreement to resume talks represent genuine, if fragile, progress. Critics of continued Western military support argue that Ukraine cannot win outright, that prolonging the war merely extends suffering, and that Trump’s pressure on Kyiv to negotiate — however clumsily applied — is ultimately a corrective to a Biden-era policy that gave Ukraine enough weapons to bleed but not enough to prevail. If Moscow is at the table, the argument runs, it should be taken seriously.
There is something to this. Wars do end in negotiations, and eventually both sides will have to make concessions that feel politically impossible today. The diplomacy-first instinct is not inherently naïve.
A different read
The problem is that Russia’s behaviour on October 21st, 2026 — signalling openness to talks in the morning and firing on Kyiv by evening — is not an anomaly. It is a pattern. Throughout the entire conflict, Moscow has used pauses in fighting, prisoner exchanges, and peace-process gestures as operational cover: to resupply, reconsolidate, and reset. The 2014–2015 Minsk agreements, signed under Franco-German sponsorship and hailed at the time as a diplomatic breakthrough, were used by Russia to rearm the Donbas separatists and entrench positions that made the 2022 full invasion easier to execute. The lesson the West consistently fails to absorb is that Russian negotiating signals and Russian battlefield intentions are different categories of information.
The timing of the latest missile strike is instructive precisely because it was so brazen. Putin is not trying to hide the contradiction; he is broadcasting it. The message to Washington is: I will talk to you, but I will not stop. Pressure Ukraine to concede, or watch the bombing continue. That is not a good-faith opening. It is coercion dressed as diplomacy.
What makes this moment particularly consequential is that Trump genuinely wants a deal — perhaps more than any US president since the early Clinton years wanted to end the Bosnian war. That hunger for a headline agreement creates real leverage for Moscow. The Kremlin has studied Trump’s psychology carefully. It knows that he needs a win he can announce at a rally, that he has limited patience for the grinding details of any serious security arrangement, and that his instincts tilt toward visible gestures over durable structures. Russia is offering just enough of the former to forestall the latter.
The historical parallel that comes to mind is not Minsk but rather the 1938–1939 period, when Hitler’s willingness to appear at the conference table was repeatedly mistaken for a disposition toward settlement. That comparison is deliberately dramatic, and I do not make it lightly — Putin is not Hitler, and contemporary Ukraine is not Czechoslovakia in every respect. But the structural dynamic is eerily similar: a revisionist power using the language of diplomacy to extract territorial concessions from a coalition whose members disagree about how much they are willing to pay to stop the aggressor.
The right-of-centre foreign-policy tradition — Thatcherite, Reaganite, Kissingerian in its hardest-nosed moments — has always insisted that deterrence and negotiation are complements, not alternatives. You negotiate from positions of strength, not desperation. Witkoff arriving in Moscow without a credible military threat to back his words is not diplomacy; it is a supplication. The administration’s simultaneous signals that it is considering further military aid reductions to pressure Kyiv undermine whatever modest leverage Washington might otherwise bring to the table.
None of this means talks should never happen. Eventual negotiations are inevitable. But the sequencing matters enormously. An agreement reached while Russia is actively shelling the Ukrainian capital is not a peace deal — it is a surrender document with diplomatic formatting.
What to watch
- The next Witkoff visit: whether any formal ceasefire precondition (even a partial, localised one) is attached to resumed talks will be the tell. If not, Russia has paid no price for the Kyiv strike.
- Zelensky’s room for manoeuvre: his public defiance of Trump’s pressure is politically necessary at home but financially precarious. Watch whether US military resupply slows in October or November.
- European coalition coherence: France and Germany have diverged on Ukraine policy before. Macron’s current domestic difficulties (see: riots, foreign-meddling accusations) reduce his bandwidth for Ukraine leadership precisely when it is most needed.
- Russian information operations: any resumption of “peace talks” will be accompanied by a surge in Russian influence efforts aimed at Western electorates ahead of European elections in 2027.
— J