Brent crude oil rose above $117 a barrel on 23 October 2026, reaching a five-month high as markets priced in the possibility of renewed US and Israeli military action against Iran. US diplomats were instructed to leave Saudi Arabia amid escalating Houthi attacks, a standard precautionary measure that nonetheless sent clear signals about the assessment of regional risk. European and Middle Eastern foreign ministers convened urgently to warn Washington and Jerusalem against strikes that could ignite a broader regional conflict. A tanker strike in the region had already washed oil onto UAE beaches, a vivid physical reminder that energy infrastructure vulnerability is not merely a market abstraction. Meanwhile, Secretary of State Rubio turned to a small Indian town as Washington scrambled to find alternative oil supply amid high prices — an illustration of the scrambled geography of America’s energy relationships.
The received wisdom
The progressive-multilateralist case runs as follows: the West has spent decades propping up authoritarian Gulf regimes and providing Israel with unconditional military and diplomatic cover, and is now reaping the predictable harvest of that arrangement. Iranian nuclear ambitions were containable under the JCPOA framework; the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the deal in 2018 — and subsequent administrations’ failure to credibly restore it — created the conditions for today’s crisis. Dialogue, not military strikes, is the only path that doesn’t risk a regional catastrophe. High oil prices hurt ordinary consumers worldwide, and the populations least responsible for geopolitical decisions bear the heaviest burden.
This argument captures something real. The JCPOA’s collapse did accelerate Iran’s enrichment programme. Military strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities — even if tactically successful in the short term — carry serious risks of regional escalation, Houthi intensification across the Red Sea corridor, and Iranian retaliation against Gulf allies whose stability is integral to global energy supply. European caution here is not mere timidity; it reflects a sober reading of second-order consequences.
A different read
The problem with the multilateralist framing is that it treats the current situation as the product of a policy failure — the wrong decisions made at identifiable moments — rather than as the expression of an underlying structural reality: Iran has, for forty-five years, been an expansionist revisionist power that has used every period of Western diplomatic engagement as cover for capability development. The JCPOA, for all its genuine merits as a near-term constraints mechanism, did not alter Iran’s fundamental strategic orientation. It bought time. Time was used — by Iran to continue its proxy network expansion from Yemen to Lebanon to Iraq, and by the West to persuade itself that engagement was producing transformation.
At $117 a barrel, the energy security consequences of Western policy choices are no longer abstractions. The UK is already grappling with inflation and borrowing at a year-long high ahead of a Budget, and a further oil price surge triggered by Middle East escalation would detonate those already-fragile fiscal calculations. European households, many of whom are still paying elevated energy bills following the Russia-Ukraine supply disruption, face the prospect of another energy shock at precisely the moment when central banks have only partially unwound the inflationary damage of the last.
The right-of-centre argument here is not enthusiastically pro-strike. It is pro-deterrence — which is a meaningfully different thing. Deterrence requires the adversary to believe that the costs of provocative action exceed the benefits. When Iranian proxies can sink tankers in the Strait and shell Saudi facilities with Houthi drones while Tehran faces no direct consequence, deterrence has plainly failed. The question is whether limited, targeted military action restores deterrent credibility or triggers the escalatory cascade that the Europeans fear. History offers precedents in both directions: Israeli strikes on Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981 and Syria’s Al-Kibar facility in 2007 achieved their tactical objectives without regional conflagration. The Iranian case is more complicated — deeper capabilities, more sophisticated proxy networks, stronger public nationalist sentiment — but the Osirak precedent is not nothing.
Rubio’s appeal to India for alternative oil supplies is a revealing data point. It suggests that Washington is at least partially aware that any strike scenario requires a prior plan for energy market consequences — that you cannot simultaneously threaten Iran and assume Gulf supply remains uninterrupted. Whether the administration has actually done that planning is, based on its track record of strategic preparation, a question that deserves a genuinely worried answer.
What to watch
- Whether the oil price sustains above $115 or retreats — a sustained high signals market belief that strikes are genuinely probable, not merely rhetorical.
- The content of any emergency UN Security Council session, and specifically whether China (a major Iranian oil customer) signals any deterrent interest in restraining Tehran.
- Houthi attack frequency and target selection over the next two weeks — escalation in Red Sea corridor attacks would represent Iran testing Western resolve directly.
- Any reported movement of US carrier strike groups toward the Gulf — operational positioning is more reliable as an intent signal than White House statements.
— J