The White House announced the lifting of tariffs on some Canadian goods on 23 October 2026, a move timed with conspicuous precision to the approach of the midterm elections. The Guardian reported explicitly that the exemptions were designed to bolster the re-election prospects of Senator Susan Collins of Maine, whose state has deep economic ties to the Canadian market — forestry, seafood, tourism — that have been directly damaged by the tariff regime. Simultaneously, US consumer sentiment hit a near-record low before the elections, with economic anxiety — much of it traceable to elevated prices downstream of tariff costs — registering as a significant voter concern. NPR reported that Ohio’s rural voters may prove decisive in Senate control, with agricultural communities that initially supported Trump’s trade nationalism now quietly calculating the costs against the benefits they were promised.
The received wisdom
The Democratic and mainstream economic critique of Trump’s tariff policy has been consistent and, on the core empirical questions, substantially correct. Tariffs are a consumption tax. American consumers and businesses pay them, not the foreign exporters against whom they are nominally directed. The Peterson Institute for International Economics, the Congressional Budget Office, and virtually every mainstream economic forecast have confirmed that the net effect of the Trump tariff programme on American household purchasing power has been negative. The targeting of Canada — the US’s largest trading partner, a fellow NATO member, a country that has not engaged in the unfair trading practices that justify WTO remedies — was particularly difficult to justify on economic-nationalist grounds, and the midterm rollback implicitly concedes as much.
The received wisdom also notes the obvious hypocrisy: if Canadian imports were genuinely threatening American industry, you don’t lift the tariffs six weeks before an election to save one senator’s seat. You defend the policy on its merits.
A different read
Fair enough — but the hypocrisy critique, while satisfying, does not quite reach the most interesting question, which is what the tariff reversal reveals about the structural logic of Trump-era trade policy more broadly.
Trump’s economic nationalism was never, at its intellectual core, primarily about comparative advantage or efficient resource allocation. It was a political project aimed at reconstructing the coalitional geography of American politics — specifically, at convincing the working-class Midwest and rural communities that had been economically dislocated by three decades of trade liberalisation that there was a political force willing to name their displacement and act against it. The tariffs, in this reading, were expressive politics as much as economic policy. They said: your pain is real, it has identifiable causes, and someone in power is taking your side.
The problem, which the Collins manoeuvre illustrates perfectly, is that expressive politics makes for incoherent governance. You cannot simultaneously signal nationalist solidarity with Ohio steelworkers and quietly carve out exemptions for Maine lobstermen. You cannot maintain that Canadian trade is predatory while lifting restrictions when a Senate seat is at risk. The political economy of selective tariff enforcement — which is what the Trump administration has practised from 2017 onwards — invariably collapses into a system of administered favours, in which politically connected industries and electorally important states receive relief while the costs are borne by less organised constituencies.
The deeper conservative critique of this pattern — which gets less attention than it deserves — is that it represents exactly the kind of managerial, top-down economic intervention that free-market conservatism has long opposed when practised by the left. Industrial policy administered through executive discretion, with outcomes determined by political calculation rather than market signals or legislated rules, is bad governance regardless of whether it wears a nationalist or a progressive label. Consumer sentiment near record lows suggests that voters are beginning to make this calculation themselves — that the expressive solidarity of tariff announcements has not translated into the economic improvement that was promised.
The Ohio rural voter story is worth watching closely. Agricultural communities have historically been the most natural constituency for free trade within the Republican coalition — they sell globally, they buy globally, and they understand in their bones what a trade war costs. If those voters are peeling away from Trump-style trade nationalism, it suggests that the political project’s economic contradictions are finally becoming electoral ones.
What to watch
- The Collins race result and whether the tariff reversal measurably moved her polling in Maine — this will set the template for how the next administration uses trade policy as electoral leverage.
- Ohio Senate results and rural voter turnout patterns — a Republican underperformance in rural Ohio would signal that trade nationalism’s political shelf life is shortening.
- Whether Canada responds to the selective rollback with its own selective retaliations, which would expose the fragility of the bilateral relationship further.
- Any signal from the administration about post-election tariff policy — whether the Maine exemption is made permanent or reversed after the votes are counted.
— J