More than a million Lula da Silva supporters flooded the streets of São Paulo on election eve, while Jair Bolsonaro drew his own vast crowds in Rio. Polls showed the two men virtually tied, making Sunday’s runoff the most consequential Latin American election in a generation. Brazil — the world’s fifth-largest country by population, the largest economy in the southern hemisphere, and home to the Amazon basin that climate scientists treat as a planetary lung — goes to the polls with its institutions, its press freedom, and its democratic settlement itself in open question. Whatever the outcome, this election will define the arc of Latin American politics for years.
The received wisdom
The standard framing from most international commentators is straightforward: this is democracy versus authoritarianism. Lula, the veteran left-wing former president who spent time in prison on corruption charges later overturned, represents a return to institutional normalcy — a Brazil that rejoins the Paris climate agreement, rebuilds alliances with Europe, and reins in deforestation. Bolsonaro, by contrast, is cast as the southern hemisphere’s Trump: a conspiracy theorist who spent years undermining confidence in Brazil’s electoral system, who oversaw record Amazon destruction, and who has repeatedly implied he might not accept a defeat. On this reading, a Bolsonaro victory would deepen democratic backsliding, embolden authoritarian populists worldwide, and hand the Amazon over to agribusiness and miners.
This framing is not wrong. Bolsonaro’s attacks on the electoral courts were reckless, and his management of the pandemic — which killed over 700,000 Brazilians — bordered on criminal negligence. The international concern is earned. Guardian reporting on the election-eve rallies captures the genuine fervour on both sides, and the civilisational stakes feel real to millions of Brazilians.
A different read
But the simple democracy-versus-autocracy framing obscures something important about why Bolsonaro commands roughly half of Brazil’s electorate, and why dismissing those voters as dupes or fascists will not help whoever wins govern a deeply divided country.
Lula served two terms from 2003 to 2010 during a commodities boom that allowed him to reduce poverty substantially through the Bolsa Família programme. That achievement is real and lasting. But his Workers’ Party (PT) presided over one of the largest corruption scandals in democratic history — the Petrobras “Car Wash” investigation that eventually snared hundreds of politicians, businessmen, and party officials across the spectrum. Lula himself was convicted, imprisoned, and only later rehabilitated by courts that ruled the original judge had been biased. His supporters see a judicial coup; his critics see a man who escaped accountability on a procedural technicality.
Bolsonaro’s voters — many of them evangelical Christians, small farmers, military veterans, and middle-class Brazilians who saw their savings erode under PT-era inflation — did not vote for him despite his crudeness, but in many cases because of it. They saw in his contempt for the media, for NGOs, for international climate bodies, a man who would not be managed by the same technocratic and progressive establishment that had, in their view, governed Brazil for a generation and left them behind. Brazil’s changing working class is a genuine political phenomenon, not a mirage of false consciousness.
Historically, this pattern is familiar. In every case from Viktor Orbán’s Hungary to Rodrigo Duterte’s Philippines to AMLO’s Mexico, the backlash populists draw on genuine grievances — about corruption, about elite capture, about the hollowing out of national sovereignty by supranational bodies — that the centre-left fails to address because it is too comfortable with the institutions that generate those grievances. The right answer to Bolsonaro is not to pronounce his voters deplorable, but to understand that Lula’s PT must demonstrate, in office, that it can govern cleanly and that its internationalist agenda will improve the lives of Brazilians who do not live in São Paulo or attend climate conferences.
The Amazon question is real but also more complicated than the global commentary suggests. Brazil contains roughly 60% of the Amazon, but the forest spans nine countries. Deforestation accelerated under Bolsonaro, but it also accelerated under previous governments when soy and cattle prices were high. The drivers are economic incentives as much as ideology. A Lula victory will slow destruction; it will not stop it without structural changes to commodity markets that are largely set in Chicago and Rotterdam, not Brasília. The battle for the Amazon is ultimately a battle over who absorbs the economic cost of conservation — and until wealthy nations are willing to transfer real money, not pledges, to compensate Brazilian farmers for not clearing land, no president will solve it.
There is also the question of what happens if Bolsonaro loses narrowly and refuses to accept the result. His four years of undermining the electoral courts have primed his base to see fraud in any defeat. The Brazilian military, which Bolsonaro has cultivated carefully, would face a moment of choice. Institutions will be tested in ways they have not been since the end of the 1985 dictatorship. The world should be watching the days after the vote as closely as the vote itself.
What to watch
- The margin: A narrow Lula victory is more dangerous than a wide one. Watch for Bolsonaro’s response in the first 48 hours and whether he concedes clearly or equivocates.
- Military posture: The Brazilian armed forces’ statement (or silence) after the result will tell you more about institutional health than any court ruling.
- Amazon deforestation data: INPE, Brazil’s space agency, publishes near-real-time deforestation data. A meaningful decline within Lula’s first year would signal genuine policy change, not just rhetoric.
- Commodity prices: Global soy and beef markets will shape Brazilian land-use decisions regardless of who wins. Watch the Chicago Board of Trade as much as the Palácio do Planalto.
— J