Israeli forces this week demolished homes and displaced more than 2,000 Palestinians in the Hebron area of the occupied West Bank, in what the government described as a security operation following the killing of two Israeli soldiers. The operation included the razing of an entire neighbourhood and the imposition of a full lockdown on the occupied West Bank. Al Jazeera reported that more than 2,000 people were forced from their homes. The Guardian described Israeli soldiers razing a neighbourhood. Simultaneously, thousands of Israelis rallied against Netanyahu’s government days before Tuesday’s national election — an election that, depending on the outcome, could determine whether the current government’s maximalist approach in the West Bank intensifies or moderates.
The received wisdom
The progressive and international-left framing is immediate and largely consistent: the Hebron operation is collective punishment, a war crime under the Fourth Geneva Convention, timed to shore up Netanyahu’s right flank before the election by demonstrating strength. The demolitions — which affect not only the family of suspected attackers but entire neighbourhoods — punish hundreds of civilians for the acts of individuals. International humanitarian law prohibits this explicitly. The scale of displacement (over 2,000 people in a single week) represents an acceleration of what human rights organisations have documented as a long-running campaign of settler expansion and Palestinian displacement in the West Bank that continued even during the Gaza operations. Critics further argue that this approach radicalises the next generation of Palestinians and creates the very security threats it claims to address.
The Guardian’s analysis of Israel’s election frames Netanyahu’s “greatest political trick” as surviving repeated predictions of his political demise while presiding over the worst security failures in Israel’s history.
A different read
Let me engage seriously with the Israeli security perspective before offering a different critique. The killing of two soldiers in Hebron — one of the most volatile cities in the West Bank, with a long history of Jewish-Arab violence going back centuries and a small Jewish settlement embedded in an Arab city — represents a genuine security challenge. Israel’s doctrine of deterrence has historically involved making the costs of attacks on its soldiers prohibitively high. The logic: if attackers believe their families and communities will face severe consequences, the social pressure against attacks increases. This doctrine has had genuine operational effects; Israel’s security establishment is not composed of people who operate purely from revenge impulse.
But deterrence theory has limits that the current government appears unwilling to grapple with. The empirical record of collective punishment in counterinsurgency is poor. The British experience in Mandatory Palestine, the French experience in Algeria, the American experience in Iraq and Afghanistan all point toward the same conclusion: measures that punish civilian populations beyond the perpetrators of specific acts tend to increase rather than decrease long-run insurgent recruitment. The population that is dispossessed and humiliated becomes the recruiting pool for the next generation of violence. Israel’s security services have produced classified assessments making exactly this argument — they have been overruled by political leadership.
The election timing matters here in ways that should concern anyone, left or right, who values the distinction between military strategy and political theatre. Netanyahu has spent thirty years demonstrating an extraordinary capacity for political survival. He faces multiple corruption indictments. His coalition depends on far-right partners — Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich — whose explicit programme includes annexing the West Bank and making Palestinian life there untenable. An operation of this scale, days before an election, serves political purposes that may not align with security purposes. When military operations are timed to elections, their strategic logic is contaminated.
The deeper structural problem is that Israel faces a choice it has been avoiding for decades: between a two-state solution that its current government coalition is ideologically committed to preventing, and a one-state reality in which Israel controls the lives of millions of non-citizen Palestinians without giving them political rights. The latter is not sustainable — not morally, not demographically, and ultimately not militarily. Could Israel’s crackdown influence Tuesday’s election? The honest answer is: it probably helps Netanyahu in the short term and makes Israel’s long-term problem worse.
There is something worth naming on the right that is often left unnamed: a conservatism that takes seriously national security and Jewish historical memory can simultaneously hold that the Hebron demolitions are strategically counterproductive, legally indefensible, and bad for Israel’s long-run interests. Support for Israel’s right to exist and defend itself does not require endorsing every operation conducted under that right’s banner.
What to watch
- Election result: Whether Netanyahu’s coalition retains its majority or the opposition produces a coalition large enough to form a government will shape the West Bank trajectory for years.
- International Criminal Court: The ICC’s ongoing proceedings against Israeli officials; any new arrest warrant applications would intensify the diplomatic fallout from operations like Hebron.
- Settler violence: Watch whether the settler movement — emboldened by ministerial support — escalates attacks on Palestinian farming communities in the West Bank during and after the election period.
- US position: The Biden administration condemned previous demolitions in language that was rarely followed by action; watch whether any new administration maintains even the rhetorical objection.
— J