The Fed holds and inflation's political bill grows

The Federal Reserve announced on Wednesday that it would leave its benchmark interest rate unchanged at 3.75–4 percent, even as U.S. inflation continues to run above target. Markets had anticipated the hold; investors widely expect the central bank to begin a cautious easing cycle before the end of the year, though the timing depends on incoming data. The decision comes as the Trump administration is heading toward midterm elections with an economic problem that one analyst has described as “strangely familiar” — persistently elevated prices that voters feel directly in energy, food, and caregiving costs, despite headline GDP figures that look relatively robust. A new AARP study released this week found that caregiving out-of-pocket costs have risen roughly 60 percent in five years — a figure that compounds the broader affordability narrative.

The received wisdom

The standard progressive-Keynesian framing holds that the Fed has been too slow to cut: that rates at 3.75–4 percent, maintained well past the point of peak inflation, are now the primary obstacle to growth, not inflation itself. The argument draws on the observation that some inflation indicators have moved toward target while the job market remains relatively resilient — suggesting the medicine is stronger than the disease requires. There is also a political dimension to this reading: the Fed, by holding, is effectively choosing to keep credit conditions tight during an election cycle, which functionally advantages whoever benefits from economic dissatisfaction. The progressive inference is that the Fed’s nominal independence masks a structural bias toward hawkishness that protects asset holders and punishes wage earners.

This framing has the virtue of partial truth. Rate-sensitive sectors — housing affordability in particular — are genuinely under stress, and there is credible evidence that the cost-of-living pressure felt by ordinary households has not been as responsive to rate moves as traditional models predicted. The “vibecession” phenomenon — where sentiment is worse than macro indicators imply — is real, and the Fed’s holding pattern does not relieve it.

A different read

But the cut-now argument assumes the inflation problem is more solved than the data support. The Fed’s reluctance to ease is not, at current readings, evidence of ideological hawkishness or political manipulation. It is evidence that policymakers are looking at an economy where goods inflation has eased but services inflation — particularly in housing, insurance, and healthcare — remains sticky. Cutting rates now, before services inflation has demonstrably broken, risks reigniting the broader inflationary dynamic that took most of 2022 and 2023 to bring partially under control.

The deeper problem is fiscal, not monetary. What the Fed cannot say explicitly but what its models clearly reflect is that U.S. fiscal policy — running sustained deficits of over five percent of GDP — is itself inflationary. The federal government is spending significantly more than it collects, pumping demand into an economy that is already running near capacity. No central bank can fully neutralise the inflationary effect of a government that refuses fiscal consolidation; the best it can do is keep rates high enough that credit conditions partially offset the demand stimulus, at the cost of making borrowing expensive for households and businesses that never voted for the deficit.

This is the trap that Jerome Powell and his successors have been in for several years: serving as the effective adult supervision for a political class that has, across both parties, decided that deficit spending is electorally costless. Donald Trump’s biggest economic problem, as the BBC’s economic analysis notes, closely resembles the problem that defined Joe Biden’s presidency — which is precisely what one would expect if the underlying fiscal architecture has not changed. The script changes; the structural conditions do not.

There is a historical lesson here from Paul Volcker, whose 1979–82 disinflation is the canonical central bank success story. Volcker succeeded not merely because he raised rates to punishing levels, but because — eventually — the political class accepted the fiscal discipline that gave monetary tightening room to work. Reagan’s deficit expansion partially undermined Volcker’s work, but not fatally, because the private sector was deleveraging at the same time. The current moment is different: the private sector, while not in bubble territory on all measures, is not deleveraging at a scale that offsets continued public-sector expansion.

The Fed’s hold is therefore not irresponsible — it is the only tool available to an institution whose mandate is price stability, applied as well as it can be in an environment where the primary source of inflationary pressure is beyond its remit. The frustration is legitimate; the target of that frustration is misidentified when it lands on the Fed rather than on the Congress that controls the fiscal lever.

What to watch

The October CPI reading, due in November, will be decisive. If services inflation shows a genuine downward move, the case for a December cut solidifies considerably. If it is flat or rising, the hold-through-year-end scenario becomes central.

Watch the political pressure on the Fed chair. In an election cycle, the temptation to demand easier money is bipartisan — presidents of both parties have wanted cheaper credit before polling day — and any overt political pressure on Powell will itself become a market signal.

The midterm campaign’s economic messaging will be a useful proxy for whether either party intends to address the fiscal root of the problem. If “cut rates now” is the whole programme, the structural picture does not change regardless of which party wins.

Finally, the global dimension: if other major central banks — the ECB, the Bank of England — move toward easing faster than the Fed, the dollar strengthens, which helps contain import prices but hurts U.S. exporters. The Fed’s decision is never made in an economic vacuum.

--- J