Netanyahu's election gambit tests Israeli democracy

Israel’s election results, finalized on October 29, produced a political stalemate that the country has seen many times before — but with an unprecedented twist. Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud bloc fell short of the 61-seat majority required to form a government, with the opposition led by Gadi Eisenkot and Yair Lapid appearing to have a narrow path to power if they can bring Palestinian-Arab parties into a coalition. Rather than acknowledge the result, Netanyahu’s Likud party moved swiftly to allege foreign interference — specifically accusing Qatar of funding operations that boosted Arab-Israeli turnout — while Netanyahu himself circulated an AI-generated image on social media purportedly showing Arab voters queueing in implausible numbers. Israeli police, the opposition, and Qatar all dismissed the claims as fabricated. The question now is whether Israel’s institutions are robust enough to survive a sitting prime minister’s attempt to nullify an unfavourable result.

The received wisdom

The mainstream liberal reading of these events is sympathetic: Netanyahu is a man of enormous political skill who has governed Israel for longer than any other prime minister and who now faces the prospect of losing power — and, relatedly, facing trial on corruption charges that have hung over him for years. From this vantage point, his behaviour is entirely predictable. A cornered politician, the argument goes, will reach for whatever tool keeps him in office. The interference narrative, the AI-generated imagery, the attacks on Arab parties as illegitimate actors — these are the desperation moves of a man who knows the game is nearly up. The hopeful reading is that Israel’s Supreme Court, its independent press, and its professional civil service will hold the line as they did against his 2023 judicial overhaul attempt. Democratic backsliding, in this account, has a natural immune response.

A different read

That optimism may be too comfortable. What Netanyahu is doing is not merely tactical — it is a foundational challenge to one of democracy’s most basic premises: the legitimacy of votes cast by citizens of minority communities.

The claim that Arab-Israeli voters represent a form of foreign penetration is not new in Israeli political discourse, but it has rarely been made so explicitly by a serving prime minister. Netanyahu’s Likud charged that Arab-led parties “stole” the election through Qatari money, framing a legal election in which 1.7 million Arab-Israeli citizens participate as something closer to an occupation. The logic, once admitted, is corrosive: if the votes of a minority can always be retrospectively delegitimised when they produce inconvenient results, then those citizens have no real political standing.

The parallel to watch is not Germany 1933 — that comparison is almost always overwrought — but Hungary after 2010. Viktor Orbán never needed to steal elections outright. He needed only to change the rules, the media landscape, and the public vocabulary of what counted as legitimate politics. His model has been extensively studied by scholars of democratic erosion, and the playbook is recognisable: delegitimise the opponent’s coalition, delegitimise the process, then offer yourself as the only figure who stands between the nation and its enemies — including its internal ones.

Israel’s situation has a further specific complication that the Orbán comparison obscures. The country is fighting a multi-front war; its population is exhausted, traumatised, and divided between a security-first constituency that views the conflict as existential and a peace-coalition constituency that believes the military approach has become its own catastrophe. Into that fracture, Netanyahu is driving a wedge. The opposition’s potential coalition requires Arab-Israeli participation, and Netanyahu’s framing is designed to make that participation politically toxic — to force secular centrists to choose between forming a government with Arab partners or being branded as stooges of Hamas.

That manoeuvre may yet fail. Israeli civil society proved in 2023 that it has genuine reserves of democratic energy — the mass protests against judicial reform were among the largest in the country’s history, sustained over months against a government that showed every sign of wanting to wait them out. The difference now is that those protests happened in peacetime, relative to what Israel has experienced since October 2023. Whether citizens have the bandwidth for another sustained democratic defence, while also managing the psychological and physical toll of ongoing war, is genuinely uncertain.

There is also a question about the international context. The United States under the current administration has been notably ambiguous about democratic norms elsewhere, as its posture toward Brazil’s election results illustrated. Washington’s willingness to push back on a friendly government’s democratic backsliding has historically been a crucial backstop. That backstop may now be less reliable than at any point since the Cold War.

What to watch

  • Coalition arithmetic: Whether centrist parties like Yesh Atid and National Unity will explicitly accept Palestinian-Arab party support, and whether the Joint List’s leadership decides to offer it. That decision will determine whether a governing alternative to Netanyahu is even arithmetically viable.
  • Supreme Court engagement: Israel’s top court has shown willingness to rule against government excess; whether it takes up challenges to the interference narrative quickly matters enormously.
  • Street pressure: Protest movements that mobilised against judicial reform in 2023 have shown they can sustain campaigns. Whether they re-mobilise around this specific challenge will signal the state of civil democratic energy.
  • International diplomatic signalling: Watch whether the EU and the Biden-successor-era Democratic establishment in Washington make any explicit statement supporting the integrity of the Israeli ballot count, which would matter both symbolically and practically for Netanyahu’s cost-benefit calculation.

— J