Two headlines arrived in close succession this week that, read together, tell a more interesting story than either does alone. First: Trump has signalled progress on an Iran deal, with Tehran pushing for an accelerated ceasefire framework. Second: oil prices have fallen on hopes of a breakthrough to end the Iran war. The sequencing matters. The market moved on diplomatic signals before any agreement was signed, any terms were published, or any verified de-escalation occurred on the ground. Meanwhile, Gulf states are facing urgent pressure to rethink their trillion-dollar defence postures in light of the conflict’s unexpected trajectory, according to a new report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies. And in the background, negotiators remain braced for the worst over US-Iran talks to reopen the Strait of Hormuz — the waterway through which roughly 20% of global oil supply passes. The diplomatic picture is, in other words, simultaneously more hopeful and more fragile than any single headline suggests.
The received wisdom
The optimistic mainstream reading: Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy, whatever its many deficiencies, creates openings for deal-making that more ideologically constrained administrations close off. The original JCPOA — the Obama-era nuclear deal — was unpopular on the American right precisely because it was multilateral, long-form, and embedded in a broader diplomatic architecture that limited US flexibility. A Trump deal with Iran, if it happens, will be bilateral, transactional, and focused on near-term deliverables: sanctions relief in exchange for verifiable weapons limitations and Hormuz reopening. That is a narrower objective than the full JCPOA restoration that progressive diplomats sought, but a narrower objective that is actually achieved may produce more durable results than a comprehensive framework that gets repudiated the moment the next administration takes office.
The oil market’s response — prices falling on deal signals — also supports the case that the economic incentives on all sides are aligned toward a settlement. Iran’s economy has been severely damaged by sanctions; the Gulf states are absorbing defence costs they did not budget for; and the United States, heading into a midterm election with petrol prices as a voter concern, has an obvious domestic political interest in a Hormuz reopening.
A different read
The optimistic reading is plausible, but the history of this particular diplomatic file counsels significant scepticism.
Iran has now experienced three cycles of diplomatic engagement — under Obama, under Trump’s first term, and potentially again now — and has consistently used negotiations to buy time, generate sanctions relief, and advance its nuclear programme incrementally. The IISS report on Gulf defence implicitly acknowledges this pattern: the Gulf states’ need to “rethink” their defence postures is a consequence of discovering that American extended deterrence has more conditions attached to it than their purchasing of US arms and basing rights had led them to believe. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and others spent decades treating US security guarantees as a permanent feature of the strategic landscape. The events of the past year suggest those guarantees are more contingent than previously understood.
The Hormuz dimension is particularly important because it illustrates the asymmetry at the heart of any deal. Iran’s leverage in the current negotiation derives almost entirely from its demonstrated willingness to threaten and disrupt Hormuz passage — leverage that disappears the moment a deal is signed and the strait reopens. Once that leverage is surrendered, Iran’s ability to extract further concessions diminishes sharply. This creates a structural incentive for Tehran to delay final agreement, to demand additional concessions in the final stretch, and to preserve ambiguity about the terms. Negotiators’ caution about “bracing for the worst” reflects hard-won experience with exactly this dynamic.
There is also the nuclear question, which the Hormuz and ceasefire framing tends to marginalise. The underlying Western interest in any Iran deal is not merely the price of oil; it is the prevention of Iranian nuclear weapons capability, which would permanently transform the strategic balance in the Middle East and likely trigger a regional proliferation cascade. A deal that reopens Hormuz, reduces oil prices, and earns Trump a diplomatic headline without actually constraining Iran’s enrichment programme would be, from a nonproliferation standpoint, worse than the current impasse — because it would provide sanctions relief that accelerates the programme while creating political conditions that make future pressure harder to sustain.
The right-of-centre foreign policy tradition, at its best, has always insisted on clarity about what a deal actually achieves versus what it symbolises. Henry Kissinger’s realpolitik was unsentimental about this: the question was never whether an agreement looked good in a Rose Garden signing ceremony but whether it changed the underlying balance of incentives in a durable way. Applying that standard to the current Iran signals suggests celebration is premature.
The falling oil prices also carry a political risk that is rarely noted: they reduce the domestic economic pressure on Western governments to reach a deal, while simultaneously reducing the revenue Iran needs to fund its economy. The market has, in other words, done some of the work that a deal would do — which marginally reduces the urgency for both sides to accept terms that might otherwise be necessary.
What to watch
- Nuclear enrichment data: Whether International Atomic Energy Agency verification of Iran’s enrichment levels is included in any framework as a precondition, not an afterthought.
- Gulf states’ hedging: Whether Saudi Arabia and the UAE signal support for a deal or continue their quiet diplomacy with Beijing — the China-brokered Saudi-Iran rapprochement of 2023 is a template that some Gulf capitals may prefer to the US-mediated version.
- Congressional approval: Any deal with meaningful sanctions relief will face scrutiny from a US Congress that may look very different after today’s midterm results.
- Oil price stability: Whether prices stabilise at levels that sustain both deal momentum and sufficient economic pressure on Iran to maintain negotiating incentives.
— J