Israel’s president Isaac Herzog has begun formal consultations with party leaders after the country’s most recent Knesset election produced another inconclusive result. Herzog warned politicians publicly that “not every commitment and promise can be fulfilled” if Israel is to avoid being dragged into a fifth — or sixth — election within as many years. The deadlock is a product of the familiar arithmetic of Israeli coalition politics: Benjamin Netanyahu’s bloc commands enough seats to prevent a rival coalition from forming, but not enough to govern without the ultra-Orthodox Haredi parties whose demands — on military service exemptions, on budget allocations for their yeshivot, on matters of religious law — have become increasingly difficult to reconcile with the governing needs of a country under sustained military and economic pressure. Palestinians and Israelis alike are watching the American midterm results for signals about what a Democratic-influenced Congress might mean for US policy toward the conflict, adding an international dimension to an already fraught domestic calculation.
The received wisdom
The liberal reading of Israel’s political dysfunction locates its source in Netanyahu’s deliberate destruction of the political centre and in the corrosive effects of judicial reform legislation that has eroded institutional checks on the executive. There is also a war-context argument: a country fighting a multi-front conflict — residual operations in Gaza, the northern front with Hezbollah, the shadow war with Iran — cannot afford a governing vacuum, and Netanyahu’s willingness to risk one in the service of his own political survival and legal troubles is, on this reading, a betrayal of national interest in favour of personal interest. The international credibility argument is equally powerful: an Israel that cannot form a stable government is an ally of reduced utility, and the optics of democratic deadlock sit poorly alongside the country’s self-presentation as the Middle East’s only functioning democracy.
This critique has genuine purchase, and it is shared across a surprisingly broad coalition of Israelis — including many who would not describe themselves as left-wing.
A different read
The structural explanation for Israel’s deadlock, though, goes deeper than any individual’s manoeuvres, and it has lessons that extend beyond the country’s particular circumstances. Israel’s proportional representation system, designed to ensure that small parties can enter the Knesset, has produced a legislature so fragmented that meaningful majority coalitions are nearly impossible to sustain across the full term of a government. This is not Netanyahu’s creation, though he has exploited it with considerable skill. It is a feature of democratic systems with very low electoral thresholds — Israel’s threshold is just 3.25 percent of the national vote — that prioritise representation over governability. The Haredi parties that hold the balance of power are not a Netanyahu creation; they are the predictable product of a system that rewards demographic concentration and ideological homogeneity in small communities.
Compare Israel’s experience to that of other proportional systems that have managed similar pressures. Germany’s 5 percent threshold has historically produced more governable coalitions, though the rise of the AfD has strained that model. New Zealand’s mixed-member proportional system has generally delivered functional governments. The difference is not merely the threshold; it is also whether there are large enough centrist parties capable of absorbing the costs of coalition compromise. Israel’s political landscape, carved up by the trauma of the judicial reform crisis and the war, now lacks such a centre. What remains is a series of parties defined more by what they will not accept than by what they will.
The war dimension cannot be separated from the political one. A country that has been in some form of military confrontation continuously since October 2023 has undergone the kind of psychological mobilisation that makes political compromise feel like betrayal. The restriction of medical treatment for over 1,100 child amputees in Gaza — documented by NGOs as a consequence of Israeli restrictions on medical evacuations — illustrates how the war’s conduct has generated a set of international legal and moral entanglements that will outlast any particular government and will need to be addressed by whoever eventually forms one. A government formed under pressure, with contradictory coalition promises, and without a mandate for the hard choices that peace negotiations would require, is not the instrument for that task.
Herzog’s admonition that “not every promise can be fulfilled” is the most politically honest thing an Israeli official has said in months. Whether the party leaders he is addressing are capable of hearing it is another question.
What to watch
The key indicator is whether Netanyahu can assemble a coalition without the most maximalist Haredi demands — specifically the military exemption question, which has become a flashpoint of public anger as secular Israelis bear disproportionate combat burdens. Watch also for the Democratic Congress’s first moves on Israel-related legislation: a newly empowered House majority that includes progressive members elected partly on Gaza-related platforms will almost certainly push for conditions on military aid, which will complicate both Israeli coalition formation and the Biden-era baseline that parties have been calibrating against. And watch Herzog: an Israeli president who speaks this plainly about political dysfunction is either unusually courageous or unusually desperate, and distinguishing between the two matters.
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