The Bank of England raised its base rate to 4% on Thursday — the first increase in more than three years, up from 3.75% — with eight of nine Monetary Policy Committee members voting in favour. Governor Andrew Bailey was at pains to frame it as a conditional, cautious move: the hike “shouldn’t be seen as the first in an inevitable long sequence,” he said, while simultaneously warning that further rises were likely unless the US-Iran war was resolved. The Bank now forecasts inflation peaking at 4.9% in mid-2027, returning to its 2% target only by 2028 — and in an adverse scenario, where the conflict escalates and drives oil prices higher, it warned inflation could reach 6.2% in 2027. For the 510,000 tracker mortgage holders, the immediate arithmetic is a £31 monthly increase in repayments. For those on variable rates, similar pain. The pound rose to its highest level since the Brexit referendum, a reflection of market relief that the Bank was at last responding to inflation rather than hoping it would resolve itself.
The received wisdom
The Bank’s decision was, on the surface, the textbook response to supply-side inflation. Energy prices are rising because of a war the UK did not start and cannot end. The Bank cannot solve that problem. But it can prevent the second-round effects — energy price rises feeding through into wages, wages feeding through into prices, expectations becoming unanchored — that turn a supply shock into a structural inflation problem. The mainstream view, articulated by MPC member Clare Lombardelli, is that there is “likely to be a case for a further increase in rates in the near term.” The pound’s rise suggests markets broadly agree. And the human stories are real: Patrick Bryson, a guitar teacher from Brighton, faces a jump in monthly mortgage repayments from £1,420 to £1,680 from February as his five-year fixed deal ends. His experience — cutting wine, stopping takeaways, reviewing every subscription — is being replicated across millions of British households. The Bank, in this reading, is doing the responsible thing: prioritising long-term price stability over short-term borrowing comfort.
A different read
The responsible thing, and yet. Andrew Bailey’s framing — that progress requires “real progress towards settling the conflict in the Middle East” — is an admission that UK monetary policy is essentially hostage to events in the Strait of Hormuz. That is true, and in a narrow sense honest. But it obscures a more troubling domestic question: why was the Bank still at 3.75% when UK inflation was already running at 3.5% in September 2026, well above the 2% target, with energy bills scheduled to rise again in January?
The Bank’s record since the post-pandemic inflation surge has been one of persistent optimism about the transitory nature of price pressures, followed by belated adjustment. In 2022-23, when inflation peaked in double digits, the MPC raised rates aggressively but arguably too late. The lesson appeared to be learned. But the drift back to 3.75% during the period of relative calm in early 2026 — when the Bank was cutting to stimulate growth — left it with less room to manoeuvre when the Iran war sent energy prices back up. MPC member Alan Taylor’s description of Thursday’s hike as a “risk-management ‘one-for-now’ insurance hike” is an unusually candid acknowledgement that the committee is navigating by feel rather than by model.
The fiscal picture compounds the problem. Chancellor John Healey’s October budget left the UK borrowing more than anticipated, with gilt yields that the Office for Budget Responsibility privately considered uncomfortably elevated. The Bank’s rate rise will increase the government’s own debt servicing costs. Healey has insisted the slavery apology process will not cost taxpayers and has committed to the government’s spending envelope — but every 25 basis points of rate rises raises the cost of rolling over UK debt. The Burnham government came to office promising to grow its way out of the fiscal trap. The Bank’s decision is a reminder that the trap has walls the government does not control.
The deeper structural issue is one that neither the Bank nor the government can acknowledge openly: the UK’s exposure to global energy prices is, in part, a policy choice. The decision to ban new North Sea drilling — a decision John Swinney specifically criticised as damaging to Scotland — reduces domestic supply precisely when dependence on imported energy is most painful. This is not an argument for ignoring climate commitments. It is an observation that the timing and sequencing of energy transition policy has consequences for monetary policy that the Bank is now, in effect, managing through interest rates at the cost of British mortgage holders.
The Bank’s own forecasting record is worth noting. It now expects inflation not to return to target until 2028. When the Bank says 2028, experience suggests the range of uncertainty is wide. The question for British households is not whether Bailey is right about the direction — he almost certainly is — but whether the institution has the credibility and independence to hold the line if political pressure intensifies as the mortgage pain becomes general.
What to watch
Three pressure points over the next six months. First, January’s energy bill increases: if they come in at the upper end of current projections, the “adverse scenario” in the Bank’s own modelling starts to look like a central case, and the case for further hikes strengthens materially. Second, the MPC’s February meeting, where the committee’s current division — between Lombardelli’s “further increase likely” and Taylor’s “one-for-now” — will have to resolve into a decision. Third, gilt yields: if UK borrowing costs move decisively above the levels Healey’s budget assumed, the Burnham government faces a choice between cutting spending, raising taxes, or revising its fiscal rules — a choice it has so far managed to avoid.
— J