Israel's president breaks with Netanyahu

Israel’s President Isaac Herzog has passed over sitting prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and tasked opposition leader Gadi Eisenkot — a former IDF chief of staff and leader of the centrist Yashar party — with forming the country’s next government. The move follows inconclusive elections in which no single bloc won a commanding majority, yet Eisenkot appears to have assembled a coalition wide enough for the president to hand him the mandate. Netanyahu’s Likud remains the single largest party, but his path to a majority hinged on ultra-Orthodox and far-right partners whose conditions proved unacceptable to several centrist kingmakers. The outcome, still subject to a confidence vote in the Knesset, would represent the most significant shift in Israeli leadership in fifteen years and the first time since 2021 that Netanyahu has been excluded from government formation.

The received wisdom

Most international commentary has greeted the Eisenkot mandate as an unambiguous democratic corrective — a long-overdue pruning of an incumbent who survived multiple corruption trials and led Israel through the bruising Gaza campaign that reshaped regional alliances. Progressives and centrist liberals on both sides of the Atlantic argue that Eisenkot, a decorated soldier with a reputation for strategic sobriety and measured judgment, represents the kind of professional-class technocrat that modern democracies need: someone who will restore multilateral credibility, re-engage with the Abraham Accords partners on a more sustainable footing, and walk back the judicial overhaul legislation that provoked mass protests in 2023. The NPR headline captures the dominant framing: normalcy returning, the long Netanyahu era closing.

This reading is not dishonest. Eisenkot is respected across party lines in Israel precisely because his military career conferred a legitimacy that transcends ideological labels. The American midterm results — which weakened Republicans who had been Netanyahu’s most vocal stateside allies — removed a diplomatic safety net that had cushioned some of Israel’s more controversial moves. The alignment of domestic and international pressure is real.

A different read

And yet history counsels against treating leadership changes as transformative cures for structural dilemmas. Netanyahu has been removed before — in 2021, his ouster produced a rotation coalition under Naftali Bennett and then Yair Lapid that lasted barely a year before collapsing under the weight of its own internal contradictions. The Israeli political system’s proportional representation rules, combined with the outsized leverage of small parties, creates a chronic instability that no single statesman can dissolve by force of personality. Eisenkot faces the same arithmetic.

The deeper issue is geopolitical, not personnel. Israel’s security situation has changed irrevocably since October 2023. Hamas’s military capacity in Gaza has been degraded but not destroyed; Hezbollah retains its northern arsenal even after the Lebanon campaign; and Iran’s nuclear programme continues to advance along a timeline that Israeli intelligence estimates at months rather than years to threshold status. These are constraints that Eisenkot — who, as IDF chief, oversaw the “Octopus Doctrine” of striking Iranian assets across the region — understands viscerally. The man is not a dove in the Western liberal sense. He has authorised more targeted killings than most European defence ministers have approved sorties.

The assumption that a post-Netanyahu government will automatically be more accommodating to Palestinian aspirations or more deferential to the International Court of Justice rests on a category error: conflating governing style with strategic imperatives. Israel’s security establishment, regardless of who occupies the prime ministerial chair, will not accept an Iranian nuclear weapon, will not abandon its right to counter-proliferation strikes, and will not withdraw from the Jordan Valley absent ironclad security guarantees. Eisenkot himself has stated as much publicly and on the record.

What is genuinely different — and this matters — is the prospect of judicial reform legislation being shelved, which would restore a degree of rule-of-law credibility. Israel’s domestic institutions suffered real damage under the previous coalition’s push to curb Supreme Court oversight. A government that reverses those measures would strengthen the democratic fabric that underpins everything else. There is also the question of coalition composition: a centrist government that excludes Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich from the security cabinet would remove two of the most inflammatory actors in recent Israeli governance, men whose rhetoric actively undermined the Abraham Accords and alarmed even sympathetic Gulf interlocutors.

Historical parallels are instructive. West Germany’s transition from Adenauer to Erhard in 1963, from de Gaulle to Pompidou in 1969 — in each case the successor inherited the strategic framework of his predecessor while adjusting its tone and diplomatic register. The structure endured; the style evolved. We should expect something similar in Jerusalem. The US midterm results that tipped several pro-Netanyahu Republicans out of Congress may matter more symbolically than substantively: a changed American congressional mood does not alter the fundamental calculus of Iranian enrichment or Hezbollah rockets.

The right-leaning case for welcoming an Eisenkot government is not that it will be softer — it is that competent governance and institutional legitimacy actually serve Israel’s long-term security interests better than the maximalism of the Ben-Gvir era, which provided propaganda victories to Israel’s enemies at negligible strategic gain. Stability, rule of law, and allied credibility are themselves security assets. On that narrow but real ground, the transition is welcome.

What to watch

  • Whether Eisenkot can secure a stable Knesset majority without requiring the ultra-Orthodox parties, whose coalition conditions have repeatedly blown up centrist governments
  • The pace of any judicial reform reversal — this is the clearest indicator of whether institutional repair is genuine or cosmetic
  • Iran’s response: a new Israeli government that signals restraint could invite nuclear acceleration if Tehran reads it as strategic hesitation
  • Washington’s posture — with Trump ordering fresh strikes on Iran even as Eisenkot prepares to take office, the question of Israeli-American coordination on the nuclear file will define the new government’s first hundred days

— J